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Law and Economics: The 'hidden' rationale for unfair dismissal 
Jonathan Wood 
Statutory unfair dismissal legislation has been around since 1971 1, yet 34 years on the 
core principles and rights remain unchanged, still suffering from a lack of credibility 
and certainty. There is much confusion and unhappiness from both sides as to how 
decisions are made and how a balance between the interests of employers and 
employees is to be struck. There seems to be little certainty as to the application of 
justice in dismissal, with employer and employees alike feeling aggrieved. The 
seeming lack of coherence in the judiciary's approach results in damage to the 
legislations certainty and credibility. 
This thesis will suggest a new way of looking at unfair dismissal, one that provides 
coherency and consistency. It will look in depth at the most contentious problem areas 
and sustained criticisms associated with the legislation, before suggesting that a 
rationale can be brought to the judiciary's approach when reference is made to the 
doctrine of Law and Economics. It will seek to show that the principle of efficiency is 
highly influential in judicial decision making and that this can be traced to a law and 
economics ideology. The basics of the doctrine of law and economics will be 
explained and an example of it in action will be given. This it is hoped will provide 
the reader with enough information to be able to engage with a law and economics 
analysis of the contentious areas of unfair dismissal in the subsequent chapters. 
1 Industrial Relations Act 1971, now found in the Employment Rights Act 1996 
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The thesis will suggest the Band of Reasonable Responses Test is not an unruly beast 
as it is controlled by efficiency. Building on this it will show how the rise in the use of 
Some Other Substantial Reason can be understood in a similar way. The thesis will 
then address the problems pertaining to job security and remedies and seek to answer 
the critics by showing what the legislation originally intended and that the judiciary's 
approach is rooted in efficiency. Lastly it will deal with the growing calls for the 
common law action of wrongful dismissal to be used to remedy the inherent weakness 
in the unfair dismissal statute. Using law and economics it will be shown why this is 
not in the interests of efficiency and therefore is unlikely to occur, whilst further 
buttressing the contention of the thesis that law and economics is at the root of the 
judicial approach to dismissal. 
The thesis will seek to bring a fresh perspective into a debate which whilst remaining 
contentious has become stuffy and stagnant with regard to realistic suggestions for 
reform. It does not seek to offer comment on the correctness of the judiciary's 
approach or suggest any radical reforms. It seeks to bring a fresh understanding of a 
hidden rationale which can be seen to encapsulate the judicial approach to dismissal 
and further stimulate debate which will enable proponents of change to explore other 
avenues. 
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Chapter 1 - Dismissal and the Economy 
'Employment law requires a balancing of interests of employers and employees, 
with proper regard not only to the individual dignity and worth of the employees but 
also to the general economic interest. Subject to observance of fundamental human 
right, the point at which this balance should be struck is a matter for democratic 
decision. '2 
Introduction 
1.1 A legitimate private hobby 
Should a legitimate private hobby done outside of work hours constitute a valid 
reason to dismiss? What if, in the opinion of the employer, the hobby harms the 
business? Should the employer be allowed to interfere with employment status 
because of activities in an individual's private life? 
Mr Pay found himself facing this situation in 2001 3. He had been employed as a 
probation officer for Lancashire Probation Service for 18 years and was well regarded 
for his work with sex offenders. In 2000 the Probation Service became aware of Mr 
Pay's role as a director of an internet company specialising in the selling of products 
associated with bondage, domination and sado-masochism. Furthermore he also 
performed a fire act4 in hedonist and fetish clubs. Pictures were available of him in 
this guise on the Internet and the employer took the view that these were in the nature 
of soft pornography. The employer dismissed him for misconduct, stating his 
activities were incompatible with the role of any probation officer. The employers 
2 Per Lord Hoffman- Johnson v Unisys Ltd [2001] IRLR 279; para 37 
3 Pay v Lancashire Probation Service [2004] IRLR 129 
4 Which the tribunal held was not offensive and had been performed at Office open days 
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were particularly worried about the impression that might be given to victims of the 
offenders who Mr Pay would be working with and feared confidence in the probation 
system may be undermined as a result. 
Mr Pay claimed unfair dismissal, arguing that Articles 8 and 10 the Human Rights 
Act 1998 (that is the right to a private life and freedom of expression) meant that 
when an employer was deciding whether to dismiss, the decision had to be 
'reasonable' in light of taking into account the Human Rights protection. He 
contended that this had not happened, that the decision was not 'reasonable' and 
therefore he had been unfairly dismissed. 
The tribunal in the case held that Article 8 was not engaged because the information 
about his activity was on the Internet and therefore in the public domain. They also 
held that there had been no 'unjustified' interference with Article 10 because 'a 
probation officer must expect to have some limitation on his freedom of expression. ' 5 
This left the tribunal with the task of having to decide whether the dismissal was fair, 
in line with the 'Band of Reasonable Responses Test' (herein after "BORRT''). The 
tribunal held that because of the issue surrounding the protection of public 
confidence, the employer had acted within this band of reasonable responses and 
therefore it could not say the decision was unreasonable. This decision was held to be 
correct at the appellate tribunal. 
5 ibid at page 130 
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The underlying reasoning of the Tribunals was that there was a legitimate 'pressing 
social need for the [employer] to dismiss [Mr Pay]iiin order to avoid undermining 
public confidence in the Probation Service. Whilst the justification for this approach 
can be understood, it is important not to miss the very tangible sense of injustice Mr 
Pays must feel. Could it not be just as persuasively argued that there is a pressing 
social need to protect the legitimate private interests of individuals? 
Mr Pays lost his source of income and all the associated trappings because in the 
Tribunal's opinion other employers could have behaved as the Probation Service did, 
regardless of whether the action was "fair". Losing ones job as a result of a private 
legal hobby because there is a reasonable chance other companies would also take a 
negative view of your activities and not have the tribunals, the supposed arbiters of 
fairness, make their own subjective opinion as to whether it was fair treatment could 
undermine faith in the application of the unfair dismissal legislation. Not simply the 
decision, but the process through which the decision is reached amplifies this 
perception of injustice and leaves a tangible dilemna: How can the correct balance 
between individual fairness and economic competitiveness be adjudicated when both 
have equally compelling yet opposed needs? 
1.2 The importance of the employment relationship 
We will return to Mr Pay's case later but in order to fully appreciate this dilemna it is 
necessary to spend a brief time contextualising the industrial environment and the 
differing pressures involved in industrial relations. This will aid our understanding of 
the complexities of industrial relations and inform any analysis. 
6 ibid at page 136 
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The importance of the employment relationship cannot be overstated. It provides the 
framework for individuals to work and it is accepted that: 
'Work is the economic motor of any society and the single most important element- not only 
in quantitative terms- of the lives of the vast majority ofpeople.' 7 
The employment relationship has developed, but perhaps not as radically as would be 
first assumed, from the Victorian8 idea of 'Master and Servant'. The fundamental 
aspects of the wage/work bargain have not changed and are still present in the modern 
employment relationship. What has changed however is the involvement that the 
employee has over the construction of the terms of the wage/work bargain. Under the 
traditional master/servant relationship, it was precisely that of master and servant. 
This meant that there was no protection for, what we now term, basic social rights. 
The rise of unions in the late 19th and early 20th Century was in part a response to this 
lack of protection against the market forces. This rise resulted in the area of the 
employment relationship (and the wider labour law) being controlled by the principle 
of collective laissezfaire9. The UK government through the process of legal 
abstention chose 
'a bare minimum of State intervention in the individual employment relation, which was to be 
regulated instead by the autonomous collective organisations.' 10 
However 'the idea of the State maintaining equilibrium between the social forces 
through legal abstention was simply a myth' 11 and as such it could not and did not 
7 MacMillan, J.K - ( 1998) Employment Tribunals: Philosophies and Practicalities; at page 55 
8 This idea can be traced back further but it was given definite judicial support in the Victorian era. 
9 An apt phrase coined by Kahn-Freund 
10 Lewis, R- ( 1979) Kahn-Freund and Labour Law: an Outline Critique; at page 209 
11 ibid at page 218 
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continue past the early 1970s. In part this was because the disequilibrium between 
unions and employers was too large, with the unions becoming too strong resulting in 
the employment relationship becoming too inflexible and expensive for employers to 
maintain, leading to a decreased demand for labour12• There was also a secondary 
need to intervene because of the United Kingdoms obligations to international labour 
treaties and as time has continued, to the European Community labour directives and 
1 . 13 regu at10ns . 
The Government intervention into this abyss of statute started in 1965 through the 
introduction in of the Redundancy Payment Act and then the very influential 
Industrial Relations Act in 1971. This Act has proved to be the foundational source of 
employment protection since its inception, but there is much criticism of its 
effectiveness14. Its aim was to give individuals rights in order to protect their position 
in the employment relationship, the most prominent being the right to not be unfairly 
dismissed. This meant that they did not have to rely on trade unions to bargain for 
protection. Fundamentally it aimed to equalize the individuals bargaining 
disproportion in order to give some level of job security15 to the individual and 
through this allow stability in the employment relationship through increased mobility 
and flexibility 16• Throughout the 1980's, 1990's and this decade there has been an 
increasing amount of statutory regulation enacted, much of it designed to protect the 
individual employment relationship 17• 
12 See for example- Ewing, KD - ( 1990) Economics and Labour Law in Britain: Thatcher's radical 
experiment 
13 Davies, P and Freedland, M- (1993) Labour Legislation and Public Policy; at page 25 
14 For example Hepple says it has fallen into "disrepute' amongst academics: ( 1992) The rise and fall 
of Unfair Dismissal 
15 Job security is an ambiguous phrase which we will attempt to define in chapter three 
16 See Davies and Freedland (1993); at page 194 
17 For example the 1980's saw a large amount of regulation over the conduct of trade unions, 
culminating in the Trade Union and Labour Relations (consolidated) Act 1992. 1998 saw the 
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The employment relationship is to many individuals about more than simply 
monetary gain. 
'A worker can come to treat his job as a valuable possession: Apart from the income it yields, 
it can provide personal satisfaction, enhanced personality, and a source of companionship 
through shared work experience.' 18 
A job can give an individual, dignity, worth and purpose. Indeed society places much 
value on being in employment. The converse result of this societal judgement is that 
unemployment can lead to social problems; on an individual level of feelings of 
failure and depression and on a collective level, social depravation and crime. 
The employment relationship is also vitally important for the economy; it is the 
driving force behind a stable State. Employment fundamentally means income and 
subsistence for individuals. This relieves the burden on the Welfare State and also 
contributes to its upkeep through the payment of taxes. A thriving employment sector 
is indicative of the State having a flexible and skilled workforce which is efficient and 
able to be competitive both nationally and globally, thus bringing more investment 
into the economy. This can have the further effect of leading a drive to innovation, 
which naturally leads to greater expertise and increased demand. Put simply, a crucial 
building block in a State's economic well-being is the employment relationship. 
It is appropriate to look a little more in depth at the role and pressures on the 
employment relationship from the perspective of economy. 
introduction of the Working Time Regulations and 2002 saw a new Employment Act. Despite this, 
Tony Blair was still able to boast in the seminal white paper, Fairness at Work that the UK still had the 
most lightly regulated labour market of all leading economy countries. 
18 White, P.J- (1984) Unfair Dismissal legislation and property rights: some reflections; at page 98 
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1.2.1 The role of employment in the economy 
There are various actors who all have legitimate yet often diametrically opposed 
concerns when it comes to defining the role of the employment relationship in the 
context of the economy. The first major actor is the employer. Without them, there 
would be no framework for the production of goods or supply of services, no 
investment and ultimately no jobs. Their major concern is over the cost of 
employment. This includes wages, statutory liabilities (for example annual paid leave) 
and the ability to hire and fire at will. In order to be competitive they want to reduce 
as much of the externality cost19 as possible. 
The second major actor is the employees themselves. Without them there would be 
no labour, hence no production or supply of services. Their primary concern is to be 
paid a fair wage and to be protected from the inequality in the operation of market 
forces. They see their value as more than a commodity or a factor in production. 
Thirdly there is the Government. They have the difficult task of facilitating economic 
growth and stability whilst ensuring adequate social protection. It is not in the 
Government's interest to have businesses which are uncompetitive due to high 
employment cost (often as a result of regulation) yet it does not want to be saddled 
with the large social costs of unemployment or industrial unrest if employers can 
utilise their much larger bargaining power to the detriment of worker interests. 
The fourth actor has a small role, yet the role it plays ensures there is greater 
prominence given to the employee than there would be if it were not involved. It is 
19 That is cosl which is not directly related to the manufacturing process 
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the trade unions which are concerned with giving a collective voice to individuals in 
order to try and readdress the balance in the bargaining position between the 
employee and employer. They are not the force they used to be with only 29.1%20 of 
the UK workforce being a member of a trade union, but with the creation of 'Super 
Unions' 21 they still have a considerable influence in some areas. The aims of trade 
union's aims are to attain the best possible terms for their members and to ensure they 
are treated fairly. They have a number of tools available to 'cajole' employers into 
listening with the most severe being full industrial action. Industrial action can have 
major repercussions both for the employer and the State's economy as the 'winter of 
discontent in 1978' bares testament22• Their influence can also be undesirable because 
it can act as a distortion in the free market and some have argued that ultimately 'they 
are the chief cause of inefficiency, poverty and unemployment'. 23 
This leaves us with a hypothetical model framework that places the employers on one 
side and the employees and trade unions on the other and the government in the 
middle attempting to keep a foot in both camps in order to appease everyone. But 
whose interests should they give greater value to? Is there an ideal and efficient 
solution which can bring about the dual goals of fairness and competitiveness? 
Economists suggest the employment relationship can be viewed as an economic 
model in order to find the ideal balance. Economic analysis can however be divided 
20 Labour Force Survey 2004 -DTI 
21 For example the amalgamated public service union Unison has over a I million members 
22 A more recent example is that of the sympathy strike by baggage handlers who worked for British 
Airways in August 2005. Despite the strike being in support for workers sacked from a different 
company and only lasting 48hrs it is estimated it will cost the company £40 million in short-term loss-
Daily Telegraph 04110/05 
23 This is the view of Hayek in Clark, J and Lord Wedderburn -(1983) Modern Labour Law: Problems 
functions and policies; at page 135 in Labour Law and Industrial Relations: Building on Kahn- Freund 
eds Clark, J, Lewis, P and Lord Wedderburn 
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into two traditions of discourse; that of Institutional and Welfare analysis. An 
institutional (sometimes referred to as a positive) economic analysis 'deals with 
objective or scientific explanations of the working of the economy. '24 The aim of 
institutional economics is to explain how society makes economic decisions and with 
this knowledge be able to: 
'Judge the usefulness of a model by its ability to predict outcomes and behaviour more 
accurately or at least better than any competing theory. ' 25 
Welfare economic analysis (also commonly referred to as a normative analysis) on the 
other hand is concerned 'not with description of how the economy works but with how 
well it works. '26 This in essence means that welfare economics is concerned with the 
goals of allocative efficiency, the identification of situations where efficiency is not 
achieved and prescribing alternative corrective solutions. 
It has been said of their interrelationship that: 
'Positive economics can be used to clarify the menu of options from which society must 
eventually make its normative choice.' 27 
As such both branches of analysis could be useful in our analysis of the unfair 
dismissal from an economic perspective and it is appropriate to bear their differing 
attributes and roles in mind when considering an ideal model. 
Essentially an ideal model is one where the market forces have enabled the market to 
be Parito-efficient. This is where both parties are at an impasse where it is impossible 
24 Begg, D, Fischer, Sand Darnbrusch, R - (2003) Economics; at page II 
25 Veljanovski, C- ( 1980) Economic approach to Law: A critical introduction; at page 165 
26 Begg, Fischer and Darnbrusch, (2003); at page 257 
27 Ibid at page 13 
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to reallocate resources without making one party worse off. The market has reached a 
point where it has fulfilled its maximum potential for the balance. It can be argued 
that under certain conditions this will come about: 
'If every market in the economy is a perfectly competitive free market, the resulting 
equilibrium throughout the economy will be Parito-efficient.' 28 
This is essentially a formalising of Adam Smith's radical Invisible Hand which 
suggested that under a free market the results were guided by the 'invisible hand' to 
be for the social good. But it must be noted that this is only true under 'certain' 
conditions. The nature of those 'conditions' also relates to the value judgements the 
Government makes as to whose interests should be of greater value when reaching the 
point of balance. 
The overriding desire of a Government should be to implement policies that 'are just 
as desirable on economic grounds as they are social grounds '29 and one way of 
advancing towards this is for the labour market to be at a level of equilibrium 
employment with a stable economy. This means; making sure no party has too strong 
an influence, encouraging individuals to seek work30, giving incentives to companies 
to employ increased staff and increase productivity31 . Equilibrium employment is 
where the demand for labour is met equally by the supply, but it is important to point 
out that equilibrium employment does not necessarily mean that each individual 
business is at its most efficient, it is the total labour force which is at equilibrium. 
28Ibid at page 259 
29 HC Debs 711 [26.4.65] 37, during a discussion on the Redundancy Payments Act 1965 
30 The current Labour governments policies of Welfare to Work and Making Work Pay are good 
examples of this. 
31 This is often in the form of tax incentives or loans but these actions result in the market no longer 
being an entirely free enterprise. This is due to interference from the Government trying to coax a more 
socially and economically desirable state of affairs. 
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Balancing all these pressure is not an easy task; the Government therefore has to face 
the challenge of: 
'How to reconcile the various demands upon [it] in relation to industrial society, within a 
framework of reasonably acceptable, democratic, representative and humane labour law.' 32 
The role the employment relationship plays in the economy and the lives of 
individuals cannot be overstated. The overriding tension of fairness versus 
competitiveness permeates through every aspect of the employment relationship 
because it is of such fundamental importance. "Labour is not a commodity" yet its 
very nature means it is offered in wage/work bargain; It is intrinsic to society that 
labour is traded as a resource or commodity in some form. It is an oversimplification 
to say the employee wants full protection and a fair wage whilst the employer wants 
to get the labour as cheaply as possible. The reality is much more complicated. 
Employees will often be prepared to accept higher wages in return for a decrease in 
their social rights protection and the more socially minded and astute employers will 
be fully aware of the advantages in treating a workforce well as there is a corollary 
productivity increase. It would seem that understanding economic perspectives aids 
understanding of what is best for the State because it provides a framework from 
which one can make value judgements about how best the State can flourish and how 
fairness should be balanced with competitiveness. 
1.3 Statutory Regulation 
These pressures leave an extremely complicated path for the government to walk if it 
is to find the most efficient model to promote. We have noted that due to the 
32 Collins, H- (2003) Employment Law; at page 4 
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inequality of bargaining power simply leaving it up to market forces has not worked 
satisfactorily33 . The next question then is, has statutory regulation brought about a 
correct balance between fairness and competitiveness? 
The neo-classic institutional economist would say very clearly that statutory 
regulation of any sort would not be in the interest of the employer. It will provide 
extra cost, which will in tum diminish competitiveness. Collins aptly sums up this 
view in saying: 
'For firms to survive and prosper in modern global markets ... what is needed is not mandatory 
labour standards, but rather deregulation of labour markets, thus permitting employers to 
discover the more productive use of labour power.' 34 
Those who believe regulation can actually benefit business can persuasively counter 
this viewpoint. The Government for example have stated that: 
'Employers have shown that establishing decent standards is consistent with and can 
contribute to competitive business.' 35 
Collins also supports this viewpoint saying that the labour market needs regulation in 
order to achieve efficient outcomes36. He further states: 
'The dominant objective [of regulation] is to improve the competitiveness of businesses so 
that they may survive and prosper in an increasingly global economic system. ' 37 
33 See page 4 
34 Collins, H, Ewing, KD and McColgan, A- (2001) Labour Law: texts and Materials; at page 38 
35 Department of Trade and Industry, Employment Relations Bill. Regulatory Impact Assessment, Feb 
1999, paragraph 15 
36 Collins, Ewing, McColgan (2001); see page 49 
37 Collins, H- (2001) Regulating the employment relation for competitiveness; at page 18 -This 
article provides excellent insight into the issue of regulation and competitiveness and takes the 
discussion much further than the scope of this thesis will allow. 
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This argument might seem far removed from business reality for the employer who is 
facing a situation where they would like to dismiss a worker but feels they cannot 
because of the fear of exposing themselves to financial liability. But it can be 
contended that because of the threat of liability, the employer will take greater care in 
his hiring decisions and this could be the catalyst for increased innovation and 
efficiency. This is exemplified in the viewpoint of Kahn-Freund38 who saw the 
introduction of protection for individuals from unfair dismissal and the introduction of 
redundancy payments as being in the 'national interest in order and efficiency' 
because it removed resistance to dismissals which were 'necessary for efficiency and 
labour mobility. ' Davies and Freedland take an even stronger view suggesting that: 
'[Regulation] may contribute to the efficiency of enterprises, and best contribute to the 
creating and maintaining of a successful social and political economy. ' 39 
Statutory regulation divides opinions with critics and suitors both being convinced of 
the correctness of their viewpoint. The area is so contentious that we must take great 
care must be taken when looking at regulation and its effect because: 
'We cannot separate sharply between legal regulation designed to enhance competitiveness by 
encouraging flexible employment relations and legal regulation designed to ensure fairness at 
work.' 40 
1.4 Unfair Dismissal- the popular claim 
Having seen how important employment is both to individuals and to the economy 
and how the Government has tried to balance fairness with competitiveness, we can 
now tum our attention to how dismissal is managed and just as importantly viewed by 
38 See Lewis, R ( 1980); at page 214 
39 Davies, P and Freedland, M- (2000) Employees, Workers and the Autonomy of labour law; at page 
270 in 'The legal regulation of the employment relation' eds Collins, H, Davies, P and Rideout, R 
40 Hugh Collins quoted by Kilpatrick, C- (2003) 'Has new labour reconfigured employment 
legislation?'; at page 161 
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the law and the parties involved. In order to understand the lack of coherency in 
dismissal law it is pertinent to get a flavour of where the dissatisfaction stems from. 
Unfair dismissal remains the most popular statutory claim in tribunal applications, 
being responsible for 37%41 of all claims in 2004. This pattern seems to have 
prevailed since the introduction of the statutory right in 1971 in the Industrial 
Relations Act. Unfair dismissal is an important barometer for society of the level of 
employment protection that exists, because it is at the point of dismissal where the 
most friction between employees and employers42 occurs. The process for claiming 
unfair dismissal has brought with it a perception of unfairness because many 
individuals feel the Tribunals are biased in favour of the employer. The case of Mr 
Pays is one recent case in a vast mountain of case law which can be used to illustrate 
this point. It has been correctly said: 
'In popular culture there is a widespread view that unfair dismissal legislation has become a 
tool of management behind a mask of procedure. ' 43 
Yet employers are not happy either and still cling to the argument that unfair 
dismissal hurts them and is not in their interests as it becomes an extra cost and an 
inhibiter to change due to the retention of poor and unsatisfactory staff, which 
ultimately can adversely harm the productivity of the workforce.44 
There has been much criticism by academics and laymen about unfair dismissal and 
its application by the judiciary. One only has to look back through the Industrial Law 
Journal to notice that as a general rule of thumb it carries at least one article relating 
41 Employment Tribunal Service Report 2004; at page 23 
42 And therefore fairness and competitiveness 
43 Hepple, BA- ( 1992) The rise and fall of Unfair Dismissal; at page 80 in Legal Intervention in 
Industrial Relations: Gains and Losses. Ed Mcarthy, W 
44 Emerson, M - ( 1988) Regulation or deregulation of the labour markets; at page 803 
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to unfair dismissal every issue. There is a widespread anathema towards the unfair 
dismissal legislation. Yet in the 34 years since the Act's inception, the core elements 
of the right to not be unfairly dismissed have not changed. The evidence, both 
statistical and anecdotal45 , does not seem to suggest it is working and indicates it lacks 
credibility yet no progress is being made towards change. This leads to one of three 
possible conclusions. Firstly, the legislation is working as the Government intended as 
it does not explicitly force them to declare their preference for where the balance 
should fall and therefore they are reluctant to change it and expose themselves 
politically. Secondly, there is a coherency to the legislation and the interpretation by 
the judiciary that has not been fully seen due to the inadequacies of the analysis which 
it has been subjected too. Thirdly, the Government simply has no tenable idea as to 
how to overhaul the legislation. 
This third conclusion would seem to be the most obvious fallacy. Yes an overhaul 
would be a large and difficult task, but in the past 34 years no Government has been 
timid when dealing with industrial relations. There has been a plethora of legislation 
dealing with Working Time46 , Minimum Wage47 and Parental Rights48 and that is just 
in the past 8 years. Furthermore there is no shortage of academic, judicial, employers 
association and trade union literature on how things could be improved49 and so it 
would seem unwise to conclude the lack of action is due to lack of suggestion or 
creativity. 
45 See DTI SET A Survey 2003 and 1998 which are the two most comprehensive surveys to date 
46 Working Time Regulations 1998 
47 National Minimum Wage Act 1998 
48 The Maternity and Parental Leave Regulations 1999 
49 Which would have surely provoked a consultation document 
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Advocates of unfair dismissal would dismiss the second conclusion, that there is no 
visible consistency in the decisions, by pointing towards the managerial prerogative as 
the controlling coherent rationale. They would argue that the judiciary make decisions 
within a statutory framework which gives respect for managerial autonomy and 
discretion for employer decisions which fit into a band of reasonable responses. Thus, 
whilst the result is not always agreeable to many, an internal logic does indeed exist. 
This argument also carries over into the first proposed conclusion. If the Government 
have given the judiciary a framework in which they can exercise discretion, meaning 
the regulations are not simply inflexible onerous burdens, then it would seem from the 
Government's point of view entirely advisable to not further expose themselves. They 
have, through a framework that deals with the extremes of the balance between 
fairness and competitiveness, left the ultimate arbitration of where the balance should 
fall up to the judiciary50. There is certainly something persuasive about this argument 
and it could be suggested to provide the answer as to why no serious reform has 
occurred in the past 34 years. The discretion given by the oft quoted managerial 
prerogative is the lynch pin of the unfair dismissal legislation and it would seem to 
prima facie, provide the suggested rationale for its application, thus vitiating any 
suggestion that there is no internal logic in the court's approach. 
But is this the complete picture and if it is, why is there still much dissatisfaction? By 
understanding that the managerial prerogative has a role to play in the decisions of the 
courts and tribunals can we predict with more certainty the likely outcome of cases 
and make more informed reform suggestions? The answer would seem to be no. The 
managerial prerogative is shrouded in mystery, one could even go so far as to suggest 
50 All mention of the judiciary in this thesis unless otherwise defined should be taken to include 
tribunal and appellate tribunal chairmen and wingmen. 
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it is a legal shibboleth, and this results in little understanding of the processes and 
factors influencing the judicial decision. The vagueness of the managerial prerogative 
and its 'behind-closed doors' application means we cannot confidently assess the 
balance between managerial autonomy and individual justice. This failing results in 
the area of unfair dismissal law, where employer and employee clash head on, being 
reminiscent of an uncharted minefield. 
As was noted above there has been much study of unfair dismissal and its 
shortcomings. This has been carried out from many angles51 but has still not found the 
proverbial smoking gun to give credibility to the legislation. This thesis will seek to 
take a fresh approach by subjecting some of the problematic and contentious areas of 
unfair dismissal to a law and economic analysis in order to see if new light can be 
shed on the judiciary's rationale. Law and economics is, in legal terms, a fairly new 
analytical tool which primarily has been developed in the United States of America. It 
will be explained in depth below but for now it is sufficient to say it seeks to suggest 
that decisions are not based on justice as we traditionally understand it, but on 
efficiency considerations. This analysis will seek to aid and inform some of the debate 
surrounding unfair dismissal and provide a new avenue from which reform can be 
launched due to a greater understanding of the deeper lying rationale of the policy in 
unfair dismissal. 
51 For a justice perspective Justice in Dismissal by Collins is extremely comprehensive, and Pitt's reply 
is worthy of note. From an economic perspective see Ewing and Thatcher's Radical Experiment and 
Collin's essay of corporatism and capitalism. From a collective bargaining standpoint see Hepple's 
Rise and Fall of Unfair Dismissal and Clark and Lord Wedderburn in Labour Law and Industrial 
Relations. Davies and Freedland provide a thought provoking analysis from a public policy point of 
view and Dickens and Stilgoe have both produced excellent statistical analysis of the impact of Unfair 
Dismissal law. 
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The following chapters will seek to analyse these areas with reference to law and 
economics in order to see if it is an appropriate analytical tool. 
To embark on a complete law and economics analysis of unfair dismissal is beyond 
the scope of this thesis, therefore it is proposed to concentrate on a few of the 
particularly problematic areas of incoherency, with the majority of these ultimately 
relying on the managerial prerogative as the justification for the approach taken. The 
areas chosen to be considered deal with issues prominent in academic and judicial 
literature and it is hoped they will also provide enough diversity to show law and 
economics is an appropriate analytical tool across a wide range of employment law 
issues. 
o The remainder of this chapter will provide an overview of the history of the 
unfair dismissal legislation and then introduce the tool of law and economics. 
The case of Mr Pays will then be analysed through a law and economics lens. 
o Chapter two will look at the rise of procedural fairness at the expense of 
substantive justice. Within this there will be an in-depth discussion about the 
appropriateness of 'the Band of Reasonable Responses Test' and if there is an 
internal logic and justification for its application from a law and economics 
perspective. The chapter will then turn to consider issues surrounding the 
growth in reliance on 'Some other Substantial Reason' in economic 
dismissals, which sidestep redundancy payments. 
o Chapter three looks at the issues surrounding job security and remedies. It 
counters popular academic thought that the legislation has failed in both these 
areas by stating the current situation is in line with a law and economics 
analysis. It will then look at why the judiciary have steadfastly refused to use 
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the common law to rectify any purported problems with the unfair dismissal 
legislation and will suggest that a law and economics analysis is appropriate 
across the whole field of dismissal. 
Consideration and discussion of these areas from a law and economics standpoint will 
it is hoped, bring some fresh air to what has become a stuffy debate about the way 
forward for unfair dismissal. 
It is first fitting to put into context the history and aims of the legislation before giving 
a brief overview if the core elements of unfair dismissal. If we are going to be able to 
effectively analyse the deep rationale behind the legislation it is necessary to 
understand how the law came about and what was said at the time of its creation as 
this will provide useful insight into the ideology behind the statute. 
1.5. The aims and history of Unfair Dismissal legislation 
Before 1971 termination of the employment relationship was managed with reference 
to contract and the common law. This meant for employees employed on contracts of 
indefinite termination (which was the majority) that the employer could lawfully 
terminate for any or no reason upon giving the requisite (and often short) period of 
notice. Breach of contract would only avail the claimant of damages equivalent to 
what they would have been paid in the notice period, whatever the circumstances of 
the breach. 52 As Davies and Freedland point out this was viewed as understandable 
because the low level of protection afforded to the individual employee by the 
common law principles was to be redressed through the norms supplied by collective 
52 G.de N. Clark- ( 1969) Unfair Dismissal and reinstatement; page 532 
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bargaining. 53 This reliance on the collective avenue was to prove to be the catalyst for 
the introduction of statutory protection from unfair dismissal. 
During 1964-66 there had been an average of 267 strikes a year over employment, 
suspension or dismissal of employees. 54 The obvious negative economic impact 
caused consternation in both the Government and Parliament and a speedy solution 
was sought. It was suggested by the Conservatives55 in Fair Deal at Work that: 
'Britain is one of the few countries where dismissals ... are a frequent cause of strike action .. .It 
seems reasonable to link this with the fact that Britain is one of only seven out of sixty-two 
countries covered in an ILO study where dismissal procedures are not regulated by statute.' 
Whilst this could be criticised as 'a pretty crude piece of comparative argument' 56 the 
Donovan Commission also reached this conclusion after much greater analysis. The 
Donovan Commission was set up by the Labour government in 1965 to look into a 
solution for this problem of large-scale industrial action and to see if statutory 
regulation was viable. 
The process of looking into other ways of providing protection from unfair dismissal 
had begun in 1964, when the Government announced it had accepted the International 
Labour Organisations Recommendation 119. The main thrust of the recommendation 
was that the 
'termination of employment should not take place unless there is a valid reason for such 
termination connected with the capacity or conduct of the worker or based on the operational 
requirements of the undertaking establishment or service.' 
53 Davies and Freedland (1993); at page 25 
54 figures quoted in Hepple ( 1992) 
55 Who came into government the following parliamentary session 
56 Davies and Freedland (1993); page 200 
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The Government referred the ILO recommendation to the National Joint Advisory 
Council57 ("NJAC") who were tasked with deciding how to proceed with it. Two 
years later they reported that whilst the common law was not sufficient to provide 
adequate remedies for termination of employment as detailed in ILO recommendation 
119, it was advisable to seek redress through enhancement of the current voluntarist 
procedures. They felt regulation would undermine the development of voluntary 
procedures, which were advantageous because they were 'simple, inexpensive and 
quick.' 58 
The Donovan Commission published its report in 196859 and disagreed with the 
conclusion of the NJAC. It was heavily influenced by the ILO recommendation 119 
and proposed to adopt its definition of termination, stating that an employer would 
have to show a dismissal was fair based on conduct or capacity otherwise it would be 
classified as unfair.60 It sought to solve the problem associated with striking over 
dismissal by bringing in a statutory remedy because in the Commissions view 'the 
right to secure a speedy and impartial decision on the justification for a dismissal 
might have averted many of these stoppages. '61 This idea was the kernel which 
influenced the desire for the Tribunals to become the one stop shop for employment 
disputes and to provide: 
'[A] procedure which is easily accessible, informal, speedy and inexpensive. ' 62 
57 Which was made up of the ministry of labour and CBI and TUC representatives. 
58 Ministry of Labour, Dismissal Procedures para 19 
59 Report of the Royal Commission on Trade Union's and Employers associations 1965-1968, Cmnd 
3623 
60 ibid para 55 
61 ibid para 528 
62 ibid para 572 
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The Commission sought to counter the NJAC argument by saying that regulation 
would actually encourage employers to adopt a fair and proper procedure: 
'[l]f employers know that employees have a right to challenge dismissal in a statutory tribunal 
then there is clear incentive for them too see that dismissals are carried out under a proper and 
orderly procedure, so as to ensure both that as many cases as possible are settled satisfactorily 
without recourse to an outside appeal and that in those cases where appeal is made it can be 
shown that the dismissal was fair and justified.' 63 
The Donovan Commission in essence said that statutory intervention was needed to 
force improved procedures and the Labour government in their White Paper the 
following year accepted this view, noting that whilst voluntary procedures were 
desirable they were progressing too slowly64 . The Donovan Commission report was 
highly influential and its recommendations formed the basis of the Industrial 
Relations Act 1971. 
It can clearly be seen that an overriding aim of the introduction of unfair dismissal 
legislation was to calm the turbulent industrial waters that were prevailing at that 
time. 
'The result was that the legislation was only partly influenced by considerations of employee 
rights: the legislation had at the very least a dual purpose of managerial efficiency and 
employment protection. ' 65 
There was a political strategy formed by both the Conservative Governments of that 
era
66 
which saw stability and the increase of efficiency obtainable through the 
63 ibid para 533 
64 In the place of strife - white paper Cmnd 3888 1969; at para I 03 
65 Deakin, Sand Morris, G- (2001) Labour Law; at page 387 
66 1971-1975 and 1979-1997 
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increase of individual rights at the expense of collective rights. This was intended to 
have the effect of minimising the need for a union and therefore undermining 
collective solidarity and a decrease in collective disputes 
But as we have briefly alluded to, political advantages were not the only reason for 
the Donovan Commission recommending the implementation of a statute to protect 
against unfair dismissal. They were in broad agreement with Recommendation 119' s 
powerful ideology. It is appropriate to quote the report at length in order to get the full 
force of its rhetoric: 
'In practice there is usually no comparison between the consequences for an employer if an 
employee terminates the contract of employment and those which will ensue for an employee 
if he is dismissed. In reality people build much of their lives around their jobs. Their incomes 
and prospects for the future are inevitably founded in the expectation that their jobs will 
continue. For workers in many situations dismissal is a disaster. For some workers it may 
make inevitable the breaking up of a community and the uprooting of homes and families. 
Others, and particularly older workers, may be faced with the greatest difficulty in getting 
work at all. The statutory provision for redundancy goes some way to recognise what is really 
at stake for an employee when his job is involved, but it is no less at stake if he is being 
dismissed for alleged incompetence or misconduct than if he is being dismissed for 
redundancy. To this it is no answer that good employers will dismiss only if they have no 
alternative. Not all employers are good employers. Even if the employers intentions are good, 
is it certain his subordinates' intentions are always also good? And even when all concerned in 
management act in good faith, are they always necessarily right? Should their view of the case 
automatically prevail over the employee's?' 67 
67 ibid para 526 
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This comprehensive summation of why unfair dismissal legislation was and is needed 
provides our departure point for looking at the reality of the legislation when it was 
enacted in the Industrial Relations Act. 
1.5.1 The legislation 
The legislation has changed very little since 1971 and is now encapsulated in the ERA 
1996. Section 94( 1) of the Employment Rights Act 1996 ("ERA") states: 
'An employee has the right to not be unfairly dismissed by his employer.' 
This right is however qualified by a number of things: 
o An employee68 who has the requisite one-year qualifying period has to show they 
have been dismissed. They then must bring a claim within three months of the 
effective date of termination. 
o The employee has to demonstrate a substantial reason for the dismissal under the 
statutory headings of misconduct, lack of capability or Some Other Substantial 
Reason. 
The tribunal will then determine whether the reason was reasonable in relation to 
Good Industrial Practice and the practice of other employers. This is more commonly 
known as the Band of Reasonable Responses Test.. 
If the dismissal is found to be unfair, the tribunals primary remedy is to order 
reinstatement or reengagement. If this is not practicable then the remedy is 
compensation. 
Compensation is split into two parts, basic and compensatory. The basic award 
mirrors the redundancy payment award and thus is calculated by reference to the 
68 Note not a worker 
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individual's weekly earnings (capped at £28069) multiplied by years of service. This 
award is capped at £8400. The discretionary compensatory award has recently been 
increased recently due to much criticism of its derisory size,70 It was £12000 in1999 
but is now capped at £56,800 
The unfair dismissal legislation has played a vital role in shaping the current industrial 
and economic climate and in the search to find the correct balance between individual 
rights and managerial efficiency. Whether this balance has been achieved is the 
subject of much contention, as we have seen above in the case of Mr Pays and also in 
the widespread criticism from many affected groups. This thesis seeks to offer a new 
analysis, using the doctrine of law and economics, to the approach of the judiciary to 
the legislation and will suggest that the balance is in fact controlled by efficiency. But 
before we can look at the justifications behind this conclusion it is pertinent to start 
with an explanation of the doctrine of law and economics and how it can be useful. 
1.6 What is Law and Economics? 
'A lawyer who has not studied economics ... is very apt to become a public enemy.' 71 
This would seem quite a blase statement; but to dismiss it straight away misses the 
insight it offers. Put simply, it recognises that the separate disciplines of law and 
economics are not poles apart and that economics can be of relevance to lawyers. It is 
perhaps appropriate at this stage to offer a definition of economics in order that we 
69 Figures correct as of Feb 2005 
70 Which was due to its failure to increase in line with inflation. 
71 Justice Brandeis- 'The living law' - Illinois Law Review [ 1916]- taken from Hirsch, W Z- ( 1999) 
Law and economics: an introductory analysis; at page I 
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depart from the same point. Hirsch states that the accepted definition of the discipline 
of economics is: 
'[T]he study of how societies use scarce resources to produce valuable commodities and 
distribute them among different groups.' 72 
Law is often the instrument used to ensure that this allocation of resources is fair and 
structured. Whilst economics is concerned wholly with what decisions are made and 
therefore the substantive rationality 73 , the law takes account of the process of how the 
decisions are made, that is procedural rationality. Whilst it will never be a totally 
harmonious marriage of ideas, both disciplines deal with providing order in society 
and can complement one another. 
Adam Smith, often referred to as the 'father of economics' seemed to suggest in his 
seminal work The Wealth of Nationl4 that law and economics were intrinsically 
linked. Campbell suggests: 
'Smith manifests one of the chief characteristics of an economic analysis of law, the idea that 
law is a means for diverting self-interested individuals towards a mutual accommodation in 
which clashes of interest are settled at least over all cost to the community, thus contributing 
to the market pursuit of maximal efticiency.' 75 
Despite this insight, the discipline of law and economics has developed only recently 
and can more appropriately be classed as an offshoot of modem neoclassical welfare 
economics76. Mainstream acceptance of a law and economics discipline in the United 
States only started to occur in the 1970's and it still continues to be a highly debated 
72 Hirsch (1999); at page 4 
73 See further Simons point of view in Vejenevski ( 1980); at page 163 
74 Published in 1776 
75 In Deakin, S -(1996) Law and Economics, in Legal Frontiers ed Thomas; at page 67 
76 ibid; at page 68 
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and controversial area of study. The precise scope of law and economics continues to 
be elusive with several offshoot theories seeking to correct some of the inherent 
problems 77 • This thesis will concentrate on what is regarded as mainstream law and 
economics theory as this will give a much better overview of law and economics role 
in unfair dismissal. Due to the uncertain nature of its scope, caused in the main by its 
relative youth and also the general unfamiliarity in the UK with law and economics, it 
is wise to inform ourselves of how and why the discipline developed so that we are 
able to judge its appropriateness as an analytical tool from a more informed 
perspective. 
1.6.1 A brief history of law and economics. 
The first major proponent of a basic law and economics theory was Ronald Coase. In 
his seminal work The Problem of Social Cost 78 Coase radically suggested that: 
'[F]rom an economic perspective it may prove rational for parties to contract around pre-
existing legal rules should those rules preclude them from maximising their resources and 
minimising their costs. 79 
With this suggestion came the assumption that the task of judges and juries in 
deciding on conflicting resources disputes is not to establish which action caused the 
harm and therefore impose liability but rather to establish which cost caused the 
activity which resulted in the harm and, from this, which party should be responsible 
for minimising costs. 80 This abstract theory is perhaps best understood by reference to 
77 A discussion of this is beyond the scope of this paper: See Duxbury, Polinsky, Leff and Campbell 
and Picciotto for a fuller discussion. 
78[ 1960] 3 Journal of Economics 1-44 (also republished in The Firm, Market and the Law- Chicago 
University Press 1988) 
79 Duxbury, N -(1991) Is there a dissenting tradition in law and economics?; page I 
80 Ibid page 2 
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the problem Coase was addressing in The problem of social cost. Deakin aptly 
illustrates Coase's purpose: 
'Coase's immediate objective was to analyse what was then a standard application of welfare 
economics, the imposition of a Pigovian tax on business enterprises responsible for causing 
uncompensated damage (such as pollution) to third parties. Pigou had argued that the state 
could increase social welfare by imposing a tax equivalent to the extent of the social cost of 
the enterprises activity. Coase shows that such intervention might not be welfare enhancing: 
the enterprise itself might suffer damage if it is effectively prevented from carrying out the 
pollution-creating activity. This assessment has to be reciprocal: the imposition of a tax would 
only lead to a net welfare gain if the costs of those injured by the enterprise exceeded the 
enterprise's costs from shutting down or relocating production.' 81 
Classical Coase theorem therefore suggests that if transaction costs are zero, then 
efficiency will be achieved regardless of which party is assigned the property right in 
a situation of conflicting issues. 
Coase's work provided the foundation for the formation of law and economics as an 
analytical tool, however it remained very much a tool in the economist's portfolio. 
Coase's work was grounded in economic and theoretical nuance82 and would seem to 
have been of much greater interest to economists than lawyers. It was not until 
Richard Posner asserted himself squarely into the debate with the publication of 
Economic Analysis of Law in 1972 that academic lawyers began to take interest. 
Posner's book dealt with providing market based solutions to a wide range of issues 
pertaining to the law. His basic premise of a doctrine of law and economics was: 
81 Deakin (1996); page 75 
82 Campbell, D and Picciotto, S- (1998) Exploring the interaction between law and economics: the 
limits of formalism; at page 255 
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'[L]egal rules and institutions should be designed to facilitate economic efficiency, that they 
should make the greatest use of competitive markets, and in the absence of such markets, 
should "mimic" what competitive markets would do.' 83 
Posner sought to promote economic efficiency through the law and this efficiency is 
best defined as equivalent to the notion of Pareto efficiencl4 • It will be remembered 
that this means a situation where no-one can be made better off without there being 
detriment to the other party. Law and economics therefore under Posner's view 
provides a guide as to how the market should act in order to achieve efficiency. 
'Guide' is the most accurate statement. The whole theory of law and economics rests 
upon the assumption of zero transaction costs but the reality is in industrial relations 
that will never happen. Hiring and firing costs money; in terms of time, initial slow 
productivity and severance pay for example. Its lack of realism could be seen as an 
inherent weakness of law and economics and one which undermines its application 
yet Posner has robustly defended this line of criticism: 
'[l]t's [sic] lack of realism, far from invalidating the theory, is the essential precondition of 
theory. A theory that sought faithfully to produce the complexity in the empirical world in its 
assumptions would not be a theory but a description.' 85 
This particular line of defence does not go anyway to helping us reconcile the 
problem zero transaction costs creates, it merely excuses it with semantics. A much 
83 Polinsky, AM- (1974) Economic Analysis as a potentially defective product; page 1657 
84 It is worthy of note that this definition of 'efficiency' is contested- whilst the majority seem to use 
Pareto as the base, Deakin suggests Posner (particularly) had in mind the definition of Kaldor-Hicks 
efficiency. This holds that an exchange is efficient if it makes one person better off, and that person is 
capable of compensating the disadvantaged. Deakin's view of Posner's efficiency has not been shared 
by all, see Polinsky in particular, and for the purpose of this thesis we will assume Pareto efficiency as 
the correct assumption. 
85 Quoted in Deakin ( 1996); at page 84 
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more tenable solution can be found in the assumptions Posner makes about Smith's 
Invisible Hand. Posner assumes that the judiciary will be intuitively be guided by this 
'invisible hand' to act in way, which whilst perhaps unwittingly, results in the 
consistent creation of efficient legal rules. This, it can be argued, goes some way to 
circumvent the zero transaction cost problem as the judiciary will be acting in a way 
which mimics the market (thus trying to establish the outcome as if there were no 
transaction costs). Posner further suggests the law (and judiciary) should enable the 
minimisation of transaction costs so that market solutions are more likely. 86 Davies 
sums up this idea cogently when she says: 
'In the real world, transaction costs are rarely zero. Neo-classical economists draw from this 
the conclusion that the Government should interfere as little as possible in the labour 
markets.' 87 
There has however been much debate over Posner's particular brand of law and 
economics with Polinsky stating: 
'The lens Posner uses to view the law provides a virtually distortion-free vision of individual 
behaviour and the market, a fuzzier view of collective decision making, and almost 
completely filters out issues of equity.' 88 
This comment and others surrounding his methodological approach89 would seek to 
minimise the impact and importance of Chicagoan90 law and economics theory. Much 
of the criticism relates to Posner's broad-brush strokes91 and the lack of requisite 
86 Polinsky (1974); at page 1665 
87 Davies, A C L- (2005) Perspectives on Labour Law; at page 26 
88 Polinsky (1974); at page 1655 
89 See Campbell and Picciotto (1999); Duxbury (1991); Polinsky (1974) 
90 Named because of the Universiy where Posner and his contemporary's promulgated their theory. 
91 See in particular Campbell and Picciotto (1999) and Polinsky (1974) 
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empirical evidence to support his positive economic analysis92• This criticism seems 
to be succinctly stated by Campell and Piccitto: 
'Posner makes an economic judgement (based on no evidence or analysis) and assumes the 
law will sort out the consequences. ' 93 
Yet, it is submitted, this is not such a heinous crime as many seem to think. Posner's 
theory sets out precisely to do what it is criticised for. Law and economics analyses 
decisions from an economic point of view and sees if the law is instrumental in 
facilitating this economic view. Whatever the inherent weaknesses which are a result 
of the assumptions made, it would still seem to operate as an analytical tool to help 
suggest understanding, allowance merely has to be made for it not being perfect and 
remembering this when using it. 
Polinsky sums up the paradox of Posner's law and economics approach cogently in 
his highly logical argument: 
'The competitive market paradigm, which is the basis of Posner's approach, requires a number 
of stringent assumptions, many of which are likely to fail in the context of the real world 
problems which Posner analyses. These failures arise not only in the analysis of legal 
problems, but also in many other problems to which economic analysis is applied. However, 
the crucial assumptions are more likely to fail in those areas which the Jaw plays an important 
role. Because Posner does not make the limitations of the paradigm sufficiently explicit, 
readers not fully aware of them may accept this conclusions uncritically or may extrapolate 
his analysis to draw conclusions unwarranted in reality ... To say that Economic Analysis of 
Law is a potentially defective product is not to deny it is a valuable one. I believe it is. But 
even a valuable is subject to misuse if proper care instructions are not included. ' 94 
92 See the example in Campbell and Picciotto ( 1999); at page 268 
93 ibid at page 268 
94 Polinsky (1974); at page 1680 
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Proceed with caution, but do proceed would seem to be the appropriate message in 
looking at and using this dynamic tool. 
1.6.2 The basics of the theory 
'The ultimate question for decision in many lawsuits is, what allocation of resources would 
maximjze efficiency?' 95 
The relative youth of the doctrine of law and economics means it is still an area fertile 
for development with much still up for grabs. There continues to be much debate as to 
the correct interpretation of Coase theorem96and the relationship between welfare and 
institutional economics97 • It would be extremely easy to become embroiled in the 
finer complexities of this doctrine and lose sight of the aim to bring fresh insight into 
unfair dismissal legislation. It is for this reason that it is pertinent to state the core 
elements of law and economics, which are of general academic acceptance, and seek 
to bring them to bear as an analytical tool. 
Fundamentally, law and economics theory says decisions are made on the basis of 
efficiency and not justice. It infers that decision makers look at the allocation of 
resources and decide where they should fall not with reference to 'fairness' but with 
reference to what is best; and for best it is more appropriate to substitute 'efficient.' 
Law and economics also seeks to minimise transaction costs so that markets mimic 
free markets. It recognises: 
'That the world of zero transaction costs is an unobtainable goal [but that] the theory first 
accepts the traditional methodology of neo-classical economics based on the assumption of 
95 Hirsch, W Z ( 1999); at page 7 
96 See Deakin, Sand Wilkinson, F- (1999) Labour Law and Economic Theory: A reappraisal in 'Law 
and economics and the labour market' eds De Geest, G, Siegers, J and van den Bergh, R 
97 See Duxbury ( 1991) 
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zero transaction costs, and secondly, leads to the inescapable conclusion that the design of 
social institutions should be aimed at the reduction of transaction costs. ' 98 
It is not unreasonable to infer that courts99 should come under this banner of social 
institutions and as such, if law and economics is an applicable analysis this should be 
evidenced in the way they seek to allocate resources and minimise transaction costs. 
1.6.3 Justice 
It is important to note that by embracing a law and economics analysis our concept of 
justice has to change. Justice in a traditional sense means the upholding of social or 
moral principles. In employment law this is probably best understood by reference to 
individuals rights. We commonly assert justice as being done when perceived 
individual rights are upheld, or less accurately from a layman's perspective, when the 
result seems intuitively right or fair. 
Law and economics does not define justice in this way, it sees justice as merely a 
synonym for efficiency100. The argument promulgated runs that if a worker is 
dismissed for capability, the decision of the court should be one which brings about 
the most efficient outcome. So if the dismissed worker is found to have been fairly 
dismissed and is awarded no compensation, the employer maintains and potentially 
improves efficiency because he has been able to rid himself of a staff member who 
was not up to the task and replace him with someone who is, without suffering 
financial penalty. This therefore leads to increased productivity due to increased 
98 Ashiagbor, D -(2000) Flexibility and adaptability in the EU employment strategy; at page 384 in 
Legal Regulation of the Employment Relation eds Collins, Davies and Rideout 
99 Again mention of Courts should read tribunals as well unless stated different. 
100 See Duxbury (1991 ); at page 178 
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efficiency and ultimately the creation of new jobs in the employment market, for 
which the sacked worker can potentially apply. Thus, justice was done because the 
decision was in the best interests of efficiency, which results in what is best for the 
economy. 
The argument continues that, if the worker dismissed for capability was not really 
dismissed for capability but because the employer did not like him then the courts 
would be right in awarding compensation. This award would act as a deterrent to the 
employer to not act in this way again. The logic? Not the upholding of the individuals 
rights, but that it is inefficient to dismiss someone who is good at their job and incur 
the cost of lower productivity whilst the new worker gets up to speed (and of the 
added cost of recruitment). There is also the potential of decreased productivity if the 
morale of the other workers is damaged by a capricious dismissal. 
This differing concept of justice can be clearly seen in the contention of Duxbury: 
'While the economist may be able to contribute more to discussions about efficiency this does 
not justify or support the suppression of the ethical basis and implications of legal decisions, 
and one of his tasks should be to make these clear. If there is a conflict between efficiency and 
justice [in the traditional sense] the nature of the tradeoffs can be illuminated by economic 
analysis, and since the attainment of justice usually involves the use of scarce resources the 
economic approach can contribute to normative discussions by providing information on the 
cost of justice.' 101 
This comments further strengthens the case as to the apparent usefulness of a law and 
economics analysis. In order to avoid confusion with terminology it is proposed to 
adopt 'equity' as the term that refers to what we have previously referred to as 
101 Duxbury (1991); page 178 
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traditional justice. Throughout the analysis it would serve us well to remember the 
words of Hirsch: 
'[law and economics] is best equipped to deal with resource-allocation efficiency, but justice 
[equity] and fairness which relate to distributional issues, must also be considered. Our task 
would be so much easier if efficiency could be rigorously defended as the only and ultimate 
objective. Instead we face two all too-often opposing objectives - efficiency and equity.' 102 
Bearing this in mind the next question that has to be considered is whether law and 
economics is an appropriate analytical tool to use in employment law? 
1.6.4 Law and economics and employment law 
'Labour law is as natural a field for the application of economics to law as one could 
imagine.' 103 
These words of Posner would seem to give credence to a law and economics analysis 
of employment law. But this enthusiasm must be tempered by the warning he gives 
almost immediately that 'labor[ sic] law is doctrinally complex.' 104 Whilst it is true 
US labour law is very different to that in the UK, it would surely take a brave man to 
argue it is not complex. For example in unfair dismissal law, individuals are subject to 
numerous time limits and qualifying periods and can receive a variety of remedies 
calculated in a variety of ways and this is even without consideration of recourse to 
the common law or judicial review which bring a whole other set of complexities. 
Posner's statement is ironic in some ways, because it is precisely the complexity of 
unfair dismissal which means we need to search for a new rationale in order to try and 
102 Hirsch (1999); page 8 
103 Posner, R- (1984) Some economics of labor law; at page 988 
104 ibid page 989 
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understand it. A law and economics analysis will seek to provide a framework that 
cuts through the complexity and sets up the platform from which the decisions can be 
understood. This is particularly relevant because of the wide scope given to the 
judiciary by Parliament. One fine example can be seen in the application of the Band 
of Reasonable Responses Test ("BORRT") where there is very little understanding of 
the process which the judiciary apply. The test is so wide and decisions seemingly so 
inconsistent that it is extremely difficult to see which factors are of greater influence 
upon the judiciary when balancing fairness and competitiveness105 • This lack of 
coherent rationale is why in the employment context a law and economics analysis 
could: 
'[B]e extremely useful. If the judge is viewed as an allocator, judgements can be examined for 
their consistency and incentive effects ... Economics can aid in drawing out the implications 
and interrelationships of legal judgments ... and provide a different perspective to the 
traditional method of analysing cases.' 106 
Before we can move onto a law and economics analysis and see the interaction 
between efficiency and equity, it is necessary to highlight the assumptions in the 
model we are using. This is in order that we might maintain our approach of caution 
when considering the doctrine. 
1.6.5 Assumptions in a law and economics model 
We have already discussed the fundamental assumption of a zero transaction cost and 
concluded that it does not interfere with the ultimate goal of using law and economics 
as an analytical tool. However we must also note in passing the tool also makes the 
105 See chapter two for coverage of this in greater depth 
106 Veljanovski ( 1980); at page 176 
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assumptions of zero redistribution costs and convexity107. In essence the argument 
surrounding zero transaction costs carries over into these two areas and can be 
applied108, with the assumption of convexity necessary to create a competitive 
equilibrium; a requisite for zero transaction costs to create Pareto efficiency. 109 
But this does lead us to another potential problem, the assumption of the free market. 
Free markets can and do exist in many areas of life, but not in the employment 
relationship. As has been seen in the UK's industrial history the doctrine of Collective 
Laissez-Faire was essentially that of allowing a free market and this was 
comprehensively interfered with due to its inherent failings. From one viewpoint the 
statutory scheme of unfair dismissal and the resultant inequality in bargaining 
power, 110 further compounded by the inferior knowledge employees will often have 
when taking jobs means it is hard to make a case for the existence of a free market. 
However it is actually contended that the existence and operation of the unfair 
dismissal Statute remedies this problems of a lack of free market because the very aim 
of the statute was to equalise the bargaining power and give a situation where 
employee and employer came to the table with certain inalienable rights. The existing 
interpretation of the Statute provides the scope for the trade off of other rights but 
without the loss of those inalienable rights. Put simply the legislation aimed to 
equalise the market, so in a sense facilitating a mimicking of the free market. There is 
still a problem with lack of knowledge when entering the relationship, something only 
107 See Hirsch and Veljanovski for more detail. 
108 See n86 
109 See Polinsky (1974); at page 1668 
110 The statutory scheme gave rights to the individual at the expense of collective bargaining power. 
Whilst those individual rights protect many core rights it has also had the paradoxical effect of 
minimising the individual's ability to influence/bargain with the employer with regard to other rights. 
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partly rectified by the Statues inalienable rights, but it would not seem a sufficient 
problem to derail a law and economics analysis. 
Another potential problem with the use of a law and economics analysis is its lack of 
use. There is not a plethora of evidence in the UK to show any acceptance of this 
doctrine by mainstream academia or more importantly the judiciary. This however 
does not mean that it does not exist, it may simply not have been vocalised in an 
evidentiary way. The doctrine of law and economics seeks to understand judgements 
from the basis of efficiency and it is quite conceivable that the judiciary could make 
very agreeable law and economics decisions without fully vocalising or 
comprehending the complexities of the doctrine. The doctrine exists whether people 
know about it or not and therefore the reasoning behind it can exist regardless of 
knowledge of the terminology of the doctrine. To deny its use on this basis would 
seem nonsensical. 
1. 7 Law and Economics in action 
This thesis was started with reference to the case of Mr Pays. It will be remembered 
that he was dismissed from employment as a probation officer due to his involvement 
and appearance on bondage, domination and sado-masochism websites. The case was 
particularly perplexing because it seemed to ignore the rights of Mr Pays and simply 
asserted that the dismissal was fair dismissal because other employers would have 
acted in the same way. This does not seem wholly satisfactory or fair and as noted, 
gives the impression that there is no objective standard of fairness. This apparent lack 
of objective fairness could be suggestive of a lack of consistency as reliance on 
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subjective judgements offered by different people does not lend itself to certainty and 
consistency. 
It is appropriate to therefore see if a law and economics analysis can clear up any 
confusion by looking at it through a different lens. When reference is made to 
efficiency and the allocation of resources does a clearer picture emerge? The first 
thing to note is that the case does not seem strikingly obvious to be susceptible to a 
law and economics analysis. It does not revolve around productivity, financial gain or 
the buying of rights and therefore one could wonder how applicable law and 
economics is. The simple answer is very. Law and economics should in theory be 
appropriate to most situations and this case is no exception. The decision to dismiss 
Mr Pay revolved on harm to the Probation Service ("the business"); any risk of harm 
means that efficiency can be affected. 
This case also provides a good example of how some rights are inalienable and 
therefore cannot be traded or minimised in the interests of efficiency. If Mr Pays' 
Human Rights arguments had been held up, the tribunals would have had no option 
but to give him a remedy, regardless of the impact on the Probation Office111 • So law 
and economics is not a plausible analysis when rights, which are so fundamental that 
they should never be diminished in the interests of efficiency, are involved. The 
Government and the principles of equity make the decision as to which those rights 
are and the size of their scope will naturally impact on the efficiency of business. 
111 Although it is interesting that Article 8 of the Human Rights Convention does provide for 
interference should it be necessary for the economic interests of the State. How wide this is, is 
unknown but it would seem unlikely to fall under the margin of appreciation. 
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As we noted, the tribunals decided that Mr Pays could not claim protection under the 
umbrella of Human Rights due to the public nature of his activities. This meant the 
tribunals judgement was purely with reference to whether the decision to dismiss was 
one another reasonable employer could have made 112. The tribunal held that the 
dismissal was fair because of the pressing social need on the employers 113but there is 
little explanation as to how they came to justify this need over the plausible pressing 
social need for individual freedom outside of work. This is where a law and 
economics analysis is potentially useful. It is clear from the case that the employers 
and the tribunal recognised that the role of the Probation Service and the maintenance 
of its integrity as vital. In the words of the EAT: 
'The modern probation service is a law enforcement agency at the heart of the criminal justice 
system. It aims to see that offenders receive proper punishment for their offending by the way 
they are supervised in the community. It works for the effective rehabilitation so they are less 
likely to offend in the future. Its objectives include Home Office priorities which were to 
challenge offenders in their behaviour, to enforce community sentences rigorously and to 
reduce the risk of harm from dangerous offenders. Its responsibilities include the delivery of 
effective programmes for supervising offenders safely in the community and upholding the 
interests of victims of crime.' 114 
We can therefore see that damage to the employers' integrity is commensurate with 
damage to its efficiency. If the public lose faith in the service115 then it would not be 
able to do its job effectively. It would seem then that it is better to maintain public 
faith in the probation service, due to the service it provides to society, than to alleviate 
hardship for Mr Pays. The tribunal can be viewed as taking account of the allocation 
112 Section 98(4) ERA 1996 
113 See above n5 
114 ibid paragraph 14 
115 Which was a very real worry of the probation service - sec paragraph 22 
46 
of resources and judging where it is most efficient for them to fall. In this case, Mr 
Pays becomes the victim of the employers' greater need for efficiency through 
maintenance of its integrity and the positive results it produces. 
Coached in these terms, the decision seems more logical and it is submitted not as 
inequitable as when one first reads the decision. There seems to be an internal logic in 
the way the decision is made and it gives an element of certainty. If we applied a law 
and economics analysis to the facts of the case before a decision was made, the 
predicted 'right' or appropriate outcome would match what in reality occurred. It is 
entirely plausible to counter this conclusion by saying there is no mention of 
efficiency and furthermore the decision obviously rested on the actions of a 
reasonable employer. But to advance this argument would seem to discount seeing the 
bigger picture. Yes, the transcript tells us that the decision revolved on the actions of a 
reasonable employer, but which reasonable employer will not act in the interests of 
maintaining their efficiency? Furthermore, as has already been tirelessly stated, what 
is the underlying rationale for reliance on the 'reasonable employer' if it is not one of 
allowing freedom for efficiency. A law and economics analysis not only fits in this 
case, it provides a coherent and consistent framework to understand the decision 
which can then be utilised in other cases to inform all parties of the logic of the 
tribunals. 
Having understood what law and economics is and how it has developed we have 
seen first hand how useful it can be in bringing fresh air to a case which seemed 
incoherent and unfair. We can now turn to see whether law and economics is 
appropriate when considering some of the problems, which have prevailed in 
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employment law for some time. Is law and economics the way to actually understand 
what has been regarded as an incoherent inconsistent minefield? 
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Chapter two - Disciplinary and Economic dismissals : A hidden control? 
There are many criticisms surrounding the unfair dismissal legislation. In order for us 
to apply a law and economics analysis in an attempt to find a rationale for the judicial 
approach we must first be familiar with some of these problems. Only by being fully 
informed will we be able to judge the appropriateness and value of a law and 
economics analysis. 
However before we can even reach the point of understanding the problems 
associated with unfair dismissal it is necessary to provide an overview of how the 
legislation works and what it covers. This means we will briefly cover the three types 
of dismissal covered under the legislation, noting Automatically Unfair Dismissal 
before turning to a discussion on how the case law has influenced the interpretation of 
the statute. This is an area vital for understanding if we are to see how law and 
economics controls the judiciary's decision-making rationale. 
Looking firstly in the context of disciplinary dismissals we will consider the enduring 
criticism of a lack of substantive fairness. This area is of great importance due to the 
role played in it by BORRT. We will give a detailed biography of BORRT before 
looking at the suggested rationale for its operation and concluding that law and 
economics provides a much more consistent rationale. From this understanding of the 
rationale behind BORRT it will be shown how efficiency is paramount in dismissal 
and that the lack of substantive fairness is as a result of facilitating efficiency. 
The thesis will then tum to chart the rise in procedural fairness which has occurred in 
a manner inversely proportional to substantive fairness. After contextualising its rise 
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the chapter will then see how BORRT has spread into procedural fairness and law and 
economics is in fact the controlling rationale. 
The remainder of the chapter will concentrate on economic dismissals. Whilst passing 
comment on redundancy and how the legislation is interpreted it will focus on the 
growing problem of the use of 'Some other Substantial Reason' (hereinafter "SOSR") 
to avoid redundancy payment at all. It will be shown that SOSR is in fact a vehicle 
used by an efficiency rationale. 
2.1 Three types of dismissal 
Unfair dismissal covers in essence, three differing types of dismissal. These can be 
categorised as: 
o Automatically unfair dismissals\" A UD") 
o Disciplinary dismissals 
o Economic dismissals 
The legislation has designated certain rights as inalienable and as a result any 
dismissal which conflicts with them will come under the umbrella of the AUD 
category. AUD covers a number of specific rights laid down in the legislation which 
Collins helpfully summarises in his creation of three categories. 
'Protection of Social Rights: for example dismissals in connection with pregnancy, maternity 
leave and paternity leave; dismissals in connection with trade union membership and 
activities; dismissals for refusals to work under conditions of serious and imminent danger; 
dismissals for taking protected industrial action; dismissal for making protected disclosure. 
1 Collins refers to these as public right dismissals- see generally Justice in Dismissal (1992) 
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Protection of Worker Representatives in performing their functions: for example, health 
and safety representatives; representatives for the purpose of information and consultation 
with respect to transfers of undertakings and collective redundancies; representatives in 
European Works Councils. 
Victimisation for asserting a statutory right enforceable in an employment tribunal: for 
example, dismissals in bringing claim for minimum wage and working tax credits; or for 
bringing a claim with respect to discrimination against part-time workers. ' 2 
Dismissals for the reasons covered above result in the dismissal being classified as 
automatically unfair. The legislation also ignores the need for a qualifying period3, 
circumvents the rules about upper age limits4 and can result in higher levels of 
compensation with the potential for removal of the cap on the compensatory award. 5 
The existence and operation of AUD is in reality fairly non contentious. The rationale 
behind their existence fits with modem democratic principles of inalienable rights and 
as such there is a consistency and coherency to their application by the courts. There 
is little scope or need for a law and economics analysis of these provisions because 
the current state of the law is satisfactory6 and seems credible7. It is therefore 
appropriate to concentrate the remainder of this chapter on the much more contentious 
areas of disciplinary and economic dismissals. 
2 Collins, H- (2004) Nine proposals for the reform of the law of Unfair Dismissal; at page 75 
3 See section 108(3) of the ERA 1996 
4 Section 109(2)ERA 1996 
5 See sections 124 (I A) and 120 of the ERA 1996. It is also worthy of note that a finding of AUD 
means the employee can seek interim relief and therefore a continuation of his contract of employment 
If employer fails to co-operate the compensation can reflect this- sections 128 -132 
6 In Collins' review of change in unfair dismissal he does not fault the scope of AUD but the remedial 
scheme, a criticism which would seem to apply across the board of the legislation. 
7 Efficiency has no place here because these rights have been designated inalienable by Parliament. 
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2.2 The Statute and the rise of case law 
It remains a simple, if often forgotten, truth that unfair dismissal is statute based. 
Primacy must be given to the wording of the statute not the principles illuminated in 
the case law. The reality in unfair dismissal often seems to be in stark contrast with 
this. The statute in most contexts affords the discretion to the tribunals and this has 
had the effect of greater consideration being given to other interpretations of the 
statute and not the 'plain meaning of the Statute itself.' This can result in: 
'The [employment] tribunals bent down under the weight of the law books or, what is worse, 
asleep under them. ' 8 
There has been much discussion about the role of case law in unfair dismissal with the 
courts and tribunals periodically engaging in the somewhat ironic exercise of 
castigating the amount of judge-made law and interpretation pertaining to unfair 
dismissal, whilst continuing to advance a multiplicity of opinions as to the correct 
interpretation of the legislation. 
'This is a tribunal which, rightly in our view, preferred to drink at the pure waters of the 
section rather than allow itself to be diverted into the channels created by judicial decision ... 
in other cases in different circumstances. ' 9 
This, to the uninformed or perhaps naive reader, would suggest that by relying on the 
plain meaning of the statute the application of the law should be more coherent and as 
a result more consistent. Munday summarises this viewpoint excellently when he 
says: 
'One strongly suspects that some people's assumption is that, in general, Parliament has 
created a species of layman's law which can be safely administered in tribunals whose 
8 Per Lord Denning MR- Walls Meat Co Ltd v Khan [ 1978] IRLR 499; at page 50 I 
9 Per Mr Waite P- Siggs & Chapman Ltd v Knight [1984] IRLR 83; at page 85 
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procedure is informal and whose application of legal rules is free, discretionary and, basically, 
unfettered by precedent.' 10 
But he disturbs this assumption by maintaining 
'[It] is mistaken for it is founded upon the misapprehension about the nature of language.' 11 
It is pertinent at this point to turn to the statute in order to get a flavour of the 
language and see whether resort to the plain words of the Statute would solve 
problems of certainty. 
The unfair dismissal legislation is contained in the Employment Rights Act 1996 and 
is primarily located between sections 94 and 181. The kernel of the right revolves 
around section 98. As we noted in chapter one, in order to initiate a claim for unfair 
dismissal the claimant must clear a number of hurdles. The claimant must be: an 
employee, have been dismissed and have the requisite one-year qualifying period. 
Once these hurdles are cleared, section 98 is engaged and the burden of proof passes 
on to the employer, who has to show two things. 
l. The reason for the dismissal. If there is more than one reason the employer must clarify the 
principal reason. 
2. That this reason justified dismissal because it fell within one of the enumerated categories of 
prima facie fair dismissals. Namely that the reason was 
a) related to the capability or qualitications of the employee for performing his work, 
b) related to the conduct of the employee, 
c) that the employee was redundant, 
10 Munday, R- ( 1981) Tribunal Lore: Legalism and the Industrial Tribunals; at page 149 
II ibid 
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d) that the employee could not continue to work in that position without contravention 
of a legislative provision, 
e) Some other substantial reason of a kind such as to justify the dismissal. 
If the employer can navigate through these requirements and put forward a justified 
reason for dismissal, the lynch pin of the legislation, section 98(4), becomes live. 
'Where the employer has fulfilled the requirements of subsection I [justified reason], the 
determination of the question whether the dismissal is fair or unfair (having regard to the 
reason shown by the employer)-
a) depends on whether in the circumstances (including the size and administrative resources 
of the employers undertaking) the employer acted reasonably or unreasonably in 
treating it as a sufficient reason for dismissing the employee and 
b) shall be determined in accordance with equity and the substantial merits of the case." 2 
This synopsis of this whole process can be best found in a three-stage test. 13 
1) The reason for dismissal 
2) Prima facie fair grounds 
3) Fairness 
It must be noted that whilst the plain meaning of the statue gives us some framework 
as to the processes dismissal hearings should go through, it does not aid the quest for 
consistency and coherency. The statute does not define what it means by 'reasonable' 
or from which viewpoint this should be assessed. Nor does it enlighten us as to the 
correct balance which should be struck between an employers reasonableness and 
12 Section 98(4) ERA 1996 
13 This test is common throughout academic literature on unfair dismissal- see Smith and Wood-
(2004) Industrial Law; at page 564 for just one example. 
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equity and the substantial merits of the case. This conclusion would seem to be in line 
with Munday's; the language requires interpretation in order to give it practical 
meaning and cannot realistically be taken at plain value as it provides no certainty 
This leaves an impasse. The plain meaning of the statute cannot satisfy the desire for 
consistency and coherency without interpretation, yet the vast swathes of cases and 
the myriad of differing decisions have only served to further compound the apparent 
lack of coherency. As was noted in chapter one, there does not seem to be an agreed 
rationale as to how the legislation should be interpreted apart from with reference to 
balancing respect for the managerial prerogative with fairness. But as we have already 
alluded to, this seems insufficient because it cannot satisfactorily stand up to scrutiny 
as the managerial prerogative cannot be defined or give a certain framework. It is 
proposed to look at some of the problems caused by the interpretation and approaches 
the tribunals have taken and see if a law and economic analysis can shed much needed 
light and as such: 
'Provide a framework with which to analyse and prepare dismissal cases. The interpretation 
given to the statutory language by tribunals and judiciary can in many ways be as important as 
the design of the statute. The proposition that judges do not make law but only apply it must 
be looked at in the context of the discretion allowed for judicial interpretation by the particular 
enactment and the uses to which that discretion is put by the particular judges. In the case of 
unfair dismissal legislation the statutory language allows for varying interpretations.' 14 
2.3 Lack of substantive justice in disciplinary dismissals 
14 Boothman, F and Denham, D- (1981) Industrial Tribunals: Is there an ideological background?; at 
page 7 
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One of the most enduring criticisms about the unfair dismissal legislation is that it is 
biased in favour of the employer and as a result the employee is the victim of 
injustice. With reference to the statutory language above, it does not seem prima facie 
to indicate bias. The statute asks the tribunal to decide whether the employer's reason 
for dismissal was reasonable or unreasonable taking into consideration the business 
circumstances and the equitable merits of the case. It is a creative argument that 
makes a case for bias from the plain meaning of the words. So if this bias does indeed 
exist; that is there is a lack of substantive justice for employees, where has it come 
from? 
In the early days of the statute there was much debate as to the correct approach the 
tribunals should take to the question of reasonableness. Should it be objective or 
subjective? The majority of early cases on what is now section 98(4) saw the tribunals 
taking advantage of their tripartite formulation and acting as an industrial jury 15 . This 
resulted in them: 
'reviewing the employers conduct from their standpoint [as an objective industrial jury] and 
deciding, in light of standard industrial practice, whether on the facts they would have 
dismissed.' 16 
This approach would seem to indicate the tribunals were taking an interventionist 
stance. Interpreting 'reasonable' from an objective perspective of 'good industrial 
practice' meant the legislation had teeth in order to deliver justice for individual 
employees but it also meant that there was interference with managerial autonomy. 
15 See the Court of Appeal decision in Bessenden Properties Ltd v Corness [1974] IRLR 338 for a fine 
example of this. 
16 Smith and Wood (2003); at page 571 
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This 'objective' approach did not sit well with many, particularly when cases 
revolved around an employers belief of a set of facts at the time of dismissal, which 
would make the decision seem reasonable to him17 . During the period 1976-78 it 
seems Mr Justice Phillips in his role on the High Court and then as President of the 
newly created EAT, took it upon himself to readdress the balance from a wholly 
objective interpretation of section 98(4). Thus, in Trust House Forte Leisure v Aquilar 
Phillips J said: 
' .... when the management is confronted with a decision to dismiss an employee in particular 
there may well be cases reasonable management might take either of two decisions: to dismiss 
or not to dismiss. It does not necessarily mean if they decide to dismiss that they have acted 
unfairly because there are plenty of situations in which more than one view is possible.' 18 
And then in the same year in Grundy (Teddington) v G F Willis he said quite 
unequivocally: 
'I suspect very much that they applied the wrong test and unconsciously, perhaps, fell into the 
error of deciding not whether the employers had acted reasonably in treating it as sufficient 
reason for dismissing the employee, but whether, had they been the employers, they would 
have made the same selection. That, of course, is not their function.' 19 (emphasis added) 
The approach of Mr Justice Phillips seems best summed up in the oft quoted case of 
Watling & Co Ltd v Richardson. 
'It has to be recognised that there are circumstances where more than one course of action 
may be reasonable ... In such cases .. .If an industrial tribunal equates its view of what itself 
would have done with what a reasonable employer would have done, it may mean that an 
17 See the case of Alidair Ltd v Taylor [1978] IRLR 482 CA for comments by Lord Denning that the 
test in section 98(4) is subjective- 'it must be remembered that [section 98] contemplated a subjective 
test. The tribunal have to consider the employer's reason and the employer's state of mind. If the 
company honestly believed on reasonable grounds that this pilot was lacking in proper capability to fly 
aircraft on behalf of the company, that was good and sufficient reason for the company to terminate the 
employment there and then.' 
18 [ 1976] IRLR 251; at page 254 
19 [1976] IRLR 118; at page 119 
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employer will be found to have dismissed an employee unfairly although in the circumstances 
many perfectly good and fair employers would have done as that employer did.' 20 
The correct interpretation and application continued to remain elusive, with different 
tribunals taking differing views.Z1 The ideal solution seemed to be some sort of 
balance between an objective industrial jury and substantive view of the employer, 
however as can be appreciated achieving a consistent application of such an approach 
was unlikely. 
2.3.1 The band of reasonable responses test 
It is not entirely clear where the test commonly known as the 'band of reasonable 
responses' ("BORRT") first originated. Something similar to it is hinted at in Watling 
but it was Lord Denning in the Court of Appeal case of British Leyland UK v Swift22 
who defined the test in order to provide guidance as to how a tribunal should interpret 
section 98.23 Swift was a conduct case and involved the dismissal of an employee 
because the employer believed he had stolen from the company. Lord Denning 
defined the correct test in applying section 98(4) as: 
'Was it reasonable for the employers to dismiss him? If no reasonable employer would have 
dismissed him, then the dismissal was unfair. But if a reasonable employer might have 
reasonably dismissed him, then the dismissal was fair. It must be remembered that in all these 
cases there is a band of reasonableness, within which one employer might reasonably take 
one view; another quite reasonably take a different view. One would quite reasonably dismiss 
the man. The other would quite reasonable keep him on. Both views may be quite reasonable. 
20 [ 1978] IRLR 255; at page 258 
21 Contrast Vickers v Smith [ 1977] IRLR 11 with Wells v Derwent Plastics [ 1978] ICR 424 
22 [1981] IRLR 91 
23 It is worthy of note that it was Lord Denning who also made his feelings very clear on the subjective 
nature of section 98 in Alidair Ltd v Taylor [ 1978] IRLR 482 CA. See n 16 
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If it was quite reasonable to dismiss him, then the dismissal must be upheld as fair: even 
though some other employers may not have dismissed him. ' 24 (emphasis added) 
Mr Justice Browne-Wilkinson converted this view of a 'band of reasonableness' into 
a workable test in Iceland Frozen Foods Ltd v Jonei5. This has influenced all unfair 
dismissal cases since and has purported to provide the framework within which the 
tribunals can act as an industrial jury. Due to its fundamental importance, it is 
appropriate to set the test out in full, as it appeared in Iceland: 
'Since the present state of the law can only be found by going through a number of different 
authorities, it may be convenient if we should seek to summarise the present law. We consider 
that the authorities establish that in law the correct approach for the industrial tribunal to adopt 
in answering the questions posed by [s. 98(4) ERA 1996] is as follows: 
24 ibid paragraph 11 
25 [ 1982] IRLR 439 
26 ibid paragraph 24 
1. The starting point should always be the words of [s.98(4)] themselves; 
2. in applying the section an industrial tribunal must consider the 
reasonableness of the employers conduct, not simply whether they, (the 
members of the industrial tribunal) consider the dismissal to be fair; 
3. in judging the reasonableness of the employer's conduct an industrial 
tribunal must not substitute its decision as to what the right course to adopt 
for that of the employer; 
4. in many (though not all) cases there is a band of reasonable responses to the 
employee's conduct within which one employer might reasonably take one 
view, another quite reasonably take another; 
5. the function of the industrial tribunal, as an industrial jury, is to determine 
whether in particular circumstances of each case the decision to dismiss the 
employee fell within the band of reasonable responses which a reasonable 
employer might have adopted. If the dismissal falls within the band the 
dismissal is fair; if the dismissal falls outside the band it is unfair. ' 26 
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And so BORRT was born because it offered the benefit of: 
'actions of the employer are measured against the objective standard of a hypothetical body of 
reasonable employers who may well respond to circumstances in different, though equally 
reasonable, ways. It avoids the subjectivity of a standard set by reference to the actions of the 
particular employer, as well as a potential for subjectivity arising if tribunal panels were to 
substitute their own decisions for those of the particular employer. ' 27 
Put simply, BORRT was developed to assist tribunals in focusing on objectivity in a 
difficult area of their practices28 and has seen much judicial support in the EAT and 
the Court of Appeal. 29 
However the application of BORRT has been controversial and many commentators30 
have argued its use results in a decrease in intervention by the tribunals; resulting in a 
decrease in substantive justice for dismissed employees. Collins notes that: 
'The idea of a range of reasonable conduct broadens the scope for legitimate disciplinary 
action by denying implicitly that a fixed standard of reasonableness should be applied.' 31 
Before we get into what has been said and the specific criticisms of the test it is 
perhaps wise to familiarise ourselves with the operation of the test and establish its 
boundaries. The phrase 'boundaries' is important because the BORRT does not set 
standards; it merely defines the boundaries of reasonableness, as determined by the 
27 Davies, J- (2003) A cuckoo in the nest? A 'Range of Reasonable Responses', Justification and the 
Disability Act 1995; at page 172 
28 See Freer- (1998) The range of reasonable responses test: From guidelines to statute; at page 36; 
and Daves, J (2003); at page 174 
29 Neale v Hereford and Worcester County Council [ 1986]1RLR 168 and the more recent combined 
case of Post Office v Foley; HSBC v Madden [2000] IRLR 827 are the two most obvious examples. 
30 See Collins- 9 reforms for Unfair Dismissal; Justice in Dismissal; Freer- The range of reasonable 
responses test; Hepple- The rise and fall f unfair dismissal; Smith and Wood- Industrial law; Deakin 
and Morris- Labour law. 
31 Collins (1992); at page 38 
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tribunal's interpretation of conventional industrial practice. 32 It must also be noted 
that worryingly: 
'Because this fairness standard is an interpretation of practice, not just a description of 
conventional standards, it therefore becomes susceptible to an interpretation itself.' 33 
This potential problem was noted by the EAT in the surprising recent decision of 
Haddon v Van Den Bergh Foods. 34We will look a this decision in-depth below, but 
what is relevant is the viewpoint of President Morrison J: 
'the band has become a band or group of employers, with an extreme end. There is a danger of 
Tribunals testing the fairness of the dismissal by reference to the extreme.' 35 
Confusion surrounding whether 'reasonableness' is to be interpreted in a public law 
sense has further compounded this problem of BORRT becoming 'standard 
reflecting' rather than standard setting. It will be remembered that in the classic Court 
of Appeal decision in the case of Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v 
Wednesbury Corporation36unreasonab1eness was defined as a decision so irrational no 
reasonable person would make it. In essence Wednesbury Unreasonableness is akin to 
perversity. How 'reasonableness' is interpreted is therefore of great consequence in 
the application of BORRT. If the tribunals apply a 'Wednesbury Unreasonable' test 
then there will be negative repercussions for employees. The employee would have to 
prove that the employers decision to dismiss was so unreasonable, no other employer 
would have ever done it. It can be seen that this is a very high bar for an employee to 
clear. The debate whether BORRT amounts to a perversity test continues to rage. 
Certainly there is much evidence in the language of the tribunals to suggest a 
32 See Freer ( 1998); at page 342 and Collins ( 1992); at page 78 
33 Collins ( 1992); at page 78 
34 [ 1999] IRLR 672 
35 ibid at paragraph 26 
36 [ 1947] 2 AllER 680 
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perversity test is being applied37• This viewpoint was expressed by Mr Justice 
Morrison in Haddon: 
'The mantra "the band of reasonable responses" is not helpful because it has led tribunals into 
applying what amounts to a perversity test, which, as is clear from Iceland was not its 
purpose. ' 38 
This statement indicates the crux of the problem; BORRT according to its creation in 
Iceland is not a perversity test39, yet its application has often looked like it is40 . One 
case will suffice to illustrate the seeming injustice a wide interpretation of BORRT 
can propitiate. 
In the case of Saunders v Scottish National Camps Association Lt£11 the appellant was 
dismissed because he was a homosexual. He was employed as a handyman at a 
children's camp and his job did not require him to be in contact with children. 
However upon investigation of a homosexual incident in a nearby town he was 
dismissed because: 
'At a camp accommodating large numbers of school children and teenagers it is totally 
unsuitable to employ any persons with such tendencies. ' 42 
37 See Vickers Ltd v Smith [ 1977] IRLR 11 for an early example -although this case has been widely 
discussed it has never been expressly disapproved. Also see the decision of Judge Clark in London 
Borough of Harrow v Cunningham [1996] IRLR 256 who held that in order to fall outside the range of 
reasonable responses the decision of an employer must be 'irrational'. 
38 Ibid paragraph 26 
39 This has been confirmed in the Court of Appeal case of Foley v Post Office; HSBC v Madden and 
after thoughtful consideration in Beedell v West Ferry Printers [2000] IRLR 650 which has a very 
thorough discussion of BORRT. 
40 It could be suggested that the idea of reasonableness being akin to perversity comes from the role 
Lord Denning has had in the creation of BORRT. In British Leyland v Swift he suggested a band of 
responses for the reasonable employer and in the public law case Secretary of State for Education v 
Tames ide MBC, he spoke of reasonableness in the same terms of Wednesbury and irrationality. 
41 [1980] IRLR 174 
42 ibid page 174 
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Mr Saunders claimed unfair dismissal but failed at both tribunal and EAT level. The 
EAT held: 
'The tribunal were entitled to find a considerable proportion of employers would take the view 
that the employment of a homosexual should be restricted, particularly when required to work 
in proximity and contact with children. Whether that view is scientifically sound may be open 
to question ... Some employers faced with the problem in the present case might have decided 
not to dismiss; others, like the respondent, would have felt that in the interests of the young 
persons for whom they were responsible to parents it was the only safe course. Neither could 
be said to have acted unreasonably. The present case was one where the area of decision is 
indeterminate and, provided the employer has approached the matter fairly and properly, 
and has directed himself properly, he cannot be faulted for doing what, in his judgement, is 
just and proper. '43 (emphasis added) 
In essence the EAT said, some employers would do it so therefore it must be 
reasonable. The EAT pins its colours to the mast of procedure at the expense of any 
consideration of justice for Mr Saunders. BORRT has the effect of legitimising what 
seems to be an unfair dismissal by reflecting the standard of other employers not of 
justice. 
Before we turn to a consideration of BORRT from a law and economics point of view 
it is submitted it would be helpful to get a flavour of the academic criticism 
surrounding BORRT. This will inform our analytical approach and it is hoped, 
provide contrast between a law and economics analysis and a 'fairness/justice' 
analysis. 
43 ibid at 174 
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2.3.2 BORRT: What the papers say 
'It is a gloss on statute.' 44 
This unequivocal statement aptly sums up much of the academic criticism 
surrounding the use of BORRT. Collins fleshes out this criticism by stating that the 
use of BORRT has an effect of a two-fold shift from the statutory formulation. The 
first shift involves the insertion of the word 'range', thereby broadening the scope of 
legitimate disciplinary action. The second shift away involves a focus on the 
'unreasonableness' of the employer's decision rather than its reasonableness.45 
Collins says as a result: 
'the effect of the courts' and tribunals' double reformulation of the statutory test is to create a 
presumption of fairness and an excuse for non-intervention. ' 46 
When one compares this test with the plain words of the statute the changes although 
subtle are of great effect. This effect is further compounded by the fact the judiciary in 
taking this interpretation seem to attach little weight to the other part of the statutory 
test that refers in broad terms to 'equity and substantial merits of the case. ' 47 
The use of BORRT makes it very hard for an employee to advocate that their 
dismissal was unfair because: 
'The tribunal will not make its own decision about the question whether the dismissal was 
merited for fear of the problem of juridification 48• It simply endorses the practice of 
44 Freer ( 1998); at page 343 
45 Collins (1992); at page 38-39 
46 Ibid at page 39 
47 See Collins (2004 ); at page 36 
48 A term of which definition is notoriously hard to come by- in essence juridifcation means 
'lawification' or put another way, the process of legal rules/procedures taking over and minimising 
judicial flexibility and discretion. See Jon Clark's article The Juridification of Industrial Relations: A 
review article for a detailed introduction. 
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management in all but the most unreasonable and irrational instances of abuse of 
managerial disciplinary power.' 49 (emphasis added) 
This reluctance to interfere has the further impact of endorsing harsh disciplinary 
practices which stop short of being 'perverse' but nevertheless do not seem equitable. 
Included in this is the situation where an employer may promulgate a disciplinary 
code of some kind, which warns employees that dismissal will follow a breach A 
tribunal is likely to find that a dismissal in conformity with the disciplinary code is 
fair, without making any assessment of whether the code was fair in the first place. 5° 
As can be seen, BORRT seems to have had the effect of skewing the balance of 
substantive justice in favour of the employer. To prove the employers action was so 
unreasonable that no other employer51 would have taken it, is not an easy task and one 
at which many prima facie equitable claims may fall. 
Critics of BORRT argue that its use legitimises the managerial prerogative. This 
would certainly seem to be evidenced in the application of BORRT. But this 
acknowledgement does not help us understand the rationale behind decisions or how 
BORRT is to be construed. To reiterate a point made earlier, the managerial 
prerogative provides a face for the decision but no substantive rationale. 
In an effort to diffuse unhappiness with BORRT and in particular its application of 
perversity, the EAT52 recently tried to suggest the rationale for BORRT actually was 
analogous to the 'Bolam test.' It will be remembered that this test comes from the 
49 Collins ( 1992); at page 39 
50 See Collins (2004); at page 37 
51 Because the tribunals implicitly assume other employers are inherently reasonable 
52 Beedell v West Ferry Printers [2000] IRLR 650; at paragraph 77 
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medical negligence branch of law and deals with standards of reasonableness. In brief 
the test says: 
'A doctor is not guilty of negligence if he has acted in accordance with a practice accepted as 
proper by a responsible body of medical men skilled in that particular art.' 53 
The analogy to Bolam is certainly helpful in giving some guidance as to how the test 
is to be interpreted by and implemented by the tribunals, especially with reference to 
the question of perversity. Yet it does no more than point us towards the managerial 
prerogative when trying to understand the deeper rationale and for reasons already 
stated, this does not help us find a framework in which the decisions can be 
considered coherent and consistent. 
The dissatisfaction with BORRT was recently evidenced in the EAT54. Mr Justice 
Morrison in his last case as President of the EAT seemingly decided it was time to 
take issue with the injustice BORRT was capable of propitiating. Mr Haddon was 
dismissed for misconduct for supposedly refusing to co-operate with management. He 
had been employed with the company for 15 years and therefore was the recipient of a 
good service award with a buffet supper being provided by the employers. Mr Haddon 
was scheduled to being working a shift on the day of the presentation but was allowed 
to leave early in order to change and collect his wife. He was told however that he 
would have to return to work after the ceremony. Another manager however 
contradicted this, saying it was unusual for anyone to be required to return to work 
after such a ceremony because alcohol was provided. The employers had a stated 
policy of not providing alcohol at functions where employees were returning to work. 
53 Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [ 1957] 2 AllER 118; per McNair J at page 122 
54 Haddon v Van Den Bergh Foods [1999] lRLR 672 
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Upon his arrival at the presentation Mr Haddon was offered alcohol and it was at this 
point he decided to not return to work. The gathering was not concluded until20:30, 
leaving only one and a half hours of his shift remaining and so Mr Haddon did not 
return to work. Mr Haddon was subsequently dismissed for failing to carry out a 
proper and reasonable instruction which, according to the company's disciplinary 
procedure, was an offence normally regarded as gross misconduct for which an 
employee may be dismissed without prior warning. 
Mr Haddon brought a claim for unfair dismissal. The claim was rejected; the 
employment tribunal reasoning in applying the range of reasonable responses test 
that: 
'although many employers would have not dismissed the employee in these circumstances, it 
could not be said that no reasonable employer would have done so. The inescapable 
conclusion therefore was that the decision was fair. ' 55 
Mr Haddon appealed to the EAT, who overturned the tribunal decision and held that 
the dismissal was unfair. This is not surprising when one reads the facts of the case, 
however the manner in which Morrisson J sought to justify the decision was 
extremely radical. Instead of holding that the decision of the tribunal was 'perverse' 
and therefore sending it back to a differently constituted tribunal, which would have 
seemed a viable option, he decided to tackle BORRT head on. Some of his comments 
have been referred to above; essentially Morrison J tried to say that BORRT was not 
and should not be a perversity test and that more prominence should be given to the 
'equity and substantial merits of the case, which would allow a change of focus from 
purely an employer's perspective. He furthermore dismissed the notion that a 'band' 
55 ibid at page 252 
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actually existed in reality; the only thing to be considered was whether the employer 
had acted reasonably or not and this was a question of fact for the tribunal to decide 
bearing in mind their role as an industrial jury. 56 
One cannot fault the desire to provide justice for Mr Haddon. The decision to dismiss 
bearing in mind the irony that the company had just been throwing him a good service 
award party seems utterly illogical. Yet the reasoning of Morrisson J is disappointing. 
Whilst the argument against BORRT has been waiting to be made, one cannot but 
help feel Mr Justice Morrison's attempt comes up short. Despite this weakness, some 
tribunals who thought the shackles of BORRT had been loosened, if not entirely 
released quickly seized upon this decision. A case in the Scottish Court of Session57 
quickly followed, supporting the Morrison stance, however again the forcefulness of 
the argument was disappointing. 
This led to a short period of even greater uncertainty. Not only was the application of 
BORRT capable of rendering inconsistent results, now there was great confusion over 
whether and how it should be applied, if at all. The Court of Appeal quickly stepped 
in and expedited two cases before itself. 
In Post Office v Foley; HSBC v Madden58 the Court of Appeal did not mince their 
words. Both cases involved employers distrusting the conduct of their employees but 
not being able to prove it. The court held that BORRT as set out in Iceland was 
correct, that the tribunals job was to not simply decide whether they considered the 
dismissal fair but to always determine the decision in line with the band of reasonable 
56 ibid page 672 
57 Wilson v Ethicon [2000] IRLR 4 
58 [2000] IRLR 827 
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responses which a reasonable employer might have adopted. Furthermore they held 
that despite the criticisms surrounding the BORRT only Parliament or the House of 
Lords could interfere with the interpretation which has persisted since Iceland. 59 
The decision in the Court of Appeal had the effect of curtailing the rebellion against 
BORRT, which had been gathering momentum. It restored the familiarity of the 
presence of BORRT but did nothing to aid our understanding of its rationale. The 
confusion surrounding the correct rationale in the application of BORRT persists 
throughout the decision and is perhaps best summed up by this incomprehensible 
reference to the approach the tribunal should take in deciding whether an employer 
has behaved reasonably: 
' Although the members of the tribunal can substitute their decision for that of the employer, 
that decision must not be reached by a process of substituting themselves for the employer and 
forming an opinion of what they would have done had they been the employer, which they 
were not. ' 60 
With clear explanations like this resounding in the ears of the tribunals it is no wonder 
tribunals resort to applying a test which is deferential to the employer, interference 
only coming when a decision is obviously perverse. A tribunal chairman who wants to 
progress through the ranks of the judicial system will not want to be seen as getting it 
wrong, so by applying a perversity test they know they are on safe ground due to the 
existence of definable boundaries. 
Fundamentally, BORRT is here to stay until the House of Lords or Parliament get 
involved. It is strange that this question of the correct application of BORRT, despite 
59 Ibid paragraph ll 
60 Ibid paragraph 53 
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its immense significance in unfair dismissal cases, has not reached the House of Lords 
yet. Even if a case did reach the House of Lords, in reality the House is unlikely to 
take a much different view than the one which has been expounded by the Court of 
Appeal. This serves to heighten the need to provide an analytical framework within 
which BORRT can be understood, as it is a problem that is unlikely to go away. 
2.41Aw and economics: BORRT is a tool? 
From our whistle-stop tour of the situation surrounding BORRT it would seem a 
logical conclusion to draw that it has failed in delivering an appropriate balance 
between certainty and flexibility. Certainty can only be achieved seemingly through 
the application of a perversity test, but this comes at the expense of flexibility and 
looking at the merits of the case ex post facto. This situation is highly objectionable to 
many because it seems to allow an employer the freedom to make untrammelled 
decisions with little regard to the 'substantial merits and equity' of the case. Yet still 
confusion abounds because the courts have repeatedly said BORRT is not a perversity 
test,61 leaving us with little understanding of whether an appropriate balance between 
certainty and flexibility has been struck or whether any rationalised framework exists 
at all. 
Does BORRT seem so confused and objectionable when viewed through the lens of 
law and economic theory? The case of Saunders is a prime example of the injustice 
BORRT can propitiate. One cannot read the case without feeling a certain amount of 
sympathy for him. Some might argue that it is a case which is not appropriate for 
analysis because the advent of greater human rights protection and the 
61 Iceland v Jones; Post Office v Foley; HSBC v Madden; Beedell v West Ferry Printers 
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implementation of improved anti-discrimination laws would suggest a case like 
Saunders would be differently decided now. This argument however falls down when 
confronted with the recent post Human Rights Act cases of Pays v Lancashire 
Probation Service62and X v Y,63which delivered very similar verdicts as the EAT in 
Saunders. 
Applying a law and economics analysis to Saunders suggests there is a rationale 
behind the approach ofBORRT and that it does deliver ajust result, but only when 
we skew justice to equate with efficiency. It will be remembered from the facts of the 
case that Mr Saunders worked for a national holiday camp organisation, which 
catered primarily for school and youth trips. Mr Saunders sexuality came to light after 
an incident in a nearby town, thus indicating that it was in the public domain. As a 
result there was potential for injury to the employer's reputation. The employer held a 
perception64 that having a homosexual in the same environment of children could put 
them at risk and obviously any incident would tar the camps with a negative public 
perception and in some ways even the simple knowledge that a homosexual worked at 
the camp could have negative repercussions. This would potentially have the result of 
decreasing business, as parents would not feel safe sending their children to the 
camps65 . The logical conclusion of this thought process is that a decrease in business 
will lead to job losses, which will be bad for the local economies where these camps 
are located. The State will ultimately become responsible for welfare support and 
trying to encourage job growth in other industry sectors to cater for the loss of 
employment. 
62 [2004] IRLR 129 - see chapter one for a thorough consideration of this case 
63 [2003] IRLR 561 
64 and from the transcript of the case it would seem to be a commonly held perception 
65 See paragraph 8 
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This whole scenario could however be avoided if the tribunal allocated resources in 
favour of the employer; i.e. rather than burdening the employer with the inability to 
dismiss or a prohibitive cost of dismissal which could lead to further burdens as 
outlined above, they could put the burden of the dismissal on the individual. Thus 
freeing up the employers' resources. This response, as we are aware, was the one the 
tribunal chose to take. If one views the dismissal as one where the effect on the 
individual was far less severe than the effect on the employer had no dismissal 
occurred, there is a chilling logic behind the decision. It was more efficient to dismiss 
Mr Saunders before damage was done to the reputation (and therefore the efficiency) 
of the business than to not dismiss him and run the risk of harm. 
Therefore by allowing the use of BORRT the tribunal could point towards other 
employers acting in the same way, in order to legitimise this theory of efficiency and 
effective resource allocation. BORRT gives the judiciary the scope to effect an 
efficiency solution without prima facie seeming to go against the principals of equity. 
So we could view the approach taken by the EAT in Saunders not simply as 'was it a 
decision a reasonable employer would have taken' but 'was it a decision necessary for 
the continued efficiency of the business'. When we construe BORRT in this way, 
there seems to be a much more definable rationale. 
Another case in which the application of BORRT seemed to propitiate injustice is that 
of StJohn of God (care services) v Brooki6. In order to effectively analyse it is 
pertinent to briefly review the facts of the case. The claimants were members of the 
66 [ 1992] IRLR 546 
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nursing staff at a hospital run by the appellant company, a wholly owned subsidiary of 
a registered charity. The hospital was funded in part by the NHS. When this funding 
was considerably reduced, the company took various steps to make savings and 
increase revenue from other sources. Eventually however, it was decided that the only 
alternative to closure was to employ the staff on less beneficial terms of employment. 
The employers sent out new contracts which reduced holidays, abolished overtime 
rates and replaced a generous sick pay scheme with the much lower statutory scheme. 
Employees were told they had a reasonable period of time to decide whether to accept 
the terms but if they did not they would be dismissed. 140 out of the 170 staff 
accepted the new terms. Mr Brooks and three others were dismissed for refusing to 
agree to the new terms and brought a claim of unfair dismissal. 
The EAT held that the dismissals were fair. In applying BORRT they said it had to be 
applied in the context of the business reorganisation67 • Therefore the offer of new 
terms by the employer was not unfair as it was in line with what a reasonable 
employer would do in a similar situation. The EAT acknowledged that: 
'The situation may well be one in which the employer's legitimate interests and the employees 
equally legitimate interests are irreconcilable. ' 68 
In this situation, how and why do the employer's interests come out on top? To say 
they do because other employers act in that way also, with no consideration as to 
equity and balance, is surely not a convincing argument because it is entirely circular. 
The rationale behind BORRT producing an outcome which is in the employer favour 
has to be something deeper. 
67 See paragraph 14 
68 Ibid 
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In giving the judgement of the appeal tribunal, Mr Justice Knox immediately makes 
reference to the fact that: 
'the company recognised they were harsh terms but claimed they were necessary if the hospital 
was not to close with a large number of redundancies as a result of cuts in its NHS financing. ' 69 
This detail, it is submitted, is vitally important. We can understand the decision 
through the lens of law and economics because of this threat of large redundancies. It 
all comes down to allocation of resources and ensuring the most efficient outcome. It 
can plainly be seen that the continued operation of the hospital is more desirable than 
mass redundancy and the loss of a valuable community service. The only way to 
effect this outcome was to find that the decision to dismiss the employees who had 
not accepted the new terms was fair. By finding the dismissals fair it meant the 
hospital could stay open and run efficiently, thus keeping many people in employment 
as opposed to being a burden on the welfare state. This solution was pareto-efficent as 
it kept the employment levels in the local theatre at equilibrium, rather than leading to 
increased unemployment as the labour market was flooded with specialist nursing 
staff. To put the burden of dismissal on the hospital would have been highly 
inefficient. Again, when we view the decision of the case in light of this analysis 
there seems to be a clear logic behind it and we can see indications of BORRT being a 
vehicle used to implement this efficiency rationale. BORRT perhaps appears to 
become a little less vague and offensive once we start to understand it is controlled by 
an efficiency rationale. This efficiency rationale is even more evident in the case of N 
C Watling & Co v Richardson70• We must first make the caveat that this case was 
69 Ibid paragraph I 
70 [ 1978] IRLR 255 
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decided before BORRT was defined in Iceland, however it has been noted above71 
that Mr Justice Phillips did advance a test very similar to BORRT in this case and the 
interpretation given to 'reasonableness' is sufficiently similar to allow conclusions to 
be drawn. 
Briefly the facts: Mr Richardson was employed as.an electrical contractor. He worked 
at two different sites but was made redundant when the work at one of the sites came 
to an end. Mr Richardson claimed that his dismissal was unfair; pointing out the 
employers had engaged two additional electricians the week before his redundancy 
for work on the other site Mr Richardson had worked on. Furthermore one of them 
had worked only half a day before falling ill but had still been retained in preference 
over himself. 
The Tribunal and EAT found the dismissal unfair. In applying a reasonable employer 
test the EAT held: 
'it was not reasonable to dismiss an electrician who had been employed for a substantial 
period of time in preference to an electrician who had only been employed for a little over a 
week and who had only worked half a day.' 72 
This decision might seem quite surprising bearing in mind the deference the judiciary 
have shown to employers. It highlights the lack of inconsistency BORRT can 
promulgate because the scope of a BORRT type test is so wide there would have been 
no certainty on the part of Mr Richardson that the tribunals would agree with him, 
indeed many would have thought it unlikely the tribunal would interfere with hiring 
71 n20 
72 ibid paragraph 14 
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decisions. Can this decision, to effectively interfere with the managerial prerogative, 
be reconciled with the two cases and subsequent analysis detailed above? 
Efficiency is paramount. There seems to be no sense in dismissing employees whilst 
at the same time hiring new ones unless it is for efficiency gain. The cost of this 
process and the potential loss of productivity whilst the new workers adjust would 
seem to make no economic sense. There had been no complaints about Mr 
Richardson's work or productivity73 so there is no substance in an argument that it 
was in the employers efficiency interests to replace Mr Richardson. The cumulative 
effect of this information is to suggest that the decision to dismiss was an inefficient 
one. It would cause hardship to Mr Richardson whilst providing no tangible benefit to 
the employers. Therefore there was no benefit in allowing the dismissal to be fair; the 
tribunal would not want to encourage other employers to make similar decisions 
because it would be bad for efficiency and productivity in the economy. As such the 
law and economics analysis provides an understandable rationale where before there 
was uncertainty. 
These three cases provide a small snapshot into the differing applications of the 
BORRT and are by no means exhaustive. Yet they evidence a general trend that 
coherency behind the decisions can be seen with resort to a law and economics 
analysis. Whether that analysis indicates a desirable outcome is not the point, it 
indicates a consistent outcome. The plausibility of a law and economics theory is 
further evidenced if we look at the difference between the Statue and the practical 
73 ibid paragraph 9 
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application of BORRT. It will be remembered that section 98( 4) says the issue of 
whether the employer behaved reasonable or unreasonably: 
'shall be determined in accordance with equity and the substantial merits of the case.' 
Yet mention of this in the cases is extremely rare. In Saunders there is not one single 
mention of equity or substantial merits, the same is true in StJohn of God and 
Watling. Obviously an empirical study of all unfair dismissal cases would provide 
hard and fast data for whether this assertion is true but the author's personal 
impression from extensive research of unfair dismissal cases suggests that the 
mention of equity is the exception not the rule. To put it bluntly, this particular 
requirement seems to have been airbrushed from the Statute. 
This is intriguing because potentially giving greater prominence to consideration of 
the substantial merits and equity in a case could well provide the counter-balance to 
the employer-orientated test that BORRT seems to promulgate. Yet, this is a course 
most of the judiciary have chosen not to take. It is suggested that the justification for 
this is best explained with reference to law and economics. In chapter one we 
discussed how efficiency had replaced equity as the requisite standard of fairness in 
law and economics. If we follow this theory through it brings us to the conclusion that 
reference to the merits and equity of a case is in reality reference to the best way to 
achieve efficiency. Equity and efficiency cannot lie together so efficiency has in 
effect replaced equity in the test ins. 98(4). 
We have seen how law and economics can provide a consistent rationale for the 
operation of BORRT, giving it definable parameters; this has the great advantage of 
improving confidence in its operation the outcome would seem more and with 
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efficiency as the controlling factor it does not seem so objectionable and biased. But 
how does this understanding of BORRT fit into the problem of lack of substantive 
justice? 
2.5 Law and economics and substantive justice 
We started off this whole discussion about substantive justice by blaming BORRT for 
its demise. In light of the law and economics analysis is this still fair? To some extent 
the answer is in the affirmative, BORRT is the vehicle which has undermined the 
process of traditional substantive justice. But law and economics seems to have been 
the controlling factor, pulling the strings in order to manipulate the 'charmed circle of 
BORRT'74into facilitating efficiency. The question that naturally follows is how does 
law and economics gain creating a decline in the role of substantive justice? 
'Employment-at-will' is a doctrine which still prevails in the United States and to 
some extent also in the UK common law. 75 It is the neo-classical economists preferred 
method of employment relationship in the free market because they argue it is the 
most effective and efficient. Employment-at-will is the natural anathema to 
substantive justice; it is the classic paradigm of competitiveness versus fairness. 
Therefore for the ideas behind employment-at-will to take hold in the regulatory 
setting, the major thing to be compromised would have to be substantive justice. 
Procedural fairness can live harmoniously with employment-at-will because there is 
no incursion into one another's core territory; the process of implementing a dismissal 
74 Collins (1992); at page 2 
75 Obviously the unfair dismissal statute has provided a new avenue of redress but for those falling 
outside the qualifying conditions, their employment (with the exception of the automatically unfair 
dismissals) is no better than at-will. 
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is not the same as the process of making the actual decision. But the same cannot be 
said for substantive justice. 
In Beck's thoughtful essay on The law and economics of dismissal regulation76he 
helpfully sets out the arguments why efficiency (employment-at-will) is to be 
preferred to equity (substantive justice)77 . Firstly, knowledge that the employer can 
dismiss at will is said to decease the chances that a worker will not put forth the 
expected levels of performance: 
'Any alteration of this contract format through a restriction of dismissals, may lead to a less 
efficient employment relationship, which may impose substantial costs on the economy as a 
whole, as output in existing firms is lowered and/or few workers are hired.' 78 
Secondly, the ability of an employer to decide on discharges without restriction is 
essential to the organisational efficiency of the firm: 
'Court policing of dismissals erodes managerial property rights and, in the long run, reduces 
incentives for the creation of new firms.' 79 
Essentially the argument propounded says that a requirement of substantive justice in 
employment relationships leads to inefficiency and potential decline. This argument 
however is not attractive to many who feel employees should not be simply 
commodities and factors in production. One moderate line of thought has been to 
highlight the inequality in bargaining position between employer and employee and 
then go onto say that the employment-at-will doctrine should only be used when the 
76 Beck, M- (1999) The law and economics of dismissal regulation: A comparative analysis of US and 
UK systems in 'Law and Economics and the Labour Market eds De Geest, G, Siegers, J and van den 
Bergh, R 
77 See pages I 06, I 07 and 108 
78 ibid 
79 ibid; at page I 07 
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employers interest in dismissing workers does not extend beyond economic 
rationality. 80 The similarities between this approach and the EAT's approach in 
Watling are very clear. There was no economic benefit to the dismissal therefore it 
was not efficient to dismiss. This approach 
'[that] regulation is often necessary on grounds related to economic efficiency, as opposed to 
the social justice considerations which are most often adduced' 81 
is indicative of acceptance that regulation can be used to facilitate efficiency in a way 
that the free market was unable due to the presence of external factors. Minimising 
substantive justice gives scope for efficiency considerations to be implemented. So 
whilst the role of substantive justice is minimised by law and economics it does not 
necessarily mean justice is not done; it just has to be construed and understand in a 
different way, with different values. 
2.5.1 No evidence for law and economics 
But is the theory of law and economics the only one which can be put forward? Of 
course whenever there is a part of law which is contentious or difficult to understand 
there will be numerous different theories as to the correct interpretation. In unfair 
dismissal these range from the judiciary not understanding the needs of workers 
because of their societal background82 to the unfettered discretion of the managerial 
prerogative. 
80ibid; at page I 08 
81 Deakin and Wilkinson (1999); at page 38 
82 Collins makes this point in ( 1982) Capitalist Discipline and Corporatist Law; at page 80- it must 
however be said that there only seems to be any real substance in this claim when dealing with the 
rights of trade union's. The fact that tribunal have wingmen who have industrial experience would seem 
to defeat this theory on a general basis. 
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Critics of the plausibility of a law and economics analysis would suggest that there is 
little supporting language in the cases. This is indeed true and whilst some references 
are made to economic climate and rationale this is the exception, not the rule. There is 
much greater reference made to the managerial prerogative and the 'reasonable 
employer'. It is here we would like to suggest that some of the strongest evidence for 
a law and economics theory can actually be found. The managerial prerogative serves 
to give employers the scope and discretion to make decisions they think are best for 
their company. It is submitted it would take a pretty unreasonable employer who 
would exercise decisions under the managerial prerogative which provided no 
efficiency benefit. Surely no 'reasonable employer' will want to act in a way which 
will have a negative impact on its productivity or efficiency. The counter to this is; 
not all employers are like that, some act in a capricious and arbitrary way not out of a 
desire to increase efficiency. Whilst this is true, reference must be made back to 
Watling where the tribunal stepped in and said that the dismissal was unfair in 
precisely those circumstances. Reference to the managerial prerogative and 
'reasonable employer' gives the judiciary the requisite scope to interfere in the 
interests of efficiency. By not making this role/scope public it is not subjected to any 
criteria or definable tests making it more flexible and capable of ensuring the results 
the judiciary want to promulgate. It would seem entirely plausible to suggest that the 
focus on substantive fairness has been minimised in the interests of efficiency. The 
judiciary's pattern of interference does not fit well with the simple theory that they 
will let business do what they want, as Watling perfectly shows. Does this efficiency 
justification, which we have seen through the law and economics analysis, follow 
through into the other big area of disciplinary dismissals, procedural fairness? 
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2.6 The rise ofproceduralfairness 
'[Section 98(4)] directs the tribunal to focus on the conduct of the employer and not on 
whether the employee in fact suffered any injustice. ' 83 
This statement in the House of Lords is indicative of the approach the judiciary have 
taken towards the balance between procedural and substantive justice. By focusing on 
the conduct of the employer, not on any injustice suffered by the individual, the court 
is implicitly promoting procedure over substance. The stance the judiciary have taken 
on the amount of attention that should be paid to procedural fairness has altered 
significantly over the Statutes history, with the pendulum swinging wildly from one 
end of the spectrum to another. There seems to have been an inversely proportional 
relationship between procedural and substantive fairness. As the standard of 
procedural fairness has risen the judiciary seem to have made that the hurdle to clear 
in order to prove the fairness of the dismissal. We have already alluded to the 
airbrushing of 'equity and the substantial merits of the case' from the statute and this 
is part of the problem associated with a rise in proceduralism. By making the test 
about the employer and his conduct, the need for substantive justice can be 
circumvented because the tribunals and courts are still implementing fairness 
standards; the problem being they relate to fairness of the process not the substance. 
From an equity perspective it may seem that this rise in procedural justice is 
seemingly advantageous. The rise in procedural fairness has been given a statutory 
boost with the Employment Rights Act 2002 inserting into the ERA 1996, section 
98A. The effect of this section is to prescribe certain minimal procedural requirements 
which an employer must satisfy, before a dismissal can be found fair. Failure to 
83 W Devis & Sons Ltd v Atkin [ 1977] IRLR 314; per Viscount Dilhorne at 317 
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adhere to these requirements results in a finding of automatically unfair dismissal and 
also incurs additional financial penalties. 
Collins helpfully suggests three distinct chronological periods84 over which we can 
see the tribunal and courts differing approaches to procedural fairness. In light of 
section 98A it is necessary to add a fourth period, however the precise nature of the 
approach to this section is still not fully known and therefore only suggestions can be 
offered. 
The first period covering 1971 to 1977 he calls Symbolic Affirmation85 . In this period 
the judiciary took a very strong stance on the necessity of procedural fairness, 
maintaining that unfair procedure alone could render a dismissal unfair86. This 
approach was affirmed in the House of Lords in De vis & Sons v Atkins87 where the 
Law Lords held that despite the employees disobedience the dismissal was unfair 
because the employers had not warned that dismissal may result. 
However, the picture is not quite as rosy and pro-employee as might be perceived 
from this summary. In Devis the House of Lords also affirmed another principle 
which was prevalent in the lower courts at the time; that despite a finding of unfair 
dismissal there could be an award of zero compensation because no injustice was 
done to the employee due to his conduct still meriting dismissal. Collins aptly sums 
up the situation as thus: 
84 Collins (1992); pages 111-120 
85 ibid at page 112 
86 See Earl v Slater & Wheeler (Airlyne) Ltd [ 1972] JCR 508- employee returned after a period of sick 
leave and was dismissed due to inadequacies in his work. Whilst this incompetence would have been 
sufficient reason for dismissal the fact that the employee was given no opportunity to explain made it 
unfair. 
87 [1977] AC 931 
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'One suspects that the emphasis upon procedures was a way of avoiding the more difficult 
substantive questions of unfairness ... which were less easy for the courts to resolve. By 
determining that a dismissal had been unfair on the ground of a bad procedure, the courts 
could avoid direct second-guessing of management's substantive disciplinary decisions with a 
consequent reduction of threat to the managerial prerogative. Yet despite the importance 
attached to procedures, the courts were not willing to allow pursuit of this policy and strategy 
to undermine to undermine the corrective justice basis of the law of unfair dismissal. A way to 
reconcile these competing considerations was discovered in following a finding of unfairness 
based upon a defect in procedure by a denial of a compensatory award in cases where an 
employee was at fault. 88 
This approach shows the standard of procedural fairness was high, but the impact on 
employer behaviour was very minimal. Employers could act in capricious way and 
still not be punished apart from a potential tarnishing of their reputation, which many 
would see as an expendable cost. Collins maintains that use of this device achieved 
the aim of compelling employers to tighten up on procedures without undermining 
their perception of the ultimate corrective justice aim of the legislation89, however it is 
suggested this is not entirely correct. The device in many senses had the impact of a 
paper tiger because of the minimal punitive sanctions an employer faced. 
Between 1977 and 1986 we had a period which Collins defines as Procedure as 
Substance. The change in the judiciary's approach was caused by the introduction of 
the basic award in unfair dismissal. The Employment Protection Act 1975 introduced 
via sections 73-75 a basic award as well as a compensatory award. In essence this was 
to rectify the problem of an employee receiving no financial settlement even when the 
dismissal had been found to be unfair. The basic award could not be reduced below a 
88 Collins ( 1992); at page 113 
89 ibid see page 114 
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minimum of two weeks pay and it was the Labour Government's intention that the 
judiciary should only exercise discretion over the compensatory award not the basic.90 
This legislation sent alarm bell through the judiciary and was commented on in Devis, 
with the Law Lords noting abita dicta that they would not be able to promulgate a 
result like Devis in the future because of it and that surely Parliament had not intended 
this result; that an employee should receive compensation where his serious 
misconduct was discovered between the date of dismissal and the determination by 
the tribunal.91 
The route of symbolic affirmation was no longer fully available to the judiciary in 
their minds, because a finding of unfair dismissal for flawed procedure meant that 
there was compensation to be paid, regardless of the employees behaviour. This did 
not sit well with the judiciary because it seemed to frustrate the application of 
corrective justice. The response of the EAT is traditionally acknowledged to have 
been started in British Labour Pump v Bryne92which was approved by the Court of 
Appeal in Wass Ltd v Binns. 93Mr Justice Slynn in British Labour Pump ventured a 
general test for when bad procedure should not lead to a finding of unfairness: 
'It seems to us that the right approach is to ask two questions. In the first place, have the 
employers shown on the balance of probabilities that they would have taken the same course 
had they held an inquiry, and had they received the information which that inquiry would have 
produced? Secondly, have the employers shown- the burden is on them -that in light of the 
90 ibid see page 115 
91 See in particular Lord Diplock's comments that section 73-75 of the EPA was capable of converting 
unfair dismissal compensation provisions into a veritable rogue's charter, for the tribunal would be 
bound to award to a fraudulent employee, because he had successfully concealed his fraud, a basic 
compensation which might well amount to a substantial sum- at paragraph 5 
92 [ 1979] IRLR 94 
93 [ 1982] IRLR 283 
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information which they would have had, had they gone through the proper procedure, they 
would have been behaving reasonably in still deciding to dismiss?94 
This question quickly developed into a Court of Appeal affirmed test of: 
'A dismissal would not be unfair for improper procedure, if the employer could show on 
balance of probabilities that such a failure would not have affected the reasonableness of the 
decision to dismiss. ' 95 
This approach had the overall implication of: 
'where an employer had good substantive reasons for dismissals, then procedural steps may be 
ignored with impunity, quite the opposite message to that conveyed by the courts in the early 
years. In effect procedural considerations were treated as a subsidiary element of substance 
rather than enjoying independent weight as necessary elements of fairness.' 96 
So although more consideration was being given to substance this did not mean that 
the employees were benefiting from an increase in substantive justice. Procedural 
failure could be ignored if there was substance to the claim that dismissal would have 
occurred anyway. Yet the converse was not true; a fair procedure could not be turned 
into an unfair dismissal just because the decision did not seem correct or fair, the 
decision still had to be so unreasonable no reasonable employer would have taken it97 • 
This approach was not greeted with much happiness as it headed in the 1980's. Mr 
Justice Browne-Wilkinson became President of the EAT and quickly set about 
suggesting a return to increased procedural fairness. In Silifant v Powell Duffryn 
Timber he maintained that the British Labour Pump principle was 
94 ibid at paragraph 17 
95 Using the words of Collins (1992); page 116- but commonly accepted throughout the system- see 
Silifant v Powell Duffryn Timber [ 1983] IRLR 91 
96 Collins (1992); page 117 
97 See the section above on substantive justice and the role of BORRT 
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'wrong in principle, undesirable and inconsistent with [section 98(4)1 as construed by 
Devis. '98 
Yet he said the decision by the Court of Appeal in Wass bound them to apply British 
Labour Pump. The turning point and loosening of the shackles came in two House of 
Lords cases in 1985and 1987 
The revival of procedural standard/9 was the third stage and occurred in part because 
of changes to the legislation. The Employment Act 1980 empowered courts to reduce 
the basic award 100 to nil in light of any conduct of the employee prior to the dismissal. 
This in essence returned the legislation back to its original form and more importantly 
'removed the spectre foreseen in Devis of an employee winning a substantial basic 
award even though he had secretly been guilty of grave misconduct. " 01 This change 
was perhaps influential in the House of Lords feeling it could start to re-assert the 
need for procedural fairness; the loophole that could propitiate grave injustice had 
been removed. 
The first signs of a change in the attitude of the House of Lords in seen in West 
Midlands Co-op Society v Tipton 102 where they upheld a tribunal decision that the 
flawed procedure was capable of rendering the dismissal unfair. This was to some 
extent the start on the journey back to the ratio of Devis but it was not until two years 
later that the position became much clearer. 
98 At paragraph 30 
99 Collins ( 1992); at page 117 
100 And removed the minimum basic award of two weeks pay 
101 Collins (1992); at page 117 
102 [1985] IRLR 116 
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The case of Polkey v AE Dayton Services Limited103 was crucial because it 
'restored the importance of procedural standards in the law of unfair dismissal. It recognised 
that a dismissal may be unreasonable under what is now section 98(4) because the employer 
failed to follow a fair procedure prior to making the dismissal, even though the employer had 
good grounds for the dismissal such as the need to make redundancies.' 104 
The decision effectively overruled British Labour Pump and has had the effect of 
taking away 'the balance of probabilities test'. 
However this was not a straight return to the strictness of procedural fairness that had 
been evident in the early 1970's. The House of Lords made it very clear that 
procedural standards should not be regarded as mandatory and in replacing the 
'probabilities test' introduced 'reasonableness'. This introduction has had a massive 
impact on the way procedural fairness is implemented and interpreted because 
wherever 'reasonableness' is, BORRT is sure to follow. 
Polkey leaves us with a landscape that gives hope to both the employer and employee. 
On the one hand Lord Bridge summarise the requirement of fairness as: 
'in the case of incapacity, the employer will normally not act reasonably unless he gives the 
employee fair warning and an opportunity to mend his ways and show that he can do the job; 
in the case of misconduct, the employer will normally not act reasonably unless he 
investigates the complaint of misconduct fully and fairly and hears whatever the employee 
wishes to say in his defence or in explanation or mitigation; in the case of redundancy, the 
employer will normally not act reasonably unless he warns and consults any employees 
affected or their representative, adopts a fair basis on which to select for redundancy and takes 
103 [ 1987] IRLR 503 
104 Collins, H - (1990) Procedural fairness after Polkey; at page 39 
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such steps as may be reasonable to avoid or minimise redundancy by redeployment within his 
own organisation.' 105 
This seemingly stringent test is to be balanced by Lord Mackay's assertion in the 
same case: 
'If the employer could reasonably have concluded in the light of the circumstances known to 
him at the time of the dismissal that consultation or warning would be utterly useless he might 
well act reasonably even if he did not observe the provisions of the code [ACAS Code of 
Practice]. Failure to observe the requirement of the code relating to consultation or warning 
will not necessarily render a dismissal unfair.' 106 
The case is the epitome of balance; 'Relaxation of procedural requirements is 
permissible where the employer reasonably concludes that further inquiry would be 
futile,' 107 or in the words of Justice Browne-Wilkinson in Silifant which was approved 
by Lord Mackay in Polkey: 
'there may be cases where the offence is so heinous and the facts so manifestly clear that a 
reasonable employer could take the view that whatever explanation the employee advanced it 
would make no difference.' 108 
The balancing factor is the 'reasonableness' of the employer because it gave the 
judiciary the scope to manoeuvre. In essence this left the law at a halfway house 
between symbolic affirmation and procedure as substance with BORRT being 
introduced as the crucial and controlling factor in the standard of procedural fairness. 
This has had massive implications into how procedural fairness has been construed 
and we will look at the results below. But before this, we must consider the final and 
105 At paragraph 28 
106 At paragraph 5 
107 Collins, ( 1992); at page 119 
108 ibid at paragraph 31 
89 
very new chapter in the construction of procedural fairness. Once again the change is 
as a result of legislative action. 
The Employment Act 2002 inserted section 98A into the ERA 1996. The background 
of the instrument was the desire by the Government to reduce applications to 
tribunals. By inserting minimum procedural requirements it was hoped that recourse 
to internal procedures would increase the rate of resolution before submitting claims 
to tribunals. 109 The effect of section 98A is to 'fix minimum procedural standards' 110 
and can be presented in the simple format of a three-step procedure: 
1. A written warning of dismissal 
2. A hearing which allows both parties to explain their cases 
3. An appeal- if practicable this should involve more senior management 
The reality of these requirements is 'a little more elaborate than the three step political 
presentation' 111 but ultimately they set a basic floor of rights which one would assume 
constitutes procedural fairness. They are not especially onerous in their burden on an 
employer and envisage that many companies would have more superior disciplinary 
procedures than this as part of their standard procedure. This fact is potentially very 
important as Smith and Wood point out the new legislation leaves the door open for a 
return to the British Labour Pump principle: 
'The new section 98A will contain a major advantage for such an employer. It will state that, 
in relation to any part of a procedure that is more advanced than the standard [section 98A] 
procedure, if an employer fails to follow any part of that part [i.e. his own superior procedure] 
109 This belief came from the 1998 Survey of Employment Tribunal Applications -Employment 
Relations Research Services No 13, DTI, 2002 
110 Schedule 2 paragraph 1 
111 Collins (2004); at page 45 
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the dismissal will still not be unfair if the employer shows that he would have decided to 
dismiss the employee if he had followed the procedure.' 112 
On the face of it section 98A seems to be a very proactive way of making sure 
minimum procedural fairness occurs. Failure to follow this procedure will mean the 
dismissal is automatically unfair with additional compensation being awarded. 
However, whilst it has the effect of pushing employers towards a basic level of 
procedure it has the countervailing effect of creating disincentives to employers with 
superior protection to actually instigate those. It could be argued it has the effect of 
bringing everyone's claim down to the lowest common denominator and therefore we 
will see a uniform standard of procedural fairness but at a lower level than was in 
existence in the early 1970's. It must be noted that this section did not come into 
effect until October 2004 and at present there has been little judicial comment as to its 
interpretation. The fears about a return to British Labour Pump could be misplaced. 
What is perhaps likely is for the judiciary to take the new requirements and reinforce 
its view of a reasonable employer by reference to them, thus incorporating them as a 
requisite of BORRT and worryingly thus subjecting them to a reasonableness 
interpretation themselves rather than leaving them as an objective standard. 
2.6.1 Procedural fairness and the influence of BORRT 
It is to the relationship between BORRT and procedural fairness we must now turn. 
We have seen above how 'reasonableness' has become infused into the test for 
procedural fairness especially in deciding the stringency of the procedure to be 
followed. But this is not the only way BORRT has become entwined with the 
requirements of procedural fairness. As we have already discussed above a decision to 
112 Smith and Wood (2003); at page 542 
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dismiss for belief in an employees misconduct is essentially a substantive one. 
However, there is a very important procedural step which has to be cleared before an 
employer can legitimately dismiss. This step, of 'reasonable investigation', has 
effectively replaced any notion of substantive justice in situations involving 
misconduct. If the employer can show the investigation was 'reasonable', then to 
interfere with the subsequent dismissal decision would be an incursion into the 
managerial prerogative that the judiciary are unwilling to make. 
This 'reasonable investigation' has, as can probably be easily deduced, recently 
become subsumed by BORRT. 
The starting point for this journey of legislative interpretation is the EAT in 1978. 
British Home Stores v Burchil/113 involved an employee dismissed because the 
employer suspected she had been stealing from the company by falsifying sales 
records. They laid down a test, which has subsequently received widespread approval 
in the Court of Appeal 114, which was to aid interpretation of fairness in section 98(4). 
The test is in essence: 
in determining the fairness or otherwise of the dismissal of an employee who is suspected or 
believed to be guilty of misconduct, an employment tribunal has to decide whether the 
employer had a reasonable suspicion amounting to a belief in the guilt of the employee of that 
misconduct at that time. This involves three elements: 
I. The fact of that belief must be established 
2. It must be shown that the employer had reasonable grounds for that belief. 
113 [1978] IRLR 379 
114 See Foley v Post Office; HSBC v Madden [2000] IRLR 827 
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3. At the stage at which the employer formed that belief on those grounds, it must have 
carried out as much investigation into the matter as was reasonable in all the 
circumstances of the case.' 115 
How this 'reasonable' was to be interpreted was the subject of much discussion and in 
the recent case of Sainsbury's Supermarkets v Hitt116the Court of Appeal emphasised 
that: 
'The range of reasonable responses test applies as much to the question of whether an 
investigation into suspected misconduct was reasonable in all the circumstances as it does to 
other procedural and substantive aspects of the decision to dismiss a person from his 
employment for a conduct reason.' 117 
The impact of this statement cannot be underestimated. Essentially it says in conduct 
cases, all of the employers behaviour is to be judged with reference to BORRT.118The 
result is that the judiciary have inserted their own discretionary vehicle throughout the 
whole of the legislation. 
This leaves us with a confused picture surrounding procedural fairness. The courts 
have acknowledged the importance of procedural fairness and said it will be rare for 
an employer to show a dismissal was fair if the procedure was unfair119, however this 
statement now has to come with the caveat that 'reasonableness' as judged by 
BORRT is applicable. Once again the situation is anything but clear; how can 
certainty exist when the failure to follow procedural fairness requirements become 
only one factor in deciding if the dismissal is unfair, yet the judiciary do not define 
115 See Burchill; paragraph 2 
116 [2003] IRLR 23 
117 ibid paragraph 30 
118 It will be remembered from the discussion above how much scope BORRT gives to employers and 
the judiciary and how it seems skewed against the interests of the employee 
119 And the introduction of section 98A buttresses this view 
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the other factors and the weight given to each one of them. The whole situation is one 
where it seems that the judiciary have the scope to enforce procedural fairness when it 
suits them. In order to attempt to find a coherent framework for the application of the 
rules surrounding procedural fairness we must again tum to law and economics. 
2. 7 law and economics: the facilitator 
Collins, in an effort to prescribe a model which best fits the judiciary's approach, 
helpfully notes: 
'The reluctance of the tribunals to adopt the strict rules of natural justice demanded by respect 
for the dignity of individuals is revealed in many of their decisions ... This unwillingness to 
implement the principles of natural justice for disciplinary dismissals seems to be grounded in 
efficiency considerations.' 120 
Collins concludes that a model of procedural fairness based on the concepts of 
efficient managerial decisions best accords with tribunal practice. 121 So does a law 
and economics analysis support this conclusion? 
'The reasonable employer is the efficient employer, the one who adopts procedures conducive 
to manpower management. It is this subtle combination of the costs and benefits of dismissal 
procedures which best accounts for the diversity and flexibility of the courts' and tribunals' 
standards of procedural fairness. 122 
'The reasonable employer is the efficient employer'; the corollary of this is the 
standard of procedural fairness is proportional to efficiency. It is necessary to unpack 
a statement of this magnitude in order to see if it is indeed applicable to the judiciary's 
approach to procedural fairness. 
12° Collins (1992); at pages 120-121 -He also goes on to note that the model of democratic 
P:articipation also does not shed much light on the practice of the tribunals. 
21 ibid page 123 
122 ibid 
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Efficiency can be achieved through procedural fairness in two ways. By having a 
recognised procedure 123, employers can know what is expected of them and jump 
through the requisite hoops. It also means they can cost out dismissals124, because 
there will be certainty as to the total costs that will be awarded. This will lead to 
greater efficiency in the operations of the employer when enacting a dismissal. 
Secondly, the requirement of procedure has the effect of making sure employers do 
not dismiss without thought. This has the effect of making sure decisions to dismiss 
are for efficiency gains; the freedom to 'hire and fire' is not necessarily good for 
economic stability or an employer's productive efficiency. By concentrating an 
employer's mind through procedure the judiciary can ensure efficiency is promoted. 
Yet some procedural requirements can be an onerous burden on employers and in 
some ways become like regulations,125 which as established before, are not always 
conducive to efficiency. It is here that BORRT' s value really shines. The effect of the 
discretion BORRT gives the judiciary is to minimise the impact of the regulations 
when it would be against the principles of efficiency to enforce the procedure. This 
discretion is clearly evidenced in the decision of the EAT in Rowe v Rental/26: 
'It is very important that internal appeals procedures run by commercial companies should not 
be cramped by legal requirements imposing impossible burdens on companies in the conduct 
of their personal affairs.' 127 
123 Which is the important element in the judgement of whether dismissal is fair or not (i.e. giving 
greater weight to procedural fairness as opposed to substantive fairness) 
124 There is a cynical argument that says, if an employer can know how much Court will award they 
can calculate whether it is worth following the procedure or whether to not follow any procedure 
thereby not incurring costs but just paying increased compensation. 
125 This is especially true in light of section 98A 
126 [ 1982] IRLR 177 
127 ibid 
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This logic can be evidenced in the change in the judiciary's approach from symbolic 
affirmation to procedure as substance. The introduction of a mandatory award for 
failure of following procedure, despite good substantive reasons, led to the standard of 
procedure being minimised so as not to unnecessarily burden the employer. The 
situation of the law post-Polkey and post-Hitt means that the standard is variable, 
being controlled by the most efficient outcome. This can be seen in the case of 
Whitbread v Hal/128• Mr Hall was the manger of a very successful hotel for the 
employer but was dismissed for gross misconduct due to stock control problems. The 
Court of Appeal held his dismissal to be unfair. They held that although his 
misconduct was sufficient to warrant dismissal under BORRT the procedure of the 
disciplinary process was so flawed it rendered the dismissal unfair. On the face of it 
this finding of unfair dismissal would seem to go against the argument we have 
propounded above, but once we dig into the language of the transcript the decision 
does indeed support the efficiency argument. 
There were two crucial factors in the case; firstly, Mr Hall was very good at his job 
and had won the prestigious Evening Standard Pub of the Year Award and numerous 
awards from his employers. Secondly, the working relationship between Mr Hall and 
his immediate manager was poor. 129 The decision to dismiss came from her and she 
admitted in evidence that she did not consider any other course of action. 130 
These two details are vital in understanding the efficiency argument which explains 
the case. The court held: 
128 [2001] IRLR 275 
129 The employment tribunal diplomatically states they did not see eye to eye; at paragraph 3 
130 At paragraph 6 
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'[the] Dismissal had been decided by the applicant's immediate superior who had a bad 
relationship with him and had gone into the process with her mind made up. In the 
circumstances, that method of responding was not among those open to an employer of the 
size and resources of these employers.' 131 
It is not efficient to get rid of an employee who is good for your company simply 
because of a personal disagreement. This is in effect what the court was saying. 
Whilst Mr Hall's conduct was prima facie worthy of dismissal, because of his ability 
he should have been given a chance to explain himself so that the employer could 
make a measured decision with full knowledge of the situation. Unless there is a clear 
tangible efficient benefit in dismissal the tribunals do not seem willing to allow 
procedure to be circumvented. If as a result of following the procedure the employer 
still decides to dismiss, the tribunals are much more likely to accept the decision 
because they view an employer who has followed a procedure as having acted in a 
reasonable way, which is also highly indicative of them acting in an efficient way. 
BORRT acts as the front for efficiency based decisions once again: This is in part 
because 'reasonableness' is less offensive than efficiency to those who see procedural 
fairness as a right, furthermore by presenting 'reasonableness' and hiding efficiency it 
means there is flexibility to its application and variable standard, which if defined 
would possibly become victim to interpretation or challenge. 
It is hoped that we have shown that by viewing BORRT through the eyes of law and 
economics there is indeed a chilling logic and rationale to its application. To many it 
will still seem a gloss on statue and a tool which delivers injustice and in some ways 
131 At paragraph 19 
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this is indeed true132. However what it is not, it is submitted, is a principle with no 
definable rationale or purpose. Its function is very clear - to provide the vehicle 
through which the judiciary have the discretion to apply efficiency concepts which are 
the most suitable for the economic stability and welfare of the UK. Understanding this 
concept gives us the potential to develop a framework which can deliver certainty and 
coherency. The decline in substantive justice and rise in procedural justice it is 
suggested is as a result of the judiciary realising that they can have more control and 
impact over facilitating efficiency in the procedural setting as opposed to the 
substantive setting. Whilst it could be said this mirrors respect for the managerial 
prerogative this argument would fail to satisfactorily explain the cases where the 
judiciary have interfered, both in procedural and substantive settings. A law and 
economics analysis can however explain theses cases by recourse to efficiency; 
decisions are made to give the most efficient outcome, which can require judicial 
intervention. 133 Therefore BORRT when understood as a vehicle for efficiency does 
not seem quite such an unruly beast as it marauds through the whole of the unfair 
dismissal legislation. 
In short we have seen that BORRT has become the single most important tool in 
disciplinary dismissals. The broad interpretation and prominence given to it by the 
judiciary has meant it is highly influential. This is not by chance; it is the perfect 
vehicle for applying a law and economics rationale. It provides the flexibility to allow 
decisions made on the basis of efficiency. It does not get tied down in precedent or 
rules or parameters but is guided solely by efficiency. This means that a rationale and 
certainty does exist, one just has to be looking in the right place. BORRT also 
132 It probably continues to depend on where your allegiance lies- the workers or the employers 
133 Watling and Hall both provide appropriate and familiar examples 
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provides a valuable mask for this efficiency rationale; one which many find offensive 
and insulates the judiciary from criticism because on the face of it the judiciary 
appears to be applying an ambiguous Statute. 
It must however be noted that this thesis does not intend to offer any opinion as to 
whether a law and economics rationale is a good thing and to be promoted. It is a very 
complex discussion to decide where the balance between efficiency at the expense of 
equity should be drawn and the author seeks to make no comment on this. It is the 
author's aim for the sake of clarity and space to only discuss the appropriateness of 
law and economics as an analytical tool and what can be observed from this 
analysis 134. This thesis seeks to suggest a concept not analyse it. 
2.8 Economic dismissal and the use of 'Some other Substantial Reason' 
'It is important that nothing should be done to impair the ability of employers to reorganise 
their workforce and their terms and conditions of work so as to improve efficiency. 135 
It is with this ringing endorsement for efficiency that we tum to consider economic 
dismissal. Economic dismissals have traditionally not been contentious as the 
legislation seemed clear and a redundancy payment was given to redundant 
employees. However in recent years the judiciary have taken a very flexible approach 
particularly with reference to the use of SOSR. This has had the effect of causing 
134 For more in depth discussion of law and economics in society see Duxbury ( 1991) Is there a 
dissenting tradition in law and economics; Polinksky (1974) Posner's Economics analysis of law; 
Campbell and Picciotto (1998) Exploring the interaction between law and economics; Posner ( 1984) 
Some economics of labour law; Deakin, S (1996) Law and economics in 'Legal frontiers' ed Philip 
Thomas; Ewing, KD (1990) Economics and labour law in Britain: Thatcher's radical experiment; 
Hirsch ( 1999) Law and economics, An Introductory analysis and Estreicher, S ( 1985) Unjust dismissal 
laws: Some cautionary notes 
135 Lord Denning in Lesney Products' Co Ltd v Nolan [ 1977] ICR 235 (CA) 
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much criticism over the judicial approach to economic dismissals and an increase in 
uncertainty. This section will suggest that this increased flexibility can be traced to a 
desire to effect efficiency. It will show that there is an efficiency rationale which has 
perhaps not been acknowledged before and that SOSR is used in very much the same 
way as BORRT, to facilitate the efficiency flexibility. Firstly however it is important 
to note the debate surrounding redundancy and how the judiciary has interpreted the 
Statute, in order to see the lengths they have gone to obtain efficiency in redundancy. 
The primary area for consideration and activity in economic dismissals is redundancy. 
It will be remembered that protection from economic dismissal in the form of a 
redundancy payment was instigated in1965 136 and it has become incorporated into the 
current unfair dismissal statute: The core sections relating to redundancy are to be 
found in Sections 105, 109 and 139 of the ERA 1996. The first thing we need to note 
is that redundancy is a potentially fair reason for dismissal under section 98(2). An 
employee will be classed as redundant if the employer can fulfil the requirements of 
the statute in section 139. This section has been subjected to much debate137 on its 
appropriate interpretation despite its seemingly plain words. This confusion seems to 
have been settled by the comparatively recent judgment in the House of Lords of 
Murray v Foyle Meat/ 38 which authoritatively approved the test laid down in the 
EAT in the case of Safe way Stores v Burrell. 139 In Burrell the EAT concluded after 
much discussion that section 139 required a three stage process: 
1. was the employee dismissed? If so, 
136 Redundancy Payments Act 1965 - This was 6 years before unfair dismissal became a much more 
fenerally protected right. 
37 See generally Smith and Wood (2003) at page 625; Barnard- (2000) Redundant approaches to 
redundancy; Deakin and Morris (2001); page 502; The transcript of Safeway Stores v Burrell [1997] 
IRLR 200 also provides a thorough analysis of the history of the changing tests. 
138 [ 1999] IRLR 562 
139 [ 1997] IRLR 200 
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2. had the requirements of the employer's business for employees to carry out 
work of a particular kind ceased or diminished or were they expected to 
diminish? If so, 
3. was the dismissal of the employee caused wholly or mainly by the state of 
affairs indicated at stage 2? 140 
In giving the leading judgement in the House of Lords in Murray, Lord Irvine said: 
'This conclusion [that it was a situation of redundancy and not unfair dismissal] is in 
accordance with the analysis of the statutory provisions by Judge Peter Clark in Safeway 
Stores v Burrell and I need say no more than that I entirely agree with his admirable clear 
reasoning and conclusions.' 141 
Lord Irvine approved a very pro-employer test when it comes to deciding whether a 
redundancy situation exists or not. He said the tribunals must ask themselves two 
'simple' 142 questions of fact: 
'The first is whether one or another of various states of economic affairs exists ... .The second 
question is whether the dismissal is attributable wholly or mainly, to that state of affairs. This 
is a question of causation.' 143 
This test has been described as: 
'The Lord Chancellor[ as he was then] adopts a broad, practical approach but in doing so 
effectively air-brushes the words 'work of a particular kind' from the face of the statute: The 
statute does not say "there is a redundancy whenever a dismissal is attributable to a diminution 
140 ibid at page 200 
141 At paragraph 6 
142 Lord Irvine has caused much amusement amongst academics and students with his nonchalant 
dismissal of section 139 being 'simplicity itself 
143 At paragraph 6 
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in the employer's requirements for employees", but that is the effect of the Lord Chancellor's 
approach.' 144 
The result of the decision and it could be argued creativity in 'airbrushing work of a 
particular kind out' is that employers have a large amount of flexibility when it comes 
to redundancy situations145 . This is not surprising as the judiciary have consistently 
held the view, as illuminated in Nolan above, that nothing should interfere with 
employers right to re-organise in the interests of efficiency: 
'It is settled ... that an employer is entitled to reorganise his business so as to improve its 
efficiency and, in doing so, to propose to his staff a change in terms and conditions of their 
employment; and to dispense with their services if they do not agree. Such a change does not 
automatically give the staff a right to redundancy payments. It only does so if the change in 
the terms and conditions is due to a redundancy situation.' 146 
This deference and hands-off approach towards redundancy is, it is submitted, not 
very controversial. Part of this reasoning is the fact that when an employee is made 
redundant he does at least receive something as recognition for his service; there is an 
element of financial stability given by the redundancy payment. There is sound law 
and economics theory behind the application of a redundancy payment and the 
judiciary's approach to make it easy to classify dismissals as redundancy can 
potentially be seen as attributable to that. 
144 Barnard (2000); at page 38 
145 There is also a line of thought which suggests Murray clears the way for a practice known as 
'bumping employees'- this is because employees who are bumped will be able to claim redundancy 
but not unfair dismissal- the cost of redundancy being much lower- see Smith and Wood (2003) at 
page 630 for more in-depth discussion. 
146 Johnson v Nottinghamshire Combined Police Authority fl974] I AllER 1082; at 1084 
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When the redundancy payment was introduced Otto Kahn-Freund very insightfully 
commented that it was: 
'[A] method of strengthening management control by breaking down resistance to dismissals 
which were necessary for efficiency and labour mobility, one of the most urgent needs of our 
economy.' 147 
Proponents of law and economics theory suggest that redundancy payments facilitate 
the change that is necessary for economic efficiency to occur because it compensates 
those who 'make sacrifices in the interests of economic expansion.' 148 It must be 
noted that not everyone accepts this view and there is some suggestion that the 
presence of redundancy payments (and their relative low cost) actually encourages 
'excessive layoffs.' 149 It would however still seem more beneficial to a company (and 
the national economy) to make some workers redundant than to allow the company to 
go bust because it could not afford its wage bill. If this were to happen, the allocation 
of resources would fall squarely on the shoulders of the government; in the eyes of 
law and economics this is a comparatively worse result than making some workers 
redundant because it is inefficient resource allocation. 
The presence of a redundancy payment in economic dismissals also has a positive 
effect on employers in exercising their mind properly before taking the decision to 
make employees redundant. In a very similar way to that found in procedural fairness, 
the cost of redundancy forces an employer to weigh up the options and make the most 
efficient decision. This should in theory mean that decisions to dismiss are made out 
of economic necessity and not for arbitrary or capricious reasons. Economic 
147 In Lewis ( 1979); at page 214 
148 See Beck ( 1999); at page 99 
149 Ibid 
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dismissals can be understood clearly from an efficiency perspective and it seems that 
the Statute has been interpreted in this way. A law and economics analysis is therefore 
appropriate and many would argue obvious. 
2.8.1 Some other substantial reason (SOSR) and its use as a law and economics 
vehicle 
Of much greater controversy and confusion is the application and scope of 'Some 
Other Substantial Reason' ("SOSR"). Section 98 as has already been established is 
the lynch pin of the unfair dismissal legislation and covers situations where dismissals 
may be fair. As well as indicating categories of reasons which are capable of 
rendering a dismissal is fair, it also includes scope that the reason for dismissal may 
be: 
'[S]ome other substantial reason of a kind such as to justify the dismissal of an employee 
holding the position which the employee held.' 150 
If an employee puts forward SOSR as the principal reason for dismissal then it again 
is subject to section 98(4) and the test of fairness as perpetrated by BORRT. The main 
use of SOSR in the tribunals has been in the area relating to changing business needs 
and reorganisation, where its presence and use has had the effect of 'greatly 
expanding the scope of legitimate economic reasons.' 151 The presence of SOSR is 
evocative, with some calling its use potentially 'Chimerica/'152 while others have used 
just as powerful rhetoric to point towards its necessity: 
150 Section 98 (l(b)) ERA 1996 
151 Deakin and Morris (2001); at page 475 
152 Bowers and Clark- (1981) unfair dismissal and managerial prerogative: A study of "other 
substantial reason"; at page 34 
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'To achieve a sensible balance, the employer must somehow be allowed to make changes 
necessary for the efficiency (and in the extreme case the survival) of the enterprise. 153 
SOSR when used in an economic dismissals context prima facie seems to have the 
effect of circumventing redundancy as the reason for dismissal, thus releasing the 
employer from the liability of a redundancy payment and leaving the employee with 
nothing. But is this a correct reading of SOSR and what restrictions have the judiciary 
put on its use through their interpretation? To answer this question, we first have to 
look at how SOSR developed. 
It has existed in its present form from the very beginning of the statute's history and 
surprisingly despite the effect it has of subverting some of the intentions of ILO 
Recommendation 119 it does not seem to have been discussed in Parliament. 154 This 
means we have very little idea how wide Parliament intended SOSR to be construed 
and the plain meaning of the statue does not offer much guidance. The scope of SOSR 
was considered by the National Industrial Relations Court (NIRC) 155 in the early case 
of RS Components v R E Irwin156 and the interpretation offered has prevailed 
throughout the tribunals and courts since. 
The appellate hearing in Irwin was because the tribunal had proceeded on the basis 
that a reason for dismissal is not capable of being SOSR unless it is a reason ejusdem 
generis (of the same kind or nature) with the reasons specified as potentially fair 
153 Smith and Wood (2003); at page 599 
154 See Bowers and Clark (1981); at page 34 
155 The forerunner to the EAT 
156 [1973] IRLR 239 
105 
reasons for dismissal in section 98(2). Brightman J in the NIRC held in unequivocal 
terms that: 
'A reason for dismissal falling within the terms 'some other substantial reason' in [s.98(1 (b))] 
does not have to be a reason ejusdem generis as the reasons specified in [s.98(2)]. For whilst 
Parliament may well have intended to set out in [s.98(2)] the common reasons for a dismissal, 
they can hardly have hoped to produce an exhaustive catalogue of all the circumstances in 
which a company would be justified in terminating the services of an employee. In some 
situations, such as the need to restrict use of knowledge etc, it would be unfortunate if an 
employer were unable to meet the situation without infringing or risking infringing rights 
conferred by the [ERA 1996]." 57 
This very wide interpretation arguably has to be constrained within the umbrella of 
fairness because the NIRC seemed to qualify its comments by saying: 
'We do not quarrel with the Tribunals proposition that the words 'substantial reason of a kind 
such as to justify ... dismissal ought not as a matter of good industrial relations and common 
fairness to be construed too widely against an employee' ... The words must be construed 
according to the ordinary canons of construction and consistently with the manifest intention 
of the Act. " 58 
Yet this statement is ambiguous and unhelpful. We have already noted that Parliament 
made no mention of how SOSR was to be interpreted or what its aim was. To 
interpret its scope in line with the rest of the Act presents a unique set of problems. 
Depending from which viewpoint you look the aims of the Act can be 'fairness' or 
just as plausibly 'increased efficiency in the workforce.' 159These are obviously in 
stark contrast with one another and the interpretation of SOSR would naturally differ; 
if the aim was fairness then SOSR would be interpreted very narrowly with reasons 
157 ibid page 239 
158 ibid page 239 
159 See chapter 1 n64 
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being ejusdem generis with s.98(2) and therefore SOSR would act as a 'safety valve, 
allowing a potentially fair dismissal in situations closely analogous to those listed.' 160 
If however the aim is efficiency then it would seem logical to construe SOSR widely 
in order to give employers maximum flexibility and avoid statutory liabilities when 
dismissing for economic reasons. As such common fairness would only come into 
play where decisions by the employer were perverse or not in the interests of 
efficiency: 
'The principal concern of the NIRC in Irwin was apparently to preserve free of legal control 
the power of the employer to initiate changes beneficial to the development of industry 
without incurring the costs of unfair dismissal or of redundancy compensation.' 161 
This would seem to evidence which way the NIRC thought SOSR should be 
construed and this widening of the scope of SOSR has seemingly pervaded 
throughout the past 33 years with Bowers and Clarke bemoaning the very wide scope 
of SOSR and saying that as result: 
'In very few reported cases have employers not reached the threshold of substantiality.' 162 
The academic criticism surrounding SOSR is concentrated on saying the scope is too 
wide and as a result it is being implemented in a way which is against the legislative 
aims. Bowers and Clark recognise that an element of flexibility is needed but say the 
threshold is too low163 whilst Collins states: 
160 Deakin and Morris (2001); page 475 
161 Ibid 
162 Bowers and Clark (1981); page 35 
163 ( 1981) At page 37 -they also suggest that some tribunals have taken to viewing SOSR through 
wednesbury unreasonableness spectacles and as such often the scope given to it will only be interfered 
with if it seems perverse. 
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'The employer has an easy ride to justify the dismissal under the rubric of other substantial 
reason as soon as the employer appeals to business considerations, for the court will not in 
general look behind the business reasons and assess their merits.' 164 
This reticence by the judiciary to look behind SOSR has been acknowledged in the 
Court of Appeal, where they said: 
'It was not open to the court to investigate the commercial and economic reasons which 
prompted the closure. It may be that the court should have this power, but it does not have it 
at present.' 165 
It would seem therefore that SOSR has been given a wide scope, which is very much 
in the employers favour. However, like many other parts of the unfair dismissal 
legislation it does not have a definable controlling criteria as evidenced by Lord 
Denning's statement in Hollister v NFU, where he said SOSR can be used when there 
is: 
'Sound and good business reason for the reorganisation' 166 
What 'sound and good business reasons' are is not illuminated and would seem to 
remain as elusive as defining reasonableness in BORRT. This great width is worrying 
because of the effect SOSR has had in expanding the area of economic dismissals. 
Now, economic dismissals that are not for redundancy167 will not necessarily be 
unfair but be justified by SOSR thus avoiding any liability. The limits of SOSR and 
its operation can however be understood if we view law and economics as the 
controlling mechanism. 
164 Collins (1992); at page 66 
165 James W Cook & Co v Tipper [ 1990] IRLR 386 
166 Hollister v National Farmers Union [ 1979] IRLR 238; paragraph 12. 
167 Which has been narrowly defined by the case law 
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It would seem in the environment of business re-organisation and economic dismissal 
efficiency is controlled by flexibility and necessity. We can see from the cases that the 
increased scope given to SOSR by the judiciary generally occurs when one of these 
functions is at stake. This is recognised by Bowers and Clark: 
'A review of the 'reorganisation' case law shows the EAT and Court of Appeal appearing to 
accept as valid employers' claims that to compete efficiently in a free market they must be 
allowed latitude to trim their workforce and make 'efficient' their work methods without 
being hampered by laws protecting their workers.' 168 
There is no better summation of this point than in O'Hare and Rutheiford v 
Rotaprint, 169where Kilner Brown J says: 
'The problem here is whether or not the employer can avoid the implication of payment for 
redundancy where he has over-manned his work force to cope with work which never 
materialised. Common sense would indicate that he should .. .It would be disastrous to the 
national economy if employers were to be inhibit from taking justifiable risks in planning 
increased production, and taking on increased labour, with high hopes of fuller employment, 
by the thought that they may be saddled with claims for redundancy payments if they have to 
cut down on the workforce because their hopes have not been fulfilled.' 170 
In this case, the tribunal took the view there was a necessity to avoid the redundancy 
payments in order to keep the business efficient. This wide reading of SOSR can be 
seen to cause great injustice to dismissed employees who lose their job through no 
fault of their own and still receive no compensation. But this view must be tempered 
by the bigger picture, that a failure to allocate resources in the most efficient way will 
cost society more in the long term. 
168 Bowers and Clark (1981); page 39 
169 [1980] IRLR 47 
170 ibid paragraph 11 
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Again, if we turn to the familiar case of StJohn of God Healthcare and Brooks we 
can see the judiciary upholding SOSR as another potentially fair reason for dismissal 
because the employer needed the flexibility to be able to dictate new employment 
terms. If the tribunal had indicated Brooks was in fact redundant, the employer could 
have been facing 170 redundancy payment claims and would have then had to incur 
the cost of hiring new staff on top of that. This is obviously not efficient and would 
have probably caused the closure of the business. As a result, by circumventing the 
Redundancy Payment and holding that the dismissals could also be fair for SOSR the 
tribunal were allocating resources in favour of the employer because he had the 
greater need for flexibility and thus the employer could carry on employing the 
majority, which is the most efficient outcome for the employer and the State. 
One more case, which we have briefly touched upon, will suffice to illustrate the point 
that SOSR once seen as controlled by law and economics, has a logical rationale. In 
Hollister v National Farmers Union171Mr Hollister was dismissed for refusing to 
accept a new contract of employment, which was designed to bring him and other 
employees into line with the rest of the Country. This reorganisation was as a result of 
submissions by the Cornish Mutual (for whom Mr Hollister worked) to the effect that 
they were disadvantaged compared to others in the UK because they could not offer 
life or fire assurance. The reorganisation meant that there would be increased 
remuneration for the employees but also less advantageous pension arrangements. Mr 
Hollister refused to accept the new terms and as a result was dismissed. He claimed 
unfair dismissal. The Court of Appeal restored the industrial tribunals view that the 
dismissal was fair for SOSR. 
171 [1979] IRLR 238 
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The words of Lord Denning are particularly illuminating: 
'It was recognised by the Court in Ellis v Brighton Co-operative Society [ 1976] IRLR 419 that 
"where there has been a properly consulted-upon reorganisation which, if it is not done, is 
going to bring the whole business to a standstill, a failure to go along with the new 
arrangements may well constitute 'some other substantial reason."' Certainly, I think, 
everyone would agree with that. But in the present case Mr Justice Arnold expanded it a little 
so as not to limit it to where it came absolutely to a standstill but to where there was some 
sound, good business reason for the reorganisation. I must say I see no reason to differ from 
Mr Justice Arnold's view on that. It must depend in all circumstances whether the 
reorganisation was such that the only sensible thing to do was to terminate the employee's 
contract unless he would agree to a new arrangement. It seems to me that that [sic] paragraph 
may well be satisfied [s.98], and indeed was satisfied, in this case, having regard to the 
commercial necessity of rearrangements being made and the termination of the relationship 
with the Cornish Mutual, and the setting up of a new relationship via the NFU Mutual 
Insurance Ltd. On that rearrangement being made, it was absolutely essential for new 
contracts to be made with the existing group secretaries: and the only way to deal with it was 
to terminate the agreements and offer reasonable new ones. It seems to me that that [sic] 
would be, and was, a substantial reason of a kind sufficient to justify dismissal.' 172 
We can clearly see that SOSR was justified in the mind of Lord Denning because of 
the necessity to make efficient change; it was for 'sound good business reason' and as 
such the employer should not be penalised with financial liability. To not have this 
result would be bad for the economy because dismissal for economic reason would 
potentially cripple business leading to reluctance to dismiss, which could ultimately 
lead to greater job loss and more cost to the State. 
172 ibid paragraph 12 
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The evidence points towards SOSR being another law and economics vehicle. If we 
see the promotion of efficiency as the rationale behind SOSR, then we can see a 
logical rationale which provides certainty and definable boundaries. SOSR can be 
interpreted as widely or narrowly as necessary in order to bring about an efficient 
result, whether that be in the employers favour (as it often is) or not. It would seem 
therefore that once again law and economics provides a tenable solution to the 
problem of coherence with regard to SOSR which also fits in the context of a new 
efficiency understanding of unfair dismissal as a whole. 
Prondzynski who quotes the unreported case of Feltham v Co-op Insurance Society173 
aptly supports this conclusion: 
'It is established law that the employer is entitled, subject to the requirements of 
reasonableness, to run his business in the way he thinks right and that Parliament has 
protected the rights of business to reorganise the business . .t 74 
SOSR gives freedom in reorganisation, which in theory results in efficiency. When 
we place SOSR into the control of law and economics it does not appear so 
'chimerical' in its uncertainty of application, although it must be acknowledged that 
its very presence is of concern to many interested in equity. Prondzynski continues: 
'It is indeed possible to argue that 'fair' grounds for dismissal under the ERA 1996 amount to 
a charter of employer rights, particularly in light of their interpretation by the courts. But 
these provisions would be less unpredictable in their effect if they formed part of a more 
coherent and deliberate statutory framework to set out the employer interests which should 
receive protection in the public interest.d 75 (emphasis added) 
173 29 July 1998 
174 Prondzynski, F- (2003) Labour Law as a business facilitator; at page 109 in 'Legal Regulation of 
Employment Relation' Eds Collins, Davies and Rideout 
175 Ibid page 109 
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It is precisely this function, of giving a framework that illuminates the rights in the 
public interest, which a law and economics analysis has sought to fulfil. The drive for 
efficiency in the judiciary is perhaps best summed up by Phillips J, whose comments 
would seem to resonate with that of law and economic theory: 
'It is important that the operation of legislation in relation to unfair dismissal should not 
impede employers unreasonably in the efficient management of their business, which must be 
in the interests of aU" 76 
In summary, it is suggested that the judicial use of BORRT and SOSR and the 
subsequent rise in procedural fairness at the expense of substantive fairness is in order 
to facilitate efficiency, which is in the interests of all. Law and economics brings 
coherence and provides an underlying rationale. 
176 Cook v Linne! [ 1977] IRLR 132 
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Chapter 3- Failing to give the right remedy? 
The level of job security an employee has will determine the remedy they receive. 
However such simplicity has not been seen in the operation of the unfair dismissal 
legislation, the foggy haze of confusion surrounding the determination of the 
appropriate remedy and the correct level of job security seems to be permanent. There 
seems little understanding or acceptance as to why the judiciary have taken the stance 
that they have and how they actually interpret the statute. This lack of clarity is not 
satisfactory when one considers that the judicial determinations have a massive 
impact on individuals and employers. This chapter will look individually at job 
security and remedies before turning to consider why the judiciary have steadfastly 
resisted the increased use of wrongful dismissal, which does not suffer from the same 
confusion as to its rationale. Looking firstly as job security, we will consider what the 
legislation envisaged as 'job security' before suggesting job security is in fact far 
more complex than is commonly understood. We will look at some different 
suggestions for how job security should be interpreted before developing an existing 
theory of tri-partite differential distinction to show that law and economics suggests 
efficiency is in fact the controlling factor for the judiciary's differential and seemingly 
confused approach. 
The second part of this chapter will concentrate on the remedies available. After 
detailing what the legislation provides for, we will then tum to discuss the difference 
between the ideology and the reality. We will discuss these reasons in depth and bring 
together a common thread that links them. This thread is efficiency and it will be seen 
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that efficiency casts new light on the judiciary's approach and brings with it 
illumination of a consistent coherent rationale. 
The final area of this chapter will concentrate on the potential in using the common 
law action of wrongful dismissal as a claim. This area is pertinent because with so 
many problems surrounding the unfair dismissal legislation, a natural conclusion 
would be to seek to use the common law as a different avenue for claims. The 
judiciary have steadfastly resisted attempts to do this and have in fact gone further and 
minimised its impact. It will be shown that the explanation for this can be found in 
law and economics and that ultimately we will see that a law and economics rationale 
pervades through the judicial mindset in their approach to dismissal. 
Unfair dismissal legislation has received sustained criticisms in some quarters because 
the critics believe the remedies available are too weak and are responsible for: 
'significantly detracted from the aim of improving job security.' 1 
Job security and remedies would seem therefore to be causally and proportionally 
linked. The importance the legislation or judiciary place on one will have a direct 
impact on the other; an increased desire by the judiciary to give employees greater job 
security would likely see an increase in the potency of the remedies. Similarly a 
decrease in the scope of remedies will suggest job security is not a priority. However 
the contention and unhappiness surrounding their roles in unfair dismissal remain 
distinct. It is for this reason that we will approach them as two separate areas, whilst 
remembering that they are indeed linked. This separatist approach will enable us to 
1 Collins, H - (1992b) The meaning of Job Security; at page 228 
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look at the subtle differences in the logic of the judiciary when applying a law and 
economics theory. 
3.1 Job Security 
The overriding criticism surrounding unfair dismissal is that it has failed to provide 
meaningful job security. This popular perception is built upon the foundations of what 
a job means to people, especially when thinking of a jobs semantic definition. White 
acknowledges this: 
'While a job is an abstraction, it is customary for a worker to refer to 'my job', or for an 
employer to talk of 'giving jobs'. It seems but a short step to objectify the concept of a job as a 
form of property, as a tangible possession. A worker can come to treat his job as a valuable 
possession: apart from the income it yields, it can provide personal satisfaction, enhanced 
personality, and a source of companionship through shared work experience ... When a worker 
loses his job- an allusion, yet again, to a possession- he can said to have been deprived of his 
property.' 2 
It is easy to see how a perception of job security, which is equivalent to a property 
right, can grow from the language society uses. This perception is fuelled by the 
importance of a job to many people. The introduction of the unfair dismissal 
legislation served to buttress this understanding as it seemed to advance: 
'the promise of job security, the right to work, even a property right.' 3 
Viewed in these terms, any dismissal must be an invasion of job security, and as such 
would be unlawful as there is a promise of job security.4 Yet within 3 years of the 
legislation coming into effect, the legislation was criticised as it seemed it had: 
2 White, P J (1984); at page 98 
3 Hepple ( l992);at page 96 
4 See Collins ( 1992b ); at page 229-231 
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'advanced the cause of employee job security hardly at all. ' 5 
This criticism could be levelled at the legislation 30 years later just as easily, so where 
has it broken down. Was job security an initial aim? What sort of job security did 
Parliament have in mind? Has the judiciary frustrated the intentions of Parliament 
with a differing interpretation of job security? 
Collins suggests that whilst job security was not the only aim of the unfair dismissal 
legislation6 it was still a repeated aim: 
'The principal rhetoric in support of the legislation, and the repeated justification for it, 
emphasise the view that one of its principal motives and intended effects included the 
improvement of job security. In its boldest from, this rhetoric claimed that the legislation 
granted workers property rights in their jobs.'7 
But it does not appear that Collins is wholly correct in this confident assertion. When 
recourse is made back to the aims8, it does not seem to indicate any intention to create 
a stringent job security protection9• 
The first thing we can deal with is that the Act had no intention of creating a property 
right in the job for employees. White stresses that: 
'Ministers in Parliament did not cite the rationale of property rights, either in 1971 when the 
unfair dismissal legislation was introduced, or in 1975 when ostensibly substantial 
amendments were enacted. In other words, the connection between law and property rights 
5 Williams, K- (1975) Unfair dismissal and job security; at page 292 
6 See chapter one for a full discussion of the aims of the legislation 
7 Collins (1992b); at page 227 
8 Looking at what was said by Parliament and the highly influential Donovan Commission 
9 For an overview of what has been said see Davies and Freedland (1993) at pages 197-205 and Hepple 
(1992) at pages 80-83 
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has been made by people outside Parliament: Motives have been imputed to politicians rather 
than uttered by them.' 10 
Deakin and Morris put it even more strongly when talking about property rights in 
jobs: 
'to claim that the provisions of the statute amount to an improvement in employment security 
is akin to arguing that legislating for insurance cover for a proportion of road users would be 
about safety.' 11 
We can buttress the suggestion that Parliament never intended to create stringent job 
security with reference to the inadequacies of the remedies. We will look at in much 
greater depth below the problems surrounding remedies but for now its suffices to say 
that the broad brush stroke is one of the remedies not being of sufficient punitive 
strength on the employer and as a result the legislation pertaining to job security 
having the appearance of a paper tiger. If Parliament had a serious intent to implement 
stringent job security then it would be expected they would enforce this with the 
creation of appropriate remedies. As we will see below when we consider remedies 
this has not occurred and it would seem a conclusion can be drawn that, as quoted at 
the beginning of this chapter, the inadequacy of the remedies does not aid the quest 
for an inferring an intention of stringent job security. 
But if there was no intention to create property rights in the jobs for employees or put 
another way stringent job security protection, what did the legislation envisage giving 
the employee? Because without any protection at all the legislation would be nothing 
10 White (1984); at page 103 
11 Deakin and Morris (2001); at page 388 
118 
more than the proverbial chocolate fireguard. This is not an easy question to answer 
because 'job security' can have a multiplicity of meanings. 
'The notion of 'job security', for example, can be taken to imply that a worker is protected in 
the particular job which he or she holds; this in turn presupposes the existence of quite rigid 
job classifications and, from a regulatory perspective, the placing of limits on the employer's 
right to change those classifications at will. At the opposite extreme, 'employment security' in 
its widest sense could be taken to refer to the availability of employment opportunities in a 
given economy; if this is the goal, economic and regulatory policy should be concerned to 
maximise the chances of employees finding a job and being able to move between jobs 
throughout their career, rather than being protected in relation to a given job which they might 
hold at any one time. Dismissal legislation does not fit neatly in either of these 
definitions. 12 (emphasis added) 
White suggests that job security is best understood as not giving property rights 
except in the narrowest of senses because the 'statutory right seems to constitute only 
a title to a meagre amount of compensation income not a title to the control, recovery 
or disposal of a valuable asset which yielded that income' 13 • The viewpoint of Neo-
classical economists would suggest the concept of job security is one which should be 
construed to facilitate high levels of employment in the economy, that is that the 
employment relationships should be pareto-efficient14 . Through this myriad of 
potential differences as to the correct construction and conception of the notion of job 
security the simplest and most insightful definition would seem to be that found in 
Deakin and Morris, where it is suggested that the level of protection Parliament had in 
mind and the level the judiciary should uphold is: 
'Security only from ungrounded or arbitrary job terrnination.t 5 (emphasis added) 
12 ibid at page 383 
13 ibid at page 104 
14 See Collins, (1992b); at page 228 
15 Deakin and Morris (2001); at page 385 
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This definition still falls some way short of providing a definitive answer as to the 
level of job security intended or indeed the rationale behind this approach. It is 
perhaps the dissatisfaction with this definition that prompted Collins to come up with 
his 'taxonomy of job security in dismissals theory' 16 He suggests that the concept of 
job security is actually best understood by reference to a taxonomy of dismissals. He 
distinguishes three classes: 
o Economic (redundancy) 
o Public (this is better understood by reference to Automatically Unfair 
Dismissal) 
o Disciplinary (this includes misconduct and incompetence) 
He then goes on to state that the legislation protects job security against these three 
types of invasion by dismissal but offers different levels of protection against each. 17 
He says economic dismissals provide very little job security and the judiciary's 
interpretation of the law scarcely makes any attempt to prevent or deter dismissal. The 
existence of redundancy pay is in order to minimise the social cost and reduce 
resistance to necessary change. There is no benefit to the economy of forcing 
employers to retain staff if there is a decrease in demand for labour as that could 
easily cause the business to become insolvent, leaving a greater number of dismissals 
and the government to internalise the cost. This minimal level of protection is ' a side 
effect not a goal of the legislation.' 18 
16 See 'The Meaning of Job Security' for a brief overview or 'Justice in Dismissal' for much greater 
depth 
17 Collins (l992b); at page 232 
18 ibid at page 233 
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Collins suggests that Public dismissals are best understood as a response to the 
subversion of civil rights not simply protecting job ownership. Whilst the effect of the 
aim can be to keep individuals in their jobs, 'the fundamental aim consists in the 
protection of these civil rights against threats from whatever quarter.' 19 So this much 
higher level of protection is designed to stop employers acting in a discriminatory 
way and can be attributed to the value society places on equality not job security. 
Disciplinary dismissals present a more complicated situation. Here the principles of 
fairness and competitiveness clash head on. The first thing to be noted is are-
affirmation that job tenure is not an aim in itself. This can be seen from the fact that 
the legislation envisages fair disciplinary dismissal and as such buttresses the 
contention that 'property rights' were never an intention of the legislation. 
Collins baldly suggests that the measure of job security can be best understood not 
with reference to the relief of poverty but the respect for dignity and employee 
autonomy: 
'The conception of job security in disciplinary dismissals is neither some partial protection of 
ownership of jobs nor some inefficient and ineffective relief of poverty, but rather one which 
recognises that a measured society which seeks through its political and economic institutions 
to realise in a practical way the value of respect for the dignity of individuals and to establish 
the conditions necessary for the enjoyment of autonomy.' 20 
Collins tripartite idea seeks to give a framework of understanding as to the scope and 
rationale of job security. The allowance it makes for a variable construing of job 
security is on the whole helpful in aiding our understanding of the rationale of the 
19 ibid at page 234 
20 ibid at page 237 
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approach of Parliament and the judiciary, but it does not seem to provide a full answer 
because with regard to disciplinary dismissals the framework relies heavily on 
autonomy and respect for dignity. 
We have, however, seen a number of cases in chapters' one and two that would seem 
to vitiate this theory of respect for dignity and autonomy. Mr Saunders21 certainly did 
not seem to receive much respect for his dignity yet was found to have been fairly 
dismissed. In a similar vain, Mr Pays22 also suffered detriment despite receiving no 
respect for dignity or his autonomy. Bearing these cases in mind, the framework and 
rationale suggested by Collins does not seem entirely satisfactory. 
The position which is left is one whereby no one is quite sure what job security 
actually means. Is it analogous to a proprietary right23 or is it best understood as 
merely freedom from arbitrary managerial power? Does that understanding have to be 
interpreted in light of which type of dismissal situation is occurring? As can be seen, 
the issues surrounding job security are anything but plain and as a result there is much 
criticism as to the approach taken by the judiciary. It is necessary to provide some 
form of consistency to job security so that reform can be better informed and as an 
important corollary, remedies can become more effective in facilitating the 
appropriate definition of job security. Therefore it is appropriate to tum to the theory 
of law and economics to see if it can provide any coherency. 
3.2 Law and economics provides 'security' 
Job security is the antithesis of efficiency. This is starkly stated by Ewing: 
21 Saunders v Scottish National Camps; See chapter two n42 
22 Pays v Lancashire Probation Service; See chapter one n4 
23 See White (1984); at page 101 
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'The careful pursuit of statutory guaranteed protection against disadvantage for every 
individual circumstance can thus yield for many people, the severest disadvantage of all- the 
lack of a job. ' 24 
Collins in unpacking this notes: 
'The benefits to the community as a whole would be severely impeded if each worker could 
insist upon retention of his or her job, regardless of competence or effort. As well as harming 
productive efficiency, ownership of jobs would create friction in the labour market, by 
preventing reductions in the workforce to meet the declining demand and by discouraging 
workers from finding a new job ... By granting a worker the right to remain in possession of a 
particular job, regardless of whether useful work remains to be done, a property right in a job 
would block necessary adjustments to market conditions in the productive activities of a 
community. '25 
This argument, that a property right reduces resistance to change and harms 
efficiency, is premised on the free market doctrine of employment-at will26• This 
doctrine has at its very heart the concept that a free market will promulgate efficiency. 
As a result the doctrine suggests there should be no restriction on the employer to 
'hire and fire' as he sees fit, because the result will always be in the interests of 
efficiency. This idea is based on the misguided assumption which Epstein, in a very 
robust defence of employment-at-will, helpfully illuminates27 . He states that 
employment-at-will mirrors freedom of contract and as such will be efficient because 
the free market creation of contracts will always be efficient. As a result of this he 
equates freedom of contract to fairness to the employee; they have the right to choose 
to enter into employment and the right to leave at any point. Thus, through essentially 
24 Ewing, KD ( 1990); at page 634 
25 Collins (1992); at page ll 
26 For a more detailed explanation of employment-at-will see chapter 2.5 
27 Epstein, R - ( 1984) In defence of contract at will 
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a rehashing of the Invisible Hand argument, Epstein concludes that employment-at-
will can be equated with fairness. 
For reasons already outlined in chapter one, this proposition is not as convincing once 
one considers the inequality of bargaining power in the contract of employment and 
whether there really is freedom of contract. However it does raise a very interesting 
question. If job security is the anathema of efficiency and as such employment-at-will 
is the only way to obtain efficiency how can we reconcile the situation we have 
whereby the legislation is clear that employment-at-will is unlawful? Put another way, 
we have established that the level of job security under the legislation is akin to 
'security only from ungrounded or arbitrary job termination' yet this falls short of 
employment-at-will which is dismissal for 'any reason or no reason at all'. Does this 
defeat our ability to construct a law and economics framework in which to analyse job 
security? 
Arbitrary dismissal can be extremely bad for efficiency as it can lead to a decrease in 
productivity whilst the dismissed individual is replaced and the new employee trained. 
It can also lead to a decrease in morale again negatively impacting on the productivity 
of the firm. Of course, those in favour of employment-at-wiles argue that fear of 
damage to an employers reputation will stop them from acting wrongly: 
'The employers interest in maintaining a reputation for fair treatment of employees, may also 
deter invasion of the employee's freedom and integrity. Obviously, an employer who becomes 
known for unduly compromising the individuality of his employees may find it difficult to 
hire and keep them. ' 29 
28 See Posner, R- (1984) Some economics of Labor Law; Epstein (1984) 
29 Blades, L E- ( 1967) Employment at will vs. Individual freedom: On limiting the abusive exercise of 
employer power; at page 1412 
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This argument may at first sight seem logical but it must be remembered it is very rare 
that the employment relationship is at equilibrium or that there is a job surplus. Blades 
point this out: 
'Especially during times of abundant labour supply, an employer may think it unnecessary to 
be concerned about his reputation in this respect; and even if he is concerned, he may be able 
to exert his influence to silence those employees who are affected, and thereby ensure that his 
coercion will never become known. The interest in maintaining favourable reputation cannot 
be regarded as a very substantial deterrent to the employer who is tempted to bend his 
employees to his will.' 30 
This indicates that perhaps employment-at-will will not always provide an acceptable 
level of self-regulation and as such cannot claim to be wholly efficient. Raday's 
detailed study of the cost of dismissal 31 illuminates yet another problem employment-
at-will has with regard to fitting into a law and economics theory. He notes that: 
'A no-fault at-will contract avoids ... monitoring and enforcement costs but may add 
significant social costs caused by opportunistic behaviour. ' 32 
Law and economics deals with the efficiency of allocating resources and there is 
considerable weight to the argument that allowing a fully unrestricted dismissal at-
will actually constitutes inefficiency in the allocation of resources; by allowing the 
employer to avoid any cost associated with dismissal it means the State becomes 
solely responsible for any social costs which may arise. This inefficiency could be 
compounded as there is no duty on the employer to exercise his mind as to the 
appropriateness of the dismissal. The can result in the State supporting dismissed 
30 ibid at page 1413 
31 Raday, F- (1989) Costs of Dismissal: An analysis in community justice and efficiency 
32 ibid at page 197 
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individuals whilst the employer experiences no increased efficiency gain, thus giving 
overall a net loss to the national economy. 
It would seem therefore that a completely unrestricted employment-at-will approach 
may not always be in the best interests of efficiency or the economy when considering 
dismissal and as such not a wholly satisfactory explanation for the judiciary's 
approach. The precise scope of job security therefore seems to have to fall 
somewhere between stringent proprietary job security and employment-at-will 
because both extremes provide efficiency problems. 
It is at this point helpful to tum back to the framework suggested above. It will be 
remembered that Collins suggested a tripartite differential approach to job security. 
The sticking point we identified was that disciplinary dismissals were to be justified 
on grounds of respect for dignity and autonomy. Collins however hints at some other 
controlling mechanism surrounding disciplinary dismissals when as a defence to the 
claim that all disciplinary dismissals vitiate any respect for dignity, he states they are: 
'[N]ot grounded in disrespect for the individual himself, but in a legitimate concern to 
promote the general welfare achieved by efficient production.' 33 (emphasis added) 
Here we find implicit acknowledgement that efficiency is the root of decisions on the 
scope of job security. Once this is acknowledged the rationale behind a variable job 
security becomes much clearer. Obviously in economic dismissals there is no 
efficiency gain in enforcing stringent job security, it merely leads to greater job loss 
over time. It is much more efficient to reduce resistance to change and help the 
33 Collins (1992); at page 336 
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displaced workforce find other jobs, which decreases the burden on the State. This 
was the stated policy behind the Redundancy Payments Act 196534 that the 
compensation helped reduce resistance to change and created a more flexible 
workforce35 . Therefore by giving compensation and with that a low level of job 
security, there is the most efficient allocation of resources. With public rights 
dismissals, efficiency is displaced by fundamental rights and as a result more stringent 
job security is enacted. This does not interfere with a law and economics analysis 
because it is a situation where law and economics is not appropriate (as the result of 
democratic decision) and as such has no influence. 
The rationale behind disciplinary dismissals also becomes clearer. By only giving job 
security against 'arbitrary or ungrounded termination' the legislation provides an 
incentive for employers to exercise their minds and follow correct procedure before 
dismissing, without prohibitively burdening them. This aids efficiency because it 
pushes employers to not dismiss without just cause. Essentially it leaves the position 
that if it is in the interests of efficiency to dismiss an employee then this is acceptable, 
as long as the employer can show they have exercised their mind properly in reaching 
the decision: 
'From a purely economic perspective, it is unclear why rational employers would ever fire 
workers for anything but good cause.' 36 
By applying a law and economics analysis to job security we can avoid Collins 
complicated reasoning behind the tripartite distinction and merely view the differing 
34 Which was subsumed into the unfair dismissal legislation. 
35 See Collins (1992); at page 165 
36 Harvard Note (no cited author)- (1989) Employer Opportunism and the need for a just cause 
standard; at page 517 
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levels of job security as being controlled by efficiency. This means we can see 
variable job security as controlled by the boundaries of efficiency, giving it certainty 
in its operation. Law and economics provides the rationale and balance the judiciary 
and the legislation have used when deciding the correct scope to apply. From a law 
and economics perspective we can see why such a low level of job security is enacted, 
because stringent or proprietary job security clashes with the principles of efficiency. 
Hepple aptly sums up why law and economics is so influential in the determination of 
job security when he says: 
'There is little point in developing this particular human rights guarantee [universal job 
security] in the employment relationship unless there are also macro-economic policies 
directed towards the growth of employment and welfare . .37 
Efficiency seems to be the best lens through which to view the law surrounding job 
security. It provides a rationale for why there is a differential and flexible level and 
gives a point of reference that can guide the judiciary. Job security is very much 
dependent on what is in the interests of efficiency. 
3.3 Problems with remedies 
As we noted above, job security and remedies are very closely linked. They 
complement each other and the strength of the remedy is indicative of how much 
importance is given to job security38. We have seen from the discussion above that job 
security is a complex area and is best understood from a law and economics 
perspective but is the same true for remedies? Before we can answer this it is 
37 Hepple ( 1992); at page 96 
38 See Lewis, P- ( 1981) An analysis of why legislation has failed to provide employment protection 
for unfairly dismissed employees at page 316 for a good introduction to relationship between job 
security and remedies. 
128 
necessary to take stock of what remedies exist, how they have been implemented and 
why there is much disappointment in their strength. Only after we have grasped the 
situation and looked at the potential reasons why compensation has become the only 
real remedy, will we be in a position to look at law and economics and see if this 
provides the real rationale. 
There has been much discussion as to the appropriateness of the remedies the 
legislation propounds and the interpretation the judiciary have taken in enacting 
these.39 The Statute unequivocally states that the primary remedy should be an order 
for reinstatement: 
'The tribunal shall first consider whether to make an order for reinstatement' 40 (emphasis 
added) 
The prominence given to reinstatement is backed up by the judiciary with the 
acknowledgement in the Court of Appeal: 
'Parliament has indicated that the preferred remedies for unfair dismissal are reinstatement, re-
engagement and monetary compensation in that order.' 41 (emphasis added) 
However, in 2004 according to the figures published by the Employment Tribunals 
Service the percentage of orders for reinstatement was a mere 0.25%42 , a significant 
drop from the hardly impressive 6% that it was in 1973. This is to be compared with 
compensation being ordered in 65% of the cases. There would seem a significant 
39 See Lewis (1981); Haugh, Band Spowart-Taylor, A- (1996) Liability, Compensation and Justice in 
Unfair Dismissal; Collins (1992); Dickens, Hart, Jones and Weekes- (1981) Re-employment of 
Unfairly Dismissed Workers: The lost remedy for just a flavour of the discussion 
40 Section 116 ERA 1996 
41 per Lord Donaldson in O'Laire v Jackal International [1990] IRLR 70 CA; at paragraph 3 
42 Figures calculated from Report of Employment Tribunals Service 2004- II cases out of 4363 which 
were upheld 
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problem with the legislation if its primary remedy is used so shockingly little. The 
Labour government in Fairness at Work implicitly acknowledged the problem 
expressing hope that: 
'the voluntary arbitration alternative provided by ACAS will create a change of culture so that 
individuals who have been dismissed are more likely to get their jobs back. '43 
The statistics do not seem to match with what the legislation and judiciary say, so it is 
imperative to discover where the problem with reinstatement originates. This is in 
order for us to bring a level of coherency to the legislation surrounding remedies, 
which at present says one thing yet does another. Before we delve into suggestions as 
to why there is such a low incidence of reinstatement it is wise to spend a brief time 
defining the different remedies and what the statute says about their application. 
3.3.1 Distinctions and definitions 
The legislation provides for three different remedies, which as noted above are 
reinstatement, re-engagement and monetary compensation. Whilst reinstatement and 
re-engagement are often subsumed in the genus term 're-employment' it would be a 
mistaken conclusion to draw that they are the same. Sir John Donaldson noted a clear 
distinction very early on in the legislations history when he said: 
'reinstatement is retroactive in effect. It involves a revocation ofthe dismissal and payment of 
wages for the intervening period. Re-engagement leaves the dismissal unaffected and an 
intervening period of unemployment. .. ' 44 
In order to further support the distinctions, we will look at each remedy from its 
statutory perspective and what it is intended to achieve. 
43 At paragraph 3( 4) - Cm 3968 1998) 
44 Morris v Gestetner Ltd [ 1973] I W.L.R 1378; at page 1382 
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Reinstatement- Section 114 of the ERA 1996 deals with this remedy and states: 
'(1) An order for reinstatement is an order that the employer shall treat the complainant in all 
respects as if he had not been dismissed.' 
In effect the employee is to be put back in to the job they occupied, restored to the 
benefits they enjoyed and compensated for any loss in the interim. We must note that 
it is up to the dismissed employee to decide whether they want to seek this remedy 
and section 116 ERA 1996 says that the tribunal should take into account when 
considering reinstatement: 
'(a) whether the complainant wishes to be reinstated, 
(b) whether it is practicable for the employer to comply with an order for reinstatement, and 
(c) where the complainant caused or contributed to some extent to the dismissal whether it 
would be just to order his reinstatement.' 
We will consider below how the judiciary have interpreted 'practicable', but for now 
it suffices to observe that the remedy of reinstatement seems strong and would seem 
to have a very positive punitive effect on employers. 
Re-engagement- According to Section 116 (2) ERA 1996, this remedy is only 
triggered when the judiciary have decided against ordering reinstatement. Re-
engagement is a noticeably weaker remedy than reinstatement because it only 
provides for a return to: 
'employment comparable to that from which was dismissed or other suitable employment' 45 
45 Section I 15 (I) ERA 1996 
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The big difference between the two remedies is that under re-engagement the 
individual does not have to be compensated for loss suffered in the interim. The 
judiciary do however still have a duty to consider the suitability of re-engagement in 
light of the same criteria as for reinstatement and as such: 
'If it orders re-engagement, [it shall] do so on terms which are, so far as reasonably 
practicable, as favourable as an order for reinstatement. ' 46 
Both these remedies present quite an onerous burden on the dismissing employer and 
whilst have different effects can be termed together under the genus heading of re-
employment because they both involve, to a differing severity, an imposition of the 
courts will over the managerial prerogative in terms of the number of employees that 
should be employed. Both these remedies are distinct from that of compensation 
because they involve direct interference with the employment relationship as opposed 
to merely compensating for loss. This is potentially very significant as will be 
unpacked below. 
Monetary Compensation - Despite being the third choice remedy it is the most 
popular. Compensation is split by the legislation into two categories, basic and 
compensatory. 'The basic award is meant to reflect the loss of accrued continuity of 
employment following the dismissal: on finding new employment, the employee will 
have to begin again to acquire the continuity needed for the purposes of entitlement to 
a statutory redundancy payment.' 47 The basic award is calculated in precisely the 
same way as a statutory redundancy payment, so that it is a function of the 
employee's age, length of service and normal weekly pay at the time of dismissal. The 
46 Section 116 (4) 
47 Deakin and Morris (2001); at page 493 
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maximum weekly earnings are capped at £280 and the total basic award is capped at 
£8400. The compensatory award is payable under section 123 of the ERA 1996 and is: 
'such amount as the tribunal considers just and equitable in all the circumstances having regard to 
loss sustained by the complainant on consequence of the dismissal in so far as that loss is 
attributable to action taken by the employer.' 
This amount is now capped at £56,800. The size of the compensatory and basic award 
has been the source of much discussion over the years. In 1999 the compensatory 
award was an extremely derisory £12000, but this has been remedied by linking the 
increase in amount to the retail price index, in order that it would take into account the 
increased cost of living and reflect a much more equitable award.48 This is much more 
in line with the apparent intention of the legislation for the compensatory award to 
reflect two years pay at average earnings.49 The situation surrounding the calculation 
of the basic and compensatory award is extremely complicated with the legislation 
allowing for a number of reductions relating to employee behaviour. However these 
do not affect the central premise that compensation is a much more quantifiable 
remedy from the perspective of an employer, because he can enter a dismissal 
situation fully aware of the maximum liability he is exposing himself to. 
It is quite clear that there is an obvious disparity between the wording of the statute 
and the reality of the remedies promulgated by the judiciary. This leaves a confused 
and potentially uncertain picture because the law purports to say one thing yet does 
another. 
48 See Collins (2004); at page 67 
49 Hence in 1971 the compensatory award was two years pay or £4, 160 which ever was the lesser- the 
latter being two years average pay- see Davies and Freedland ( 1993); at page 209 
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The question which now demands out attention is what potential reasons are offered 
to explain the low incidence of re-employment? 
3.3.2 Reasons why re-employment rarely ordered 
Breakdown oftrust and confidence - A crucial facet of the employment relationship 
is that neither party acts in anyway to undermine the trust and confidence in the 
relationship. Lord Nicholls defined the implied term of trust and confidence as: 
'[The parties] would not, without reasonable and proper cause, conduct itself in a manner 
likely to destroy or seriously damage the relationship of confidence and trust between 
employer and employee. ' 50 
It is not hard to see that a dismissal which is unfair (i.e. without reasonable and proper 
cause) is likely to cause some damage to the relationship. If this is indeed the case, 
then in the words of Lord Johnston in the EAT: 
'[it was] difficult to see how the essential bond of trust and confidence that must exist between 
an employer and an employee, inevitably broken by such investigations and allegations can 
be satisfactorily repaired by re-engagement.' 51 (emphasis added) 
This can be true from the perspective of both parties involved. In the case above the 
issue was that the employer, despite dismissing the employee unfairly due to not 
following procedure, still believed in the employee's guilt. Because the employer still 
had a genuine belief of guilt it was held to not be practical to order re-engagement. 
This approach has raised fears that: 
50 Malik v BCC/[1997] IRLR 462 (HL); at paragraph 8 
51 Wood Group Heavy Industrial Turbines v Crossan [ 1998] IRLR 680 
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'the implied duty of trust and confidence, which has proved so helpful to employees trying to 
establish constructive dismissal, should be used to minimise the possibility of orders for re-
employment being made.' 52 
From the employee perspective, they may decide that 'the way they had been treated 
destroyed any desire or willingness to work for the employer' 53 again or in the words 
of Collins: 
'The employee may reasonably doubt whether his or her former expectations of betterment 
through the internal labour market will be realised if he or she is compulsorily reinstated 
contrary to the wishes of management. ' 54 
Put another way, they may fear they will be victimised and as such compensation 
seems a much more attractive option. 
The individual has a new job - Because there is a time lag between dismissal and a 
tribunal hearing, it likely in some situations that the dismissed employee will have 
found another job. This eventuality is often forced by the economic circumstances of 
the dismissed employee and also the statutory duty to mitigate loss. 55 
Impractical to hire -This is often because the job disappeared with the dismissal or 
somebody else is now employed in that job so there is no vacancy. This would mean 
re-employment was not practicable. 
52 Lewis, D- ( 1999) Re-employment as a remedy for unfair dismissal: How can the culture be 
changed?; at page 183 
53 Dickens et a! ( 1981); at page 165 
54 Collins (1992); at page 222 
55 See Lewis, P ( 1981) 
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Toothless enforcement mechanism- The employer will not incur contempt of court 
proceedings for refusing to implement a statutory order for re-employment. This was 
acknowledged by the Lord Donaldson in the Court of Appeal case O'laire v Jackson 
International56 where he said: 
'A reinstatement order under s.69 is wholly unenforceable. If such an order is not complied 
with, whether wholly or in part, the complainant's only remedy is to apply to the Industrial 
Tribunal under [s.ll7] for an award of compensation. ' 57 
This would seem to indicate that failure to re-employ will only incur further financial 
penalty and if the employer is determined not to take the employee back there is little 
the judiciary can do about it. In some ways this sums up the 'paper tiger' nature of 
remedies in one fell swoop. An employer could well be reluctant to receive back an 
employee because as well as the breakdown in trust and confidence, the returning 
employee will act as a constant reminder of the weakness of the employer. It would 
highlight the fallibility of the employer and possibly undermine other decisions they 
make which affect the workforce, therefore they can resist and effectively buy their 
way out, as the cost is quantifiable. 
However, it must be noted that the additional award can be quite significant. It 
envisages two situations; firstly where the employee is taken back but on terms less 
advantageous than ordered by the court, the court can order an additional award with 
regard to the complainant's loss. 'A more highly-paid employee might therefore 
receive substantial compensation under this head' 58because the statutory cap may be 
exceeded to the extent necessary to enable the award to fully reflect the claimants 
56 [ 1990] IRLR 70 
57 At page 70 
58 Deakin and Morris (2001); at page 491 
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loss. 59 The second situation is where the employer fails to comply at all. If this occurs 
then under section 117 of the ERA 1996 the court will award in addition to the basic 
and compensatory award a further additional award to reflect the employers failure to 
comply with the re-employment order. This award is to be the equivalent of twenty-
six to fifty-two weeks pay and is intended to reflect the amount specified as payable 
in the re-employment order, once again the statutory cap is capable of being 
exceeded. Hence it can be seen that whilst the order for re-employment is 
unenforceable and in many regards toothless, the expense of additional compensation 
acts as an incentive to comply with the order. 
Time taken to get to the tribunal- Despite the aim of the employment tribunal being 
to bring 'quick and easy access to justice' it is obvious that it will not be 
instantaneous. This 'time lag' can have a huge effect on the remedy sought by the 
employee. Over the time, they may realise that the trust and confidence has broken 
down, or their financial position may alter and they need a lump sum of 
compensation. Tied up in this is also the possibility of finding another job which 
would then make re-employment pointless. Lewis60 sees time as a big factor for the 
low incidence of re-employment. Using figures he collected through his own survey 
he shows the disparity between the remedy sought by the individual at the point of 
launching a claim for unfair dismissal and then the remedy sought when the case 
comes before the tribunal. In his figures from 1977 it seems that 71.5% of dismissed 
applicants wanted re-employment at the initial claim stage. This had dropped to 21% 
by the time the case reached the tribunal. This is highly influential in suggesting that 
59 Section 124 ERA 1996 
60 See Lewis, P (1981)- Again these figures are obviously old but they are the most up-to-date figures 
the author has found. Since the legislation has changed very little there seems no reason why these 
patterns and explanations do not remain accurate. 
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the time between dismissal and hearing affects the remedy sought and that many of 
the reasons propounded above as plausible suggestions are buttressed by the time 
factor. 
Poor legal advice -Dickens et al suggests one further factor as to why the remedy for 
re-employment is used so little, that of poor legal advice and guidance. Their report61 
suggests anecdotal evidence that dismissed employees may not really know the 
differences between the remedies and as such fear not getting anything, thus 
compensation seems the safest option. The report buttress this point by comparing 
applications for reinstatement from union and non-union members, drawing the 
conclusion that many more unions member ask for reinstatement, hence there is a 
disparity in advice. Whilst there may be truth in this it is important to not give it too 
much weight because such a crude comparative argument fails to take into account 
unionised and non-unionised employment sectors and the differences there. 
It can be seen that there are many plausible reasons as to why re-employment has not 
been the primary remedy used in unfair dismissal, but in order to see if law and 
economics is a controlling factor it is first necessary to establish who is responsible 
for the current state of affairs; Parliament or the judiciary? 
3.4 Who's to blame? The judiciary or Parliament 
In essence there is no clear-cut answer to this question because both groups can seek 
to blame each other. Parliament can point to the legislation and say it has created a 
right to re-employment and has buttressed this with punitive damages as an incentive 
61 Dickens et a1 ( 1981) 
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to comply; therefore the failure of the instigation of the remedy must lie with the 
judiciary. 
The judiciary can reply with the argument that the legislation is 'wholly 
unenforceable' and as such they are left holding the baby with an unworkable 
statutory remedy. Lewis attributes the blame to Parliament, saying that 'practicable' 
needs much more careful framing if the remedy is to become strong.62 
However, when one looks closely at how the judiciary have approached the remedy of 
re-employment it would seem the judiciary have been extremely pro-active in 
weakening the effect of the legislation themselves. Section 116 of the ERA 1996, as 
we have already noted provides three factors which the tribunal have a duty to take 
into account when considering re-employment. The most influential and source of 
much judicial discussion is s.ll6( 1 )(b), which provides that the tribunal will take into 
account whether: 
'it is practicable for the employer to comply with an order for reinstatement' (emphasis 
added) 
What 'practicable' actually means has been the root of much contention. Mr Justice 
Wood gave a good summary of how the judiciary have approached 'practicable' in 
Rao v Civil Aviation Authority: 
'[the word practicable] is not 'possible'; it is not 'capable'. It is not always wise to seek to 
define rules for different factual situations, but factors which have influenced decisions in the 
past are: the fact that the factory atmosphere is poisoned ... the fact that the employee has 
displayed her distrust and lack of confidence in her employers and would not be a satisfactory 
62 Lewis, P- (1982) Interpretation of 'practicable' and 'just' in relation to 're-employment' in unfair 
dismissal cases; at page 397 
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employee on reinstatement ... a change in policy which reinstatement would undermine ... 
insufficient employment for the employee ... and possibly where parlies are in close 
relationships at work ... ' 63 
This understanding of 'practicable' is an extremely narrow construing of the plain 
meaning of the word: 
'Practicable- able to be put into practice, able to be effected, accomplished or done; 
feasible' 64 
Lewis makes this point when he observes: 
'The courts and the EAT have narrowed what is 'practicable' very considerably and pay too 
much attention to the employers arguments. They should be less passive and not assume the 
parties have made informed judgements. ' 65 
But the intentional narrowing of the judiciary's remit is perhaps best illuminated by 
the Court of Appeal decision in the case of Port of London Authority v Payne. 66The 
facts of the case are complicated but it suffices to say 17 workers were selected for 
redundancy because of their Trade Union activity, this was held to be unfair and an 
order for re-engagement was made. The employer failed to comply with the orders 
and appealed against the decision to order re-engagement. The Court of Appeal 
tellingly said: 
'The test is practicability not possibility. The industrial tribunal, though it should carefully 
scrutinise the reasons advanced by an employer, should give due weight to the commercial 
judgement of the management. .. the standard must not be set too high. The employer cannot 
be expected to explore every possible avenue which ingenuity might suggest. The employer 
63 [1992] IRLR 203; at page 207 
64 The new shorter Oxford English dictionary; at page 2317 
65 Lewis, P ( 198); at page 388 
66 [1994] IRLR 9 (CA) 
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does not have to show that reinstatement or re-engagement was impossible. It is a matter of 
what is practicable in the circumstances of the employers business at the relevant time. ' 67 
This approach of the court looks strikingly similar to a 'reasonable employer' test, 
which we are aware, gives an incredible amount of flexibility to the judiciary and 
often results in deference to the managerial prerogative. This suggestion is supported 
by research carried out in 1985 which concluded that: 
' ... the [employment] tribunals pay a lot of attention to the employers' views regarding the 
acceptability and practicability of re-employment and rarely award the remedy in the face of 
employer opposition. This is partly because of a view that re-employment which has to be 
imposed will not work. 68 
This approach of the judiciary suggests they construe 'practicability' narrowly in 
order to give them as much scope and flexibility as possible. It is reminiscent of the 
approach they take to SOSR69 , namely that if they can show good reason the comt 
should accept that. It is therefore clear that the judiciary are responsible to some 
extent for the lack of re-employment ordered, however what is not as clear is whether 
this is because of the weakness of the enforcing mechanism or because of a judicial 
dislike of the remedy of re-employment. This leaves us in a position whereby we can 
see the potential reasons why re-employment is so rare, but are still lacking an 
underlying rationale. It is still a very mixed bag with lots of differing ideas. Before we 
turn and look at a law and economics rationale for the lack or re-employment and 
seek to provide a framework from which we can understand the judiciary's narrow 
approach it is pertinent to turn to compensation, the most popular remedy, and see 
67 ibid paragraph 57 
68 Dickens, Hart, Jones and Weekes- (1985) Dismissed: A study of unfair dismissal and the industrial 
tribunal system 
69 See Dickens et al (1981 ); at page 169 
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whether it is in fact a satisfactory remedy. This is advisable because if compensation 
is a much better remedy prima facie, all discussion surrounding understanding re-
employment and the judiciary's attitude can be summed up in accepting compensation 
is more desirable for the employee and hence the most equitable settlement is in this 
form. 
3.5 Is compensation a desirable remedy? 
The law surrounding the compensatory award has led to the creation of: 
'principles formulated almost exclusively with respect to the financial loss of the claimant, 
ignoring for the most part any other dimensions of justice and equity in the case ... this 
interpretation being such as to frustrate any conceivable aim of the legislation.' 70 
In essence the sustained criticism is, compensation does not deliver justice because it 
only looks at direct financial loss. This rather narrow concept of compensation was 
first formulated in the influential early case of Norton Tool Co Ltd v Tewson71 and has 
been a fixture ever since. Sir John Donaldson said in the case: 
' ... First, the object is to compensate, and compensate fully ... Secondly, the amount to be 
awarded is that which is just and equitable in all the circumstances, having regard to the loss 
sustained by the complainant. 'Loss' in the context of [s.l23] does not include injury to pride 
or feeli!Jgs. In its natural meaning the word is not to be so construed, and that this meaning is 
intended seems to us to be clear from elaboration contained in [s.123(2)] ... ' 72 
It can clearly be seen that whilst appearing to have regard to what is just and 
equitable, the judiciary have intentionally narrowed the remit of compensation by 
construing the statute to remove any reference to loss outside of the very narrow 
7° Collins, H- (1991) The just and equitable compensatory award; at page 201 
71 [1972] ICR501 
72 ibid 
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concept of financial loss. This can be seen even more clearly in the speech of Sir John 
Donaldson the following year: 
'[T]he purpose of assessing compensation is not to express disapproval of industrial relations 
policy. It is to compensate for financialloss.' 73 (emphasis added) 
The effect of the judicial approach is to deprive the tribunal of the capacity to reflect 
in its award the fault of the employer. This is in sharp contrast to their approach in 
assessing the compensation when the employee has acted in a way which has in part 
contributed to his dismissal. The judiciary are only too willing to reduce the 
compensation when there is contributory fault,74 and this serves to buttress the 
argument that the judiciary have intentionally acted in a more favourable way towards 
employers. The situation which has been maintained throughout the legislations 
history has been defined very astutely by Collins as the: 
'Court promulgating ... a set of cool, economic rules for totting up financial loss suitable for a 
discipline of accountancy. The criterion of loss to the complainant became the sole dimension 
of justice, rather than merely one to which the tribunal should have had regard.' 75 
There was an attack on this approach in Johnson v Unisys76but this was short lived as 
the Law Lords in Dunnachie77 quickly distinguished this attack and said the remarks 
made by Lord Hoffman were in fact obiter in any case.78 
It would seem compensation therefore has the effect of delivering very watered down 
corrective justice and no deterrent justice. This, when the remedies of reinstatement 
73 Clarkson International Tools v Shot1[1973] IRLR 90; at paragraph 15 
74 See Collins (2004) at page 68 for a good overview and reform suggestion 
75 Collins ( 1991 ); at page 203 
76 [2001] IRLR 279 (HL) 
77 Dunnachie v Kingston-upon-Hull City Council [2004] IRLR 727 
78 For greater consideration of what was said in these cases please see the appendix 
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and re-engagement are also being denied wholesale, indicates that the situation 
regarding remedies is not ideal and that the dismissed individuals are getting very 
much the short end of the stick. 
How has this situation been allowed to develop? It would seem that there are only two 
plausible explanations which can be advanced to explain the judiciary's approach. 
Either the statute leaves them powerless or the judiciary do not want to interfere with 
the managerial prerogative and therefore are reluctant to order re-employment, 
choosing instead to construe compensation narrowly. 
It is the opinion of the author that the first explanation has no real justification. The 
legislation has enough flexibility built into it for them to be creative with. They have 
shown a certain creative flair in other areas of the legislation, for example in avoiding 
the award of any compensation when the dismissal has been unfair procedurally but 
fair substantively and therefore finding the dismissal in fact fair. 79 Furthermore if the 
judiciary were really unhappy with the way the statute tied their hands they would be 
letting Parliament know, either in sustained obiter criticism or forcing Parliament to 
act through a series of creative judgements. The fact that neither of these can be 
evidenced would indicate that the judiciary do not feel powerless. In fact, they have 
been extremely creative in their interpretation of the legislation surrounding remedies. 
We have already noted their approach to defining 'practicable' and how they have 
lowered the test in favour of the employer and this is again evidenced in their 
approach to compensation, Collins insightfully noting: 
'The [judiciary's] style of interpretation has been one which reversed the statutory formula. It 
elevated the sub-principle of causation of loss to the main principle, and then relegated the 
79 British Labour Pump v Bryne is a fine example 
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general standard of just and equitable compensation to the status of a minor limitation on the 
application of the principles of causation of economic loss. ' 80 
So is it simple a case of respect for the managerial prerogative which has influenced 
the courts approach towards re-employment and compensation. Whilst this may seem 
a plausible solution, it raises the questions which been considered of what rationale 
does managerial prerogative stand for? How can it be defined and understood? It has 
been suggested that to simple stop at managerial prerogative as the explanation is to 
simplistic, there is a deeper more complex rationale underwriting the whole of the 
judiciary's approach to remedies. Law and economics provides us with this 
framework, although it is not as immediately obvious and remains well hidden behind 
the much more familiar concept of freedom of contract. 
In order to understand this we need to firstly look at why law and economics suggests 
re-employment is not a desirable remedy before turning to see how compensation is 
more appropriate. 
3.6 Law and economics and re-employment 
A justification for the reluctance to enforce re-employment can be seen from the 
efficiency perspective provided by law and economics. It can be seen below that the 
reasons suggested at the beginning of this section as to why re-employment was rarely 
ordered when it was sought, are all rooted in efficiencl1• 
8° Collins ( 1991 ); at page 202 
81 Obviously the finding of a new job, time and poor legal advice do not explicitly find their root in 
efficiency but these are decisions taken by the individuals as to why they do not want re-employment 
and therefore are not evidential as to a framework which seeks to understand the judicial position. The 
toothless enforcement mechanism is to some extent the result of the judiciary's own creativity to fulfil 
their purpose of ensuring efficiency. 
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Breakdown of trust and confidence -this will naturally led to a disruption of 
efficiency. If the employer does not trust the employee there is potential he will not 
feel able to fully utilise them, as he may want to keep them on tasks from which they 
can be monitored. Equally, an employee who has lost faith in the employer is not 
going to work as hard as someone who has not, thus leading to a decrease in 
productivity. 
Reputation of managers- Re-employment significantly undermines the managerial 
prerogative82 and as such will lead to diminution of the managers authority. This will 
naturally impact negatively on the efficiency of the firm because as well as the 
employer being saddled with a worker he dismissed, the rest of the workforce will 
potentially feel they can take liberties with the employer, who is likely to be wary of 
exercising his authority to readily83• 
Impractical for hiring/new person in the job - It would be inefficient to restructure the 
organisation in order to find space for the dismissed employee, as well as creating 
cost whilst restructuring it would also hamper the productivity in the short term and 
even potentially in the long term. There could also be a situation whereby the 
individual was so out of touch with the latest developments in their field that they 
would not be able to effectively do the job .. 
All of these reasons would seem to indicate that re-employment is bad for efficiency, 
because it is not an efficient allocation of resources. To have someone who has been 
removed from the employment nexus foisted back on the employer three to six 
82 As noted by Dickens eta! (1981); at page 167 
83 This was particularly noted in Port of London v Payne 
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months later is not good for the efficiency of the firm, especially if on top of this you 
also have the financial cost of putting the employee back in the position as if they had 
never been dismissed. The whole process can become a cost of which the employer 
cannot quantify or know because they will be unsure how productivity and efficiency, 
both of the returning employee and the other workers, will be affected. This unknown 
cost in itself can be a burden to inefficiency; this is evidenced in situations where 
employers upon being told the total cost of failure to comply with the reinstatement 
order have essentially got their chequebooks out there and then. 
'In one instance where a tribunal told an employer in advance that the cost of not complying 
with the order would be £138, it was promptly accepted as a bargain.' 84 
So if re-employment is perceived as a bar to efficiency, there seems a chilling logic to 
the judiciary not wanting to award it, unless the circumstances seem that the re-
employment would not harm efficiency. This could occur in a number of 
circumstances where there is no breakdown of trust and confidence and both parties 
are amenable to this. However, the likelihood of this it must be said is rare. It is 
unlikely an employer who dismissed an employee will be happy to accept him back 
just because a tribunal held the dismissal was fair. Therefore if re-employment is not 
the favoured remedy because of the damage to efficiency it could do, does 
compensation satisfy efficiency considerations? 
3.6.1 Compensation: The law and economics answer 
Collins notes that: 
'A substantial financial penalty strikes at the employer where it hurts most, the balance sheet, 
and may force a review of abusive disciplinary practices ... It seems clear that the aim in the 
84 Williams and Lewis- ( 1981) The aftermath of reinstatement andre-engagement, Dept of 
Employment Research Paper No 23 London; at page 37 
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law of improving the working environment are likely to be promoted more effectively by 
substantial compensation than a remedy of reinstatement. ' 85 
As we have discussed at length, the legislation had the aim of improving disciplinary 
procedures which in turn would effect greater efficiency in the workplace and the 
employment relationship as a whole. The natural conclusion is therefore that the 
judiciary are much more likely to order remedies which fulfil this aim. Compensation 
also has the advantage of being a completely quantifiable cost, in the main because of 
the statutory caps on the basic and compensatory awards. As has been noted: 
'The upper limit ensures that employers always have the resources to remove the employee's 
right not to be unfairly dismissed on payment of compensation ... it can always be financially 
practicable to dismiss. ' 86 
This is much more efficient than re-employment because the employer can budget and 
calculate whether the dismissal is worth the increased efficiency, in essence he can 
carry out a cost-benefit analysis prior to the dismissal and therefore make an informed 
judgment with all the costs known. The award of compensation also avoids the 
inefficiency in the workplace which, as discussed above, might occur if re-
employment was ordered.87 Compensation also has one further law and economics 
benefit which comes from the efficient allocation of resources. 
It has been noted in studies88 that a quarter of those re-employed stay less than six 
months, with the average only managing a year. This creates a burden on the State 
85 Collins ( 1992); at page 218 
86 Collins (2004); at page 67 
87 See the reasons above in 3.6 
88 See Williams and Lewis (1981) - it is acknowledged that this is not particularly up to date but the 
DTI commissioned surveys in 1998 and 2003 did not consider this question and the author has not been 
able to locate any other more up to date statistics. 
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because when they leave89 the employer does not have to contribute towards the 
social cost of their unemployment, which he would have done if it compensation was 
the primary remedy. Compensation therefore ensures a more efficient allocation of 
resources by not placing the burden unnecessarily on the State and instead placing it 
on the employer, but as we have noted not to such an extent which is necessarily 
prohibitive. 
Law and economics would seem to point towards compensation as the best and most 
efficient remedy; a viewpoint that was shared by the Donovan Commission90 who 
acknowledged that compensation should always be the primary remedy. This 
naturally leads us onto the question, if compensation is the preferred remedy from a 
law and economics perspective why have the judiciary construed it in such a narrow 
way and only compensated for direct financial loss? 
The answer is seen in the cogent logic of Collins: 
'An enhanced measure of compensation would redress these faults [that of reflecting all the 
employees losses not simply their economic ones]. It would supply the necessary incentive for 
compliance and provide full compensation for the employee. But it may be objected that 
heavy financial penalties for dismissal would deter employers from making even justified or 
fair dismissals, because the standard is too vague to provide a reliable guide for employers to 
use in a practical way.' 91 
Hence leaving a stagnant economy that will not grow, employers will be saddled with 
inefficient workers who they are unwilling or unable to get rid of because of the 
financial liability they will expose themselves too. This situation is the antithesis of a 
89 Either out of choice or a fair dismissal 
90 See Davies and Freedland (1993); at page 209 
91 Collins, Ewing, McColgan (2001); at page 586 
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law and economics approach, the setting of compensation at a manageable level 
means it can be avoided. High compensation also could act as a disincentive to the 
employer instigating internal fair procedure policies because they may take the view 
that the increased cost in implementing procedure is not worth it with the standard 
being so vague. Hence they will dismiss without recourse to procedure, because if 
they are going to be liable for a large amount there is not point in wasting extra 
money on a procedure that might make no difference to the outcome. This argument 
draws some support from the principle that the compensation reflects loss not 
industrial relations practice. This situation would also be disastrous from a law and 
economics point of view. The point of the procedure is to encourage the employer to 
exercise his mind so he does not dismiss where it would be inefficient to do so. To 
remove the incentive to fair procedure would be to remove one of the central 
efficiency aims in the judiciary's promotion of procedural fairness. 
A low level of compensation seems to be an acceptable law and economics solution as 
it ensures an efficient allocation of resources. The employer is responsible for some of 
the social cost if he fails to follow procedure or re-organises for the purposes of 
increased efficiency. However he is not burdened against his will with remedies that 
hinder efficiency and he can calculate the total cost of a dismissal92 , meaning he can 
apply an efficiency cost/benefit analysis when considering dismissal. 
Law and economics provides a framework from which we can understand why there 
is a push towards compensation from the judiciary, but it must be remembered it is a 
very narrowly construed compensatory award. Re-employment hurts efficiency, 
92 Which could not be done if a) the statutory caps did not exist and b) compensation included non-
financial loss 
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whereas compensation provides incentives to only dismiss when proper procedure has 
been followed and hence facilitates efficiency. 
The validity of a law and economics analysis is confirmed when one considers reform 
in the area. There has been suggestion that the solution to the low incidence of re-
employment is for the dismissed employee to remain in the job until the tribunal 
h . 93 h "d" eanng , t us avm mg: 
'The dangers of the job disappearing, or the employee needing to look for another job, and 
more importantly it might prevent the employment relationship deteriorating further. ' 94 
This reforming suggestion is an anathema to a law and economics approach. To keep 
the employee in the job after a dispute, until the tribunal makes a decision, is 
incredibly inefficient. If the employer is justified he will have been burdened with 
extra expense for an unnecessary period of time, which could have catastrophic 
implications if there was widespread dismissal for economic reasons. Furthermore, if 
the employer feels justified in dismissal, it is likely that trust and confidence will have 
already broken down; therefore it could still be inefficient if the tribunal orders re-
employment. This reform also does nothing to counter the efficiency problems created 
by damaging the reputation of the employer (the workforce will still know the 
employer tried to dismiss the employee) or the interference with the managerial 
prerogative. The failure of this suggested reform to counter any of the efficiency 
problems associated with re-employment is indicative of why it has not been taken on 
as a serous reform idea. 
93See Lewis, P (1981) and Dickens et a! (1981) 
94 Lewis, P ( 1981) at page 324 
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The current situation, whilst seeming weighted against the employee and not what the 
statute says, is the most efficient solution for the general welfare of the economy. 
When viewed under a law and economics framework, we can understand why 
compensation is the favoured remedy as it fulfils the efficiency considerations of the 
judiciary in order to promote economic growth and long-term stability. This analysis 
also fits cogently with the situation regarding job security, whereby the importance 
given to job security is flexible and controlled by efficiency. 
Law and economics provides a controlling rationale for both the differential job 
security and the emphasis on compensation. Efficiency ties a number of explanations 
tighter under one generic heading and gives everyone a framework from which to 
assess the decisions against. This can only aid consistency and help understanding so 
that reforming suggestions can be more strategically targeted. 
Having seen that law and economics provides a controlling rationale for unfair 
dismissal legislation in a number of situations where uncertainty existed it is now 
pertinent to turn and consider whether this approach of the judiciary towards 
efficiency is also prevalent in wrongful dismissal. There has been a sustained line of 
thought in recent years suggesting that wrongful dismissal should be used to remedy 
the perceived weaknesses in unfair dismissal, specifically those which we have 
discussed in depth in this thesis. But this has not happened and the judiciary have 
shown no enthusiasm for reversing this. When this resistance to utilise the common 
law is analysed from a law and economics perspective it becomes clear that the 
judiciary have intentionally kept wrongful dismissal minimised and subservient to 
unfair dismissal because of efficiency considerations. During consideration of this 
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rationale it is hoped it will become clearer to the reader that a law and economics 
approach pervades through the judicial approach to dismissal as a whole and as such 
is a valid and necessary tool in understanding the judicial rationale. 
3. 7 Wrongful dismissal in context 
It is first appropriate to briefly contextualise wrongful dismissal with regard to unfair 
dismissal. As has been noted in chapter one, unfair dismissal replaced wrongful 
dismissal as the primary remedy for dismissal in 1971. This situation came about 
because of the weakness of wrongful dismissal due to its reliance on the contractual 
principles: 
The individual employment relationship itself was under the system of collective laissez-
faire, to be regulated by social rather than legal institutions. The common law conceptualised 
the relationship between employee and employer as a contractual one, but the fictitious 
equality which the common law assumed as the basis of this contract meant that the 
contract did not regulate, but rather articulated, the inevitable subordination of the 
employee to the employer.' 95 (emphasis added) 
Under wrongful dismissal a dismissed employee can only claim damages which are 
the equivalent to the loss of salary during their contractual notice period. This 
seemingly harsh approach, which Carty describes as 'limited notice obligations and 
nothing more', 96 is rooted in contract. Since in most cases the employee is not entitled 
to remain in employment for longer than the minimum period of notice contained in 
their contract, to pay damages that are greater than this vitiates the contract and would 
have far reaching implications into other areas of labour law which are regulated by 
95 Davies and Freedland (1993); at page 24 
96 Carty, H- ( 1989) Dismissed employees: The search for a more effective range of remedies; at page 
449 
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the contract of employment. This narrowness is further compounded when one takes 
into account that: 
'as a result of express agreement or by way of an implied term, the employer will almost 
invariably possess the right at common Jaw to terminate the contract simply by giving notice, 
without needing to have a good reason, or any reason, for doing so.' 97 
This strict adherence by the judiciary to contractual principles also rules out the 'order 
[for] specific peiformance of any contract for personal services' 98 as is summed up 
aptly by the words of Lord Justice Fry: 
'I should be very unwillingly to extend decisions the effect of which is to compel persons who 
are not desirous of maintaining continuous personal relations with one another to continue 
those personal relations. ' 99 
This narrow and restrictive approach to dismissal appears to have been maintained 
despite the advent of the statutory protection 100. It can be cogently suggested that the 
court has intentionally construed the common law remedy very narrowly, using 
respect for contractual principles as their rationale101 • But more than that, the judiciary 
do not want the common law to fulfil or vitiate the role of unfair dismissal. 
'The statutory provision sends a clear signal that its intent is to introduce a form of statutory 
regulation to supplant the contractual position and that therefore the contents of the 
97 Deakin and Morris; at page 392 
98 G de N Clark- ( 1969) unfair dismissal and reinstatement; at page 532 
99 [1890] 45 Ch.D. 430; at page 438 
100 There is a suggestion by Ewing and Grubb- ( 1981) The emergence of a new labour injunction - that 
more and more people are seeking to use the common Jaw in order to remedy the weaknesses in the 
statutory scheme (mainly stemming from procedural fairness considerations) and that therefore 
wrongful dismissal is entering a renaissance. It is suggested with respect that their suggestion is more 
based on hope than reality, the courts have repeatedly emphasised that the common law will only 
provide a very narrow remedy with regard to unfair dismissal - see Anderman (2000) The 
interpretation of protective employment statutes and contracts of employment; Pitt (1989) Dismissal at 
Common Jaw: The relevance in Britain of American developments; Carty ( 1989) Dismissed 
employees: The search for a more effective range of remedies. 
101 This is indeed true in general, although the judiciary have used a considerable amount of creativity 
when it is seemingly in the employers interest. This is best exemplified in the common law doctrine of 
frustration and its use by employers to avoid liability for dismissal. For more see Collins (2004); at 
page 21 and Collins, Ewing and McColgan (2001); at page 535 
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employment contract are not to be allowed to undermine or derogate from the statutory 
provisions. Like the 'free standing' provisions, the plain intent of such legislation is to impose 
a mandatory public policy of protection, such as a reasonableness standard or a preservation of 
contractual terms standard, to replace whatever arrangement has been made between the 
parties. The statutory standard is meant to be independent of the will of the parties to the 
contract of employment because Parliament has rejected the private values of contract law 
such as autonomy, formal equality and freedom of contract preferring to substitute a public 
standard.' 102 
In Johnson 103 the House of Lords seriously considered the role of the common law but 
Lord Hoffman ultimately concluded in consideration of how unfair dismissal and 
wrongful dismissal worked together, that: 
'Judges, in developing the law, must have regard to the policies expressed by Parliament in 
legislation. Employment law requires a balancing of the interests of employers and 
employees, with proper regard not only to the individual dignity and worth of the employees 
but also the general economic interest. Subject to observance of fundamental human rights, 
the point at which this balance should be struck is a matter for democratic decision. The 
development of the common law by the judges plays a subsidiary role. Their traditional 
function is to adapt and modernise the common law. But such developments must be 
consistent with legislative policy as expressed in statutes. The courts may proceed in 
harmony with Parliament but there should be no discord.' 104 (emphasis added) 
This decision by the Law Lords would seem to have removed any hope that the 
common law claim may become a viable alternative to unfair dismissal, Collins 
unequivocally stating that: 
102 Anderman, S - (2000) The interpretation of protective employment statutes and contracts of 
employment; at page 225,226 
103 See appendix for a full consideration of this case 
104 [200l]IRLR 279 (HL); at paragraph 37 
155 
'Any hopes that the common law of wrongful dismissal might be adjusted to reflect modern 
perceptions of how employees should be treated fairly and with dignity must be thrown before 
the bonfire of innocent carcasses.' 105 
Whilst this is perhaps a little flamboyant, it does convey a sense of the frustration 
many feel with the reluctance of the judiciary to use the common law in a meaningful 
way, especially when the statute is perceived as employer-friendly. The decision in 
Johnson made certain that wrongful dismissal would be subordinate to unfair 
dismissal and that the common law would provide no 'second bite of the cherry' or 
indeed a remedy which would supplant unfair dismissal when the legislation was 
capable of providing recourse to a claim. 
3. 7.1 The law and economics justification for no overlap 
The judiciary do not want wrongful dismissal to overlap into unfair dismissal for very 
good reasons. 
Wrongful dismissal contains a much greater element of unpredictability than unfair 
dismissal. The unfair dismissal statute denotes how the balance between fairness and 
competitiveness should be drawn and provides guidance as to what standard the 
employer should be held to. The common law has no such framework and only has 
recourse to the contract of employment. To interpret this contract in any way but 
restrictively could lead to widespread confusion and uncertainty; the anathema of law. 
This potential unpredictability is clearly illustrated in the consideration of damages. 
Unfair dismissal has a cap and it is now established recovery is for direct financial 
loss, personal injury being excluded. Wrongful dismissal on the other hand, whilst 
105 Collins, H- (2001) Claim for Unfair Dismissal; at page 305 
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only compensating for financial loss in the notice period is susceptible for claims 
relating to injury before the dismissal and furthermore, confusion continues as to the 
correctness of the decision in Johnson, leading to a tenable sense of uncertainty. 
A narrow interpretation of the common law gives scope for increased width in the 
application of the statute, which brings with it a much greater element of 
predictability, particularly with reference to cost. 
An even more sustainable justification for keeping wrongful dismissal at bay is seen 
when we consider the increased procedural stringency which wrongful dismissal 
propagates. As Pitt notes: 
'The common law may be more expensive and procedurally complex than unfair dismissal 
claims.' 106 
The reason for this greater procedural burden is the application of natural justice 
principles. We have already noted above107 the way in which the judiciary have 
interpreted procedural fairness under the statute. Essentially they have ignored natural 
justice principles in favour of 'reasonable procedural standards' and this approach 
finds its rationale in efficiency: 
'The unwillingness to implement the principles of natural justice for disciplinary dismissals 
[so under the statute] seems to be grounded in efficiency considerations.' 108 
Claims under the common law are however susceptible to the principles of natural 
justice, which were summed up famously as: 
106 Pitt, G - ( 1989) Dismissal at Common law: The relevance in Britain of American developments; at 
page 41 
107 Chapter two 
108 Collins (1992); at page 121 
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'it is not merely of some importance but it is of fundamental importance that justice should 
not only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done.' 109 
Since the House of Lord's decision in Ridge v Baldwin110the judiciary have applied 
natural justice principles to wrongful dismissal cases. There has been much discussion 
about the applicability of natural justice and the role of public law in dismissals 111 but 
it would seem relatively safe to surmise the position which prevails as: 
'The courts have not been prepared to hold that a breach of natural justice can be overlooked 
if the decision is in substance fair, whereas industrial tribunals have been readier to accept the 
argument that procedural irregularity can be ignored if a dismissal is substantively fair.' 112 
(emphasis added) 
This position obviously needs to take into account the new s98A of the ERA 1996, 
which as discussed above113, lays down a basic procedure which if not adhered to will 
result in an automatic finding of unfair dismissal, yet as noted the requirements of this 
basic standard falls well short of a natural justice standard. Natural justice under the 
common law is a more stringent burden than procedural fairness under the statute and 
as a result is not as good for efficiency. We have already alluded to the fact that the 
judiciary in unfair dismissal minimised procedural fairness in the interests of 
efficiency and as a corollary of this we can see that natural justice, as a much more 
onerous burden, fetters the managerial prerogative substantially negatively impacting 
109 per Lord Heward R v Sussex Justices, ex parte McCarthy[ 1924] I KB 256; at 259 
110 [1964] AC 40 
111 See generally Fredman and Lee - (1987) Natural Justice for employees: The unacceptable face of 
proceduralism; Woolf, Sir Harry (1986)- Public Law- Private Law; Davies and Freedland- (1997) 
The impact of Public Law on Labour Law 1972-1997; Sedley, Sir Stephen - ( 1994) Public Law and 
Contractual employment; Laws, Sir John- (1997) Public Law and employment law: Abuse of power-
Public Law; Walsh, B - ( 1989) Judicial Review of dismissal from employment 
112 Stokes, M - ( 1985) Public law remedies for dismissal; at page 121 
113 Chapter 2.6 
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on efficiency. This point is well made by Ewing and Grubb in their sustained 
argument for increased justice via the common law: 
'It remains to be seen [in terms of the increase of using natural justice], whether the common 
law will follow its logical course, or whether the judges will conveniently take a wrong 
turning. It would, however, be manifestly unacceptable for the Court of Appeal to shelter 
behind the t1oodgates argument; the need for efficiency in the administration of the judicial 
system; and the availability of unfair dismissal as a justification for impatiently stamping on 
those developments. Yet although efficiency is desirable, so is justice [equity], something 
clearly not being provided by the statutory regime.' 114 
There is a clear distinction drawn between efficiency and equity, with the 
acknowledgement that the statute fails to deliver equity because of its focus towards 
efficiency. Thus, a rise in the use of the common law would result in potentially 
greater procedural justice but at the expense of efficiency. It would seem therefore 
that if the judiciary's mindset is towards efficiency then a law and economics analysis 
would evidence an attempt to minimise the role of anything which could hinder this; 
in the present situation this would be evidenced in the reduction of the scope of the 
common law because of its attitude to natural justice. This is of course what is seen. 
We can see that by keeping the wrongful dismissal remedy unattractive the judiciary 
can maintain unfair dismissal as the predominant avenue of claim, which as we have 
argued above is utilised in a way to favour efficiency for the economy. 
The third way in which law and economics suggests the rationale behind the judicial 
attitude of keeping wrongful dismissal as unfair dismissal's poor relation, is found in 
the effective allocation of resources argument. 
114 Ewing and Grubb (1987); at page 163 
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Law and economics suggests that effective allocation of resources is the way to 
achieve efficiency and therefore when deciding what decision to make, the most 
effective allocation of resources should always be considered. The unfair dismissal 
statute has always intended disputes to be resolved in the tribunals because they have 
been recognised from day one as being cheap, easily accessible and specialised in 
nature. The ordinary common law court bears none of theses qualities and, as Sir John 
Donaldson personally bears testament too, is subsequently disadvantaged115: 
'When I first read the Industrial Relations Bill containing the constitution of the NIRC[ now 
the EAT], I was astonished to find that this was the situation which was proposed [that of non-
legally qualified members having equal votes as the legally-qualified chairmen]. I thought it 
must be a mistake. In fairness to the members of the NIRC and of the EAT who were or are 
not legally qualified, I should like to make clear that after I began sitting with lay members to 
hear unfair dismissal and redundancy appeals I very soon found out that my initial reaction 
had been wholly mistaken. The field of industrial relations has its own very specialised 
'know-how' and this is something which, initially at least, is more familiar to Members of 
Parliament than to judges. Parliament, in legislating in the field of industrial relations, does so 
against the background of that 'know-how' and the words which it uses have to be interpreted 
in the light of that background. Upon more than one occasion I found that the industrial 
relations expertise of the lay members of the NIRC cast an entirely new light upon what must 
have been the intention of Parliament. At the end of my term as President of that Court, 
my regret was not that it was a mixed court of judges and industrial members, but that 
there was a right of appeal to the Court of Appeal which did not have similar 
advantages, albeit perhaps with the industrial members being in the minority." 16 (emphasis 
added) 
115 It is noted that in this context he was talking about the role of wingmen in the Court Appeal when 
considering an appeal from the EAT and therefore he is not directly talking about the common law. 
However the argument still holds up as it illustrates the inadequacies of the court when not operating in 
a tripartite wingmen format. 
116 Martin v MBS Fastenings [ 1983] IRLR 198; at paragraph 6 
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Clearly it can be seen that the judiciary had awareness that the tribunal system was the 
more appropriate for dealing with industrial relations problems 117, and as such it 
would seem an inefficient allocation of resources to encourage a remedy which is 
inferior. This line of argument can be buttressed when one considers other practical 
considerations. The English court system is already extremely busy; a further increase 
in case load could clog the system up. This could have negative implication as: 
'Delays might prompt employees to take industrial action with a consequent disruption of 
enterprise rather than await the lengthy procedures of courts to run their course' 118 
This increase in volume, as well as leading to potentially industrial disruption which 
is by itself bad for the economy, will also lead to increased cost for the State in 
maintaining the court system. It could also lead to increased cost for individuals and 
employers in terms of legal fees as unlike the tribunal system, legal representation 
will be much more important119• When considered in this way, pushing people 
towards bringing claims under the unfair dismissal legislation is much more efficient 
in resource use than the common law and it seems entirely logical and agreeable. The 
statute system has been set up to provide a quick avenue for remedy at a relatively 
cheap cost and with an understanding of 'industrial justice', as opposed to the 
common law which has over worked courts and no specialism. It makes no sense in 
terms of efficiency to work the civil courts harder whilst letting the tribunals go to 
fallow. It is not efficient for the State or the individual. 
117 See also Collins, H- (1981) Unfair Dismissal: Judicial Review of tribunal decisions in cases of 
unfair dismissal; at page 256- 'Parliament established industrial tribunals as bodies with special 
expertise in the field of employment, and these 'industrial juries' must be presumed to have a better 
grasp of the realities of industrial relations than the ordinary courts. 
118 ibid 
119 There is again a further issue in that legal aid becomes a factor when we consider the common law. 
This is obviously a very scarce resource and it would seem inefficient to allow people access to it, 
when another scheme provides access to justice without need for any legal representation at all due to 
its 'informality'. 
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When we consider these three justifications together it can be seen that a narrowing of 
wrongful dismissal by the judiciary results in: 
o The restriction of a more expensive remedy, which as is evidenced by history 
spectacularly failed and resulted in massive economic instability in the UK 
and the introduction of the unfair dismissal legislation. 
o An increased scope for unfair dismissal, which encourages greater certainty120 
and a resultant ability to quantify the cost of dismissal. 
As has already been seen through this article, the unfair dismissal legislation has been 
interpreted in a way which favours efficiency and therefore by the courts interpreting 
wrongful dismissal in a restrictive way they are able to control the exercise of 
efficiency in dismissal law by keeping unfair dismissal as the main remedy. In many 
senses it is a case of 'better the devil you know', than the potentially unruly beast you 
do not. 
It would seem therefore that the confusion surrounding why wrongful dismissal is 
such a narrow remedy and is treated as the subsidiary to unfair dismissal is cleared up 
when one considers law and economics as the analytical tool and the pursuit of 
efficiency as the overall goal. 
120 See Sir John Waite- (1986) Lawyers and Laymen as Judges in Industry; at page 40 
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Conclusion 
'Employment law requires a balancing of interests of employers and 
employees, with proper regard not only to the individual dignity and worth 
of the employees but also to the general economic interest. Subject to 
observance of fundamental human right, the point at which this balance 
should be struck is a matter for democratic decision. '1 
Through the course of this thesis it has been the contention that the balance is struck 
in favour of economic interests because of the benefits this brings to society on a 
macro scale. The balance is maintained by efficiency. It is true that the legislation 
which has brought about this state of affairs is as a result of democratic decision and 
has been the subject of much Parliamentary debate, yet the real force behind the move 
towards economic interests has come from judicial interpretation. They have 
exploited the ambiguity in the Statute and in some situations as we have seen, 
completely airbrushed other parts of it away2 in order to maintain a rationale of 
efficiency. This rationale has become apparent as a result of applying a law and 
economics analysis and goes some way to explaining how and why the judiciary have 
chosen to make the decisions they have despite the seeming unfairness it produces to 
some employees and in some cases employers. 
The law and economics theory provides an extremely consistent and coherent 
framework, something which has been lacking in the common understanding of the 
unfair dismissal legislation and ties up the main themes under one banner extremely 
successfully. 
1 Per Lord Hoffman- Johnson v Unisys Ltd [2001] IRLR 279; at para 37 
2 See chapter 2 and economic redundancy and the use of SOSR and chapter 3 and the rise of 
compensation 
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The question which seems most pertinent to address is, do the judiciary have an 
awareness that they are using law and economics theory in their decision making? 
There is no clear cut answer. The reason for this ambivalence is that the language in 
the cases sometimes evidences awareness and sometimes does not and to further 
complicate matters some cases hint at acknowledgement of law and economics, yet do 
not expressly say so. 
For example, one cannot read the judgement in O'hare and Rutherford v 
Rotaprint3and not be convinced of a judicial acceptance of law and economics theory. 
The whole tenor of the judgement can be summed up in the following statement: 
'it would be disastrous to the national economy if employers were to be inhibited from taking 
justifiable risks in planning increased production, and taking on increased labour, with high 
hopes of fuller employment, by the thought they may be saddles with claims for redundancy 
payments if they have to cut down on the wok force because their hopes have not been 
fulfilled. ' 4 
As can be seen, this is in harmony with a law and economics theory; economic 
stability through long term efficiency. A similar judicial attitude is expressed by Lord 
Denning in both Chapman v Goonvean China Cla/and Lesney Products v 
Nolan, 6where he states: 
'It is very desirable, in the interests of efficiency, that employers should be able to propose 
changes in terms of a man's employment for reasons such as these: so as to get rid of 
3 [1980] IRLREAT47 
4 ibid para 9 
5 [1973] ICR 310 
6 [ 1977] IRLR 77 - see chapter two for more on this case 
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restrictive practices: or to induce higher output by pieceworker: or to cease to provide free 
transport at excessive cost' 7 
'An employee is entitled to reorganise his business so as to improve its efficiency.' 8 
Mr Abernethy9 found to his cost that efficiency is a factor in the minds of the 
judiciary when his claim of unfair dismissal failed. The Court of Appeal held that 'an 
employee's inflexibility and lack of adaptability come under the definition of 
capability and that the employee's unwillingness to work other than from head office 
'related to his capability.'' 10 The judge's attitude was very reminiscent of law and 
economics as seen in the way they showed contempt for the lack of flexibility on 
behalf of the employee: 
'The Industrial Relations Act [now ERA 1996]is not intended to protect the unambitious from 
dismissal.' 11 
In many ways this phrase is symptomatic of the judiciary's attitude; the legislation 
will be interpreted to aid efficiency not hinder it. When these cases are considered12 it 
would seem to buttress the suggestion that the judiciary are aware of law and 
economics and are intentionally applying its principles. However these cases are but a 
small sample of a very large number of decisions on unfair dismissal and so we 
cannot confidently draw that conclusion immediately. 
7 Chapman; ibid 
8 Lesney Products; ibid 
9 Abernethy v Mott, Hay and Anderson [1974] IRLR 213 
10 ibid; at page 213 
11 ibid; at page 213 
12 For other comments on efficiency seeRS Components v R E Irwin [1973] IRLR 239; Safeway 
Stores v Burrell[ 1997] IRLR 200; N C Watling v Richardson [ 1978] IRLR 255 
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In one of the most recent seminal cases 13, the Court of Appeal gave a thorough and 
detailed judgement as to the correct interpretation of the band of reasonable responses 
test; what is notable is the complete absence of any mention of efficiency or economic 
considerations. Does this blow the contention that the judiciary have knowledge out 
of the water? It would seem premature to draw this conclusion, yes it is true that this 
case and others evidence little acknowledgement of efficiency considerations. But 
what they often do is acknowledge the role of other factors which are causally linked 
to efficiency. For example in Madden the court noted the dismissal was justified by 
the employer's belief in guilt and the subsequent destruction of trust and confidence 
in the relationship. The rationale behind this is no trust and confidence means 
impaired efficiency as the jobs the employee can do are significantly reduced 14• So 
efficiency considerations are really pulling the strings, it is simply that break down of 
trust and confidence is the expressed logic. Just because the courts do not explicitly 
acknowledge efficiency does not mean it is not hiding in the shadows. This in many 
ways sums up the situation regarding the applicability of law and economics to 
dismissal law. Efficiency considerations are there and can be evidenced, it is just 
often necessary to be pointed in the right direction as they are not always immediately 
apparent. This has been seen throughout this thesis with reference to cases like Pays v 
Lancashire Probation Service15, Saunders v Scottish National Camps16and Haddon v 
van den Berghfoods17. 
It is often necessary to look hard because at a first glance it would seem that 
managerial prerogative, BORRT, SOSR or freedom of contract are the suggested 
13 Post Office v Foley; HSBC v Madden [2000] IRLR 827- see chapter two for details 
14 See chapter three 
15 See chapter one 
16 chapter two 
17 chapter two 
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rationale and justification behind the judiciary's decision and mindset. But as we have 
contended through this work all these rationales are fundamentally masks or vehicles 
of law and economics. BORRT gives the discretion to the judiciary to propagate 
efficiency without ever having to justify why. Similarly SOSR has been developed by 
the judiciary to interfere with the statute when it is in the interests of efficiency and 
freedom of contract finds its roots in law and economics and the supposed efficiency 
the free market brings. The managerial prerogative exists precisely because a 
manger's prerogative is to act in a way which serves the purpose of his business the 
best; that of optimum efficiency and therefore greater profitability. Managerial 
prerogative is merely a mask which hides law and economics considerations and it is 
only through reference to law and economics lenses that we can clearly see the whole 
picture and establish a consistent framework. 
The managerial prerogative is presented as the face of law and economics and the 
justification behind the judiciary's decisions primarily, it is suggested, because it is 
more politically acceptable. It is not an attractive proposition to think of individual's 
rights being traded for the good of the economy, which is the essence of law and 
economics. No Government wants to be seen as particularly pro-individual or pro-
employer, they do not want to alienate either side and want to encourage a balance 
between fairness and competitiveness so that the economy might flourish and 
employment might be at equilibrium. The managerial prerogative in conjunction with 
one of the vehicles is sufficiently mysterious enough to insulate the Government from 
any association of trading rights or actively seeking efficiency over equity. The 
judiciary also benefit from this mysterious formulation because it gives them much 
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greater scope to use their discretion to act in a way which facilitates efficiency 
without being bound by inflexible principles and precedents. 
Drawing this together and accepting that law and economics is the controlling factor 
and rationale behind the judiciary and government's approach to dismissal means we 
have a much more certain framework from which reform can be suggested. As a 
result of this analysis it would seem that any reform will need to take account of law 
and economics principles as the courts are not willing to give them up and have 
steadfastly ignored any reform suggestions which do not fit in with law and 
economics theory. This is perhaps best evidenced in the way that there has been a 
massive shift towards the use of arbitration 18 whilst a complete silence and diffidence 
to any reform over the weakness of the remedy of reinstatement. 
Arbitration is rooted in law and economics principles; at its foundation is negotiation 
which mirrors in many ways the free market as two parties bargain for a solution 
acceptable to both. Whereas suggestions for reform in reinstatement, as noted in 
chapter three, have not even remotely been considered as serious reforms. 19 It is 
suggested that we can understand this by reference to its complete disregard for law 
and economic principles. If, as suggested, employees who are dismissed stay in their 
jobs until the case comes before the tribunal the impact on the economy could be 
potentially catastrophic. There would be little incentive for employers to take on new 
staff or fire any staff due to the costs and potential risks and as such the economy 
18 See for more on this Clark, J- ( 1999) Adversarial and Investigative approaches to the arbitral 
resolution of dismissal disputes. A comparison of South Africa and the UK; Edwards, P- (1998) 
Anticipating new roles for third parties 
19 The Courts have not mentioned them and there has been no white paper mention, which considering 
the comprehensive nature of Fairness at Work (1998) would surely have been expected had they had 
any serious and workable potential. 
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would stagnate, with no new job creation and no increased efficiency. When viewed 
through law and economic principles it seems clear why the judiciary have embraced 
arbitration but shunned improved re-employment. 
Law and economics seems to provide coherence to unfair dismissal. It does not solve 
any of the problems over the potential unfairness of BORRT or the lack of substantive 
justice applied under the statute. It does not solve the problem of the lack of re-
employment or for that matter the derisory compensation. It also does not reconcile 
unfair dismissal and wrongful dismissal into two harmonious doctrines. What it does 
do however is help us understand why we have the current situation that we do. It 
informs us of what aims and influences are prevalent in the judiciary's mind and from 
this we can have a much fuller knowledge of how and why the dismissal legislation 
operates in the way that it does. This can only serve to help reform suggestions 
become practical and workable and to bring increased certainty through a reference 
framework. 
The role of law and economics has a long way to travel before it accepted as a 
mainstream doctrine in the United Kingdom. However, when applying it to unfair 
dismissal law it brings fresh insight, certainty and coherency and it is hoped will 
continue to aid the discussion over the correct role and interpretation of unfair 
dismissal. 
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Appendix 
1.1 Corrective Justice and Deterrent Justice: What does the compensation provide? 
If we construe constructive justice in its narrowest form then we can see that the 
judiciary's approach to compensation fits this form; corrective justice seeks to remedy 
the quantifiable loss sustained and financial loss will always be the main part of any 
dismissal, thus corrective justice occurs. This idea of a narrow corrective justice is 
also evidenced when reference is made to the duty on dismissed employees to act in 
order to mitigate their loss, as the compensatory award reflects this and will decrease 
if the individual finds another job straight away. 1 
Lord Hoffman suggested in the fairly recent case of Johnston v Unisyithat the 
approach the National Industrial Relations Coure took in the early days, of only 
compensating for financial loss, was: 
'too narrow a construction. The emphasis is upon the tribunal awarding such compensation as 
it thinks just and equitable. So I see no reason why in an appropriate case it should not include 
compensation for distress, humiliation, damage to reputation in the community or family 
life. '4 
This statement was highly influential corning from the House of Lords and it seemed 
that perhaps corrective justice might now to be construed to encompass all problems 
caused by the dismissal, not simply the direct financial ones. This however has not 
1 s.l23(4) ERA 1996 
2 [2001] IRLR 279 (HL) 
3 Nowthe EAT 
4 ibid paragraph 55 
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proved to be the case, with two subsequent House of Lords cases5 noting the confused 
reasoning of the Law Lords in Johnson and saying that the legislation does not allow 
for recovery of non-economic loss. The main rebuttal came in Dunnachie where it 
was held that Lord Hoffman's remarks were obitel and therefore were not binding in 
effect. Lord Steyn gave the leading judgement and turning to the wording of the 
statute, he took the view that the word 'loss' in s.123 must be given its ordinary 
meaning, which in his opinion was only economic loss7. He was persuaded in part by 
the fact that up until Johnson there had been no real dissent from this position and 
there was only one academic criticism8, which Lord Steyn did not find convincing.9 
The result of Dunnachie is to leave the law surrounding the position of compensation 
and its formulation, in precisely the same situation as it has been since 1972; the 
House of Lords in Dunnachie maintaining that it was Parliaments intent to only 
compensate for financialloss. 10 
Deterrent justice it would seem has never been an aim of the judiciary; we can state 
this so baldly precisely because of what was said in Norton Tools and Clarkson, 
namely that 'compensation was not intended to express any disapproval of an 
employers industrial relations policy'. Deterrent justice is in essence one of punitive 
damages which are intended to change an employers approach, but if no disapproval 
is intoned then: 
5 Dunnachie v Kingston-upon-Hull City Council [2004] IRLR 727; Eastwood and another v Magnox 
Electric; McCabe v Cornwall County Council and others [2004] IRLR 733 
6 Lord Steyn makes mention that Lord Hoffman's language was not the language a Law Lord would 
use if he was seeking to overturn an established principle- at paragraph 12 - Lord Hoffman who was 
also involved in the case agrees entirely with the speech of Lord Steyn, which is indicative that 
compensation for economic loss is the only tenable position according to the law lords. 
7 See paragraphs 17-22 
8 Collins (1991) 
9 ibid paragraph 27 - Sedley LJ had taken a position similar to that of Collins in this case when it was 
before the Court of Appeal saying the current position 'leaves the governing concept- compensation 
which is just and equitable- without a role' (paragraph 24) 
10 See paragraph 21 
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'The compensatory award possesses an autonomy and neutral character which may not 
sufficiently serve broader purposes of deterrence and industrial order.' 11 
Collins argues that deterrent justice was the concept intended by Parliament when it 
included the reference to employer fault in principle of calculating compensation 12, 
this would seem to have some credibility because one of the aims of the legislation 
was to encourage employers to reform their internal procedures. However, the 
approach of the judiciary and the presence of the statutory cap on unfair dismissal 
awards would seem to undermine this rationale and therefore we cannot see any 
evidence for deterrent justice being an influential concept in the construction of the 
compensatory award. 
2.1 Contractual principles in wrongful dismissal 
Before the advent of the unfair dismissal legislation the employment relationship was 
treated as a contract and as such was controlled by contractual principles. Therefore, 
in the common law the Courts were very reluctant to 'order specific performance of 
any contract for personal services' .13 This approach is clearly seen in the words of 
Lord Justice Fry: 
'I should be very unwillingly to extend decisions the effect of which is to compel persons who 
are not desirous of maintaining continuous personal relations with one another to continue 
those personal relations.' 14 
11 Hough and Spowart-Taylor (1996); at page 309 
12 Section 123 of ERA 1996 
13 G de N Clark ( 1969); at page 532 
14 [ 1890] 45 Ch.D. 430; at page 438 
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Whilst this case occurred before the turn of the 201h Century, it remained indicative of 
the courts approach15 up until the unfair dismissal legislation was created, bringing 
with it a statutory right for, what is in essence specific performance of an employment 
contract. However, despite this introduction there was still much judicial wariness of 
imposing the specific performance of a contract against the will of an employer. This 
was recognised by the Donovan Commission and was responsible for the move away 
from re-employment as a remedy, Kahn-Freund a member of the Commission noted 
afterwards: 
'A contract of employment can not be specifically enforced against either side because equity 
does nothing in vain and also because an order for specific performance against the worker 
would savour of compulsory labour, and the rule of mutuality demands that if no such order 
can be made against the employee it cannot be made against the employer either.' 16 
Dickens calls the reluctance of the judiciary to order re-employment 'a hangover from 
the traditional approach' 17 and goes onto insightfully say: 
'The ghost of the common law still haunts judicial thinking about unfair dismissal and yet the 
basis on which the traditional refusal to order specific perfom1ance rests is a shaky one in 
respect of an employment contract. The personal nature of the contract and the equality of 
position as between the two parties which the common law presumes are clearly at odds with 
the real nature of a contract of employment and the realities of the employment relationship.' 18 
Whilst there is certainly more than a kernel of truth in this, the important part from 
our perspective is the recognition that specific performance of contract is not 
something the judiciary are comfortable with. 
15 See Carty ( 1989); at page 450 
16 Kahn-Freund, 0- (1974) Uses and misuses of comparative law 
17 Dickens et al ( 1981 ); at page 170 
18 Ibid 
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2.2 Johnson and the role of the common law 
Much ink has been spilt over Johnson with most academics finding some part of the 
confused judgement to take issue or agree with. But before we get to what was said, it 
is pertinent to give a brief overview of the facts and issues surrounding the case. Mr 
Johnson was summarily dismissed for some alleged irregularity, he complained to an 
employment tribunal of unfair dismissal and the tribunal upheld his claim. They found 
that the company had not followed their own disciplinary procedure; he was awarded 
the maximum compensation, reduced by 25% on the grounds of his contributory fault. 
His total award was just under £11,700. Two years later he commenced an action 
against the company in the county court for damages at common law, claiming breach 
of contract or negligence. He claimed his dismissal was in breach of various implied 
terms of his contract of employment, including the implied term of trust and 
confidence. He claimed that the manner of his dismissal caused him to suffer a mental 
breakdown, leading to periods in a mental hospital and as a result he would not be 
able to find another job. As such he claimed damages of £400,000 to compensate for 
his loss of earnings. 
The potential pitfall with Mr Johnson's claim was that the Courts have until recently, 
steadfastly resisted from opening up the common law to attack for damages under any 
head of liability other than direct financial loss for the period of notice and this can 
clearly be seen in the classic case of Addis v Gramaphone Co Ltd19• In that instance, 
the judiciary in their desire to compensate for the actual loss of Mr Addis only 
allowed him to recover damages for the salary for his six month notice period and 
reasonable commission for this period. They refused to compensate him for the 
19 [1909] AC 488 
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humiliating manner of the dismissal or the problems he may have in finding future 
work as a result. This approach persisted20 until the recent case of Malik v BCCI 21 
indicated that there was a chink in the refusal to award anything but direct 
quantifiable financial loss. The case involved a claim by ex-employees of the bank 
whose reputations had been tarnished due to their relationship with the bank whilst 
the bank had been behaving fraudulently. The employees claimed damages for injury 
to reputation and future loss of earnings22 and the House of Lords sidestepped Addis 
to award them. They reasoned that the compensation was for the breach by BCCI of 
trust and confidence and that this was now of principle importance in employment 
law, whereas it had not been in existence in Addis therefore the case could be 
distinguished. Whilst this may be evidence of the judiciary being pro-employee and 
exercising a considerable amount of enterprise in order to deliver justice, it also 
created a huge amount of confusion, as it seemed to open up an entirely new channel 
for obtaining substantial damages. The first thing that perhaps needs to be said when 
looking at the judgement is that Johnson is the 'paradigm hard case' 23 . There was a 
great deal of sympathy amongst the judiciary for Mr Johnson and the inadequacy of 
the damages under unfair dismissal and whilst they ruled by majority 4: 1 against Mr 
Johnson, one can detect in their language that they in some ways felt their hands were 
20 Gun ton v Richmond-upon-Thames London Borough Council [ 1980] ICR 755- The case also 
continues to use the language of master and servant, perhaps indicative that the judiciary mindset has 
not really changed. 
21 [ 1997] IRLR 462 HL 
22 They were unable to bring a case under the statute because they had not been dismissed, however the 
damages they sought were far in excess of the statutory cap so it is unlikely they would have had 
recourse to this even if they could - it is worth noting that when the case was finally brought it failed 
for lack of causation. 
23 Barmes, L - (2004) The continuing conceptual crisis in the common law of the contract of 
employment; at page 444 
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tied24. The principal reason given for striking out this common law claim was that it 
would conflict with the statutory claim for unfair dismissal: 
'A common law right embracing the manner in which an employee is dismissed cannot 
satisfactorily coexist with the statutory right not to be unfairly dismissed. A newly developed 
common law right of this nature, covering the same ground as the statutory right, would fly in 
the face of the limits Parliament has already prescribed on matters such as the classes of 
employees who have the benefit of the statutory right, the amount of compensation payable 
and the short time limits for making claims. It would also defeat the intention of Parliament 
that claims of this nature should be decided by specialist tribunals not the ordinary courts of 
Barmes however finds this justification for keeping the common law narrow 
unconvincing. She quotes Lord Hoffman26 and adds thought provoking comment: 
''For the judiciary to construct a general common law remedy for unfair circumstances 
attending dismissal would be to go contrary to the evident intention of Parliament that there 
should be such a remedy but that it should be limited in application and extent.' In taking this 
step Lord Hoffman and the other judges in the majority entered the fraught territory of 
divining parliamentary intention from legislative intention over time. It is not premature, 
however, to observe that working out what Parliament intended for related aspects of 
employment regulation from anyone legislative intervention is notoriously problematic. The 
extraordinary difficulty of discerning any over-arching plan or meaning behind even the 
simplest measure is one of the main reasons is such a fertile field of scholarship. The prolixity 
of Parliament, the number of actors who exert an influence on the law and the frequency of 
significant unintended effects, all mean it is not uncommon for the policy objectives 
underpinning even the same set of laws to shift and alter over time, sometimes with dizzying 
speed, while simultaneously being internally contradictory.27 
24 1t is for this reason perhaps that the judgement appears confused and has seemingly left the door 
open to challenge, particularly with regard to recovery of non-economic loss. See chapter 3 for more. 
2 ibid at para 2 
26 At para 58 
27 Barmes (2004); at page 445 
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Whilst there is certainly an element of truth in this statement, it is based on the 
rationale that the judiciary should not interfere when it might be against Parliaments 
intention. However, if we go deeper than this and suggest that the judiciary by not 
interfering can perpetuate efficiency, it becomes less of an issue actually 'divining the 
intent of Parliament' because the judiciary are focused on the goal of efficiency. This 
suggestion will, it is hoped, become more evident below. 
We can sum up the ratio of the case in Lord Hoffman's words: 
'[T}he action for wrongful dismissal could ... yield no more than the salary which should have 
been paid during the contractual notice. '28 
2.3 Advantages and disadvantages of Wrongful Dismissal 
The question that most obviously springs to mind, bearing in mind the narrowness of 
wrongful dismissal, is why would anyone want to claim wrongful dismissal and not 
unfair dismissal? 
One of the major advantages of bringing an action through the common law is that it 
circumvents the qualifying conditions which the statute imposes29 . If the dismissed 
employee does not have the requisite qualifying period for example, they have no 
recourse to statute but they do have the ability to bring a claim under the head of 
wrongful dismissal providing they have a contract of employment. Equally, if the 
employee is on a fixed term contract, they can bring a claim in the common law for 
the full amount outstanding on the contract. This can certainly be advantageous 
28 ibid at paragraph 41 
29 See chapter 1 for a synopsis of these conditions 
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financially as the award may be larger than the full capped amount under the statutory 
scheme. This benefit also applies to employees who are on a high salary or long 
contractual notice period. Another potential advantage of the common law, which 
may influence dismissed employees, is the greater importance given to procedural 
rights30. It will be recalled that the judiciary have subverted the demands of 
procedural fairness under the dismissal to include the band of reasonable responses 
test, which has led to efficiency being a major consideration in the correct standard of 
fairness to be applied. In the common law there is no flexibility; the standard is 
natural justice. Lord Wilberforce31 , when considering the applicability of natural 
justice principles in a common law action, 32 asked: 
'How could any responsible body of men reach a fair decision without hearing him [the 
dismissed employee]?' 33 
Lord Wilberforce refused to assume as inevitable that there are relationships in which 
all the requirements of the observance of the rules of natural justice are excluded.34 
Bearing this in mind, a dismissed employer may feel he is more likely to succeed in 
his claim if the court judges the dismissal against a background of natural justice and 
not the judicially created procedural fairness that pervades through the statutory 
scheme. 
We established above that as a result of Johnson, under the common law the 
employee can only receive damages for direct financial loss which is quantifiable 
under the contract of employment. As was noted, this significantly reduced the scope 
30 See Carty ( 1989); at page 452-454 
31 Malloch v Aberdeen Corporation [ 1971] 2 All E.R 1278 
32 This case occurred before the unfair dismissal legislation had come into effect- but still evidences 
the procedural burden upon employers in wrongful dismissal cases 
33 ibid at page 1295 
34 Carty ( 1989); at page 454 
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of wrongful dismissal and put the focus firmly on using the statute to remedy 
dismissal. However another recent House of Lords case has slightly muddied the 
water again and given some fresh hope to the role of the common law. 
In the joined cases of Eastwood and another v Magnox Electric pic; McCabe v 
Cornwall County Council and others35the Law Lords held 'in cases where psychiatric 
injury is alleged to have been caused by acts of the employer committed prior to, and 
separately from the act of dismissal itself, a cause of action will exist at common law 
for damages in respect of breaches of the implied terms of mutual trust and 
confidence or to take reasonable care for employee's safety, and/or negligence.' 36 The 
House reasoned that: 
'If before his dismissal an employee has acquired a cause of action at law, for breach of 
contract or otherwise, that cause of action remains unimpaired by the subsequent dismissal 
and the statutory rights flowing therefrom [sic]. By definition, in law such a cause of actions 
exists independently of the dismissal. The majority decision of the House of Lords in Johnson 
v Unisys Ltd established a line of demarcation between events leading up to the dismissal, in 
respect of which the implied term of trust and confidence applies and a claim at common law 
may be made, and the dismissal itself, actual or constructive, to which implied contractual 
obligation to act fairly does not apply and an employee's remedy for unfair dismissal is that 
provided by the Employment Rights Act. .37 
The House distinguished injury caused before the dismissal in order to try and get 
round Johnson, employing some judicial creativity when holding: 
'Ordinarily, an employer's failure to act fairly in the steps leading to dismissal does not of 
itself cause the employee financial loss. The loss arises when the employee is dismissed, it 
35 [2004] IRLR 733 
36 See Case note in IRLB 745; at page 12 
37 ibid at page 733 
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arises by reason of his dismissal and the resultant claim for loss falls squarely within the 
exclusion area defined by Johnson v Unisys Ltd. Exceptionally, however, financial loss may 
flow directly from the employer's failure to act fairly when taking steps leading to dismissal. 
Financial loss flowing from suspension is one instance. Another instance is when an 
employee suffers financial loss from psychiatric or other illness caused by his pre-
dismissal unfair treatment. ' 38 (emphasis added) 
The jump from financial loss for suspension to psychiatric illness is one which cannot 
be easily made, but in order to do justice for the claimants it was one the House were 
willing to take. It is clear from the language in the case that the court were very 
unhappy at the way Johnson had restricted their ability to act. This is because it can 
be read from Johnson that they decided to only compensate for direct financial loss in 
part because they felt the statutory scheme was capable of providing appropriate 
remedy for injury. This was subsequently held to not be the case in Dunnachie39 and 
as such it would seem that the effect of Johnson is to completely remove 
compensation for injury from either of the two remedies. The Law Lords in Eastwood 
thought this was unacceptable and as well as saying that Johnson should be re-visited 
they sought to offer a new way to obtain a remedy, hence this pre-dismissal injury 
distinction. It is worthy of note however, that the judges agreed with the Johnson 
approach with regard to the common law being subsidiary to the statute and not 
impinging on its territory.40 The decision to award a remedy in Eastwood has come 
with strings attached, as noted by the judges themselves: 
'The existence of a boundary line also means that an employer may be better off dismissing an 
employee than suspending him since a claim for unfair dismissal would be subject to a 
statutory cap, but a common law claim for compensation would not. Likewise, the decision in 
38 ibid 
39 See chapter 3 
40 See page 734 
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Johnson means that an employee who is psychologically vulnerable is owed no duty of care in 
respect of his dismissal but may be owed a duty of care in respect of suspension' 41 
The outworking of this decision could well be to see an even smaller role for the 
common law if employers decide to dismiss early and take the quantifiable cost of 
unfair dismissal, something that is obviously a factor. 
Of course, wrongful dismissal also has several disadvantages compared to unfair 
dismissal. As has been commented, if no injury occurs prior to the dismissal the 
dismissed employee will only be able to recover his salary for his contractual notice 
period42. Further to this, there is no ability to get specific performance, i.e. no chance 
for re-employment unlike under an unfair dismissal remedy. Wrongful dismissal also 
does not give the claimant access to specialised tribunals, which have layman with 
experience of industrial justice. For a statt as Collins points out: 
'The simple characterisation of employment as a contract fails to grasp the nature of the social 
relations involved. ' 43 
If the judge hearing the case has no experience in industry, there is a greater 
likelihood that they will not be able to fully grasp the complexities of the relations 
involved44. This was acknowledged astutely by May U: 
'Employment disputes not infrequently have political or ideological overtones, or raise what 
are often referred to as 'matters of principle'; these are generally best considered not by the 
divisional court but by an industrial tribunal to the members of which, both lay and 
41 ibid 
42 Which it is unlikely he will have had any bargaining power over 
43 Collins, H- ( 1986) Market Power, Bureaucratic Power, and the Contract of Employment; at page 3 
44 See Clarke and Weddderburn- (1983) Modern Labour Law: Problems, Functions, and Policies at 
page 166-167 in Labour Law and Industrial Relations: Building on Kahn-Freund eds Clark, Lewis and 
Lord Wedderbun; for a great comment on the judiciary and the fact that they are the product of class 
and therefore unable to identify with industrial relations. 
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legally qualified, such overtones or matters of principle are common currency.' 45 
(emphasis added) 
This viewpoint is also shared by members of the judiciary who have been involved 
with the tribunals, Sir John Waite remarking: 
'It would be impossible to do full justice in an appellate court, even to the most refined 
questions of employment law, without the wisdom, humour and experience introduced by the 
lay mind. ' 46 
Whilst this enthusiasm must be tempered by the knowledge that these judges are not 
wholly objective due to their roles on the EAT, it does illustrate some of the rhetoric 
which suggests industrial justice may not be something the judiciary are automatically 
familiar with, which could inhibit justice being done in a claim brought under the 
common law. 
45 R v East Berkshire Health Authority ex parte Walsh [1984] IRLR 278; at paragraph 38 (CA) 
4~ aite (2986); at page 32 -see also the article by the now Lord Browne-Wilkinson - (1982) The role 
of the EAT; at page 76 
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